Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To add to what Tony said, once you've got the estimate of the trade flow, there's the question of the estimate of the trade barrier with goods. It's typically a tariff, but it can also be a non-tariff barrier. For goods, we typically have fairly good tariff-equivalent measures of the barrier, but when we get into services and investment, then we have very poor-quality information on the barriers to services trade or to investment flows, so you need both the measure of the trade flow and the measure of the barrier.
Further, you need to know to what extent the trade negotiation will lower that barrier. Again, with tariffs it's clear, but with non-tariff measures, if you change an administrative measure that affects imports, for example, into a country with which we're negotiating, we then have to be able to translate that change in the administrative measure into a price--a tax--and that involves a fair amount of judgment, so there are limitations to our ability to give precise answers to the question of what services trade liberalization and also investment trade liberalization would imply.
With investment, and with services as well, there's a further complication in that you can do international commerce either across the border, which is what trade models measure, or you can do it by establishing a commercial presence in the foreign country. Insofar as in the presence of tariff barriers a country, Canada, may have invested abroad in order to produce in that market for that market, when you lower the tariff, perhaps the Canadian company might choose to export directly, so investment might fall and trade might increase, or vice versa. Because of the substitutability of trade foreign investment, they become complex issues for modelling how companies would actually react when both trade and investment barriers are being lowered. That is, again, a further level of complication.
The fourth level of complication involves translating trade games into what policy-makers really want to know: what the impact will be on Canadian GDP, on Canadian jobs, on Canadian welfare--the economic benefits. There we need to track the trade flows back into the economy. This is done through input-output tables, which track the impact on demand when a Canadian company exports. If we export a car, what's the impact on demand for steel, on jobs, etc.? There again we get into a considerably higher level of complication. As you can see, we have more confidence in estimating trade flows directly, but then we get into a lot more assumptions in terms of trying to estimate the ultimate benefit to the Canadian economy in terms of jobs and GDP.
That is one of the main functions of my division. We do our best. We believe we can provide estimates, a range of estimates; we would consider these not as a final answer on what the impact of a trade agreement might be, but rather as an invitation to discussion and debate to inform further policy considerations.