This would be a good deal, first and foremost, if our legal victories from the last four years were preserved. The last four years have to count for something. We can't have the legal victories we've had, and we can't have spent the last four years doing what we've done to have it mean nothing.
Seven years from now--make no mistake--there'll be Lumber V. And to think that we're going to start Lumber V exactly where we started Lumber IV, after taking the threat of injury case all the way to the ECC and getting a NAFTA decision that says we're not subsidized. The ECC was suspended, but we know what the outcome would have been from that. So that's critical.
Making sure we get our money back before we start paying the new penalties from the new agreement is critical, to ensure that we don't have a period where we're being hit three times.
We need flexibility to manage our quotas from month to month, to ensure that we serve our customers. We have obligations and commitments. When you look at a hard cap under option B, we need to make sure we work out that complexity.
On provincial exits, when we started this agreement--and Mr. Grenier spoke about it in his comments--we said we would agree to a settlement that provided exits to durable, unencumbered free trade. This agreement now has reduced provincial exits to nothing more than faith and hope. In other words, good luck, have a nice time, but not likely.
What would make it a good agreement? The bottom line is, just give us the details so we know. One CEO said that the framework has the potential of being a good agreement, but we don't know yet. From what we've seen in the legal text from the U.S. side that was sent out on Friday, the language is pretty stiff. Compromise in a settlement shouldn't mean punishment and guilt. I can tell you right now that the U.S. legal text we're looking at seems a lot like punishment and guilt, and not compromise and settlement.