I have just two quick points on the issue of NTBs, or non-tariff barriers.
My view on NTBs is that this is a tremendous opportunity for negotiators to shine a light on these NTBs and to include them in the negotiations, and hopefully to address them through successful conclusion of a deal. But in order to do that, we have to know what the NTBs are.
I think the onus is on the industries in Canada who feel that there are some serious non-tariff barriers in Korea to spell out in as much detail as possible the nature of these problems so that we can shine a light on them, embarrass the Koreans perhaps, but more importantly, put to our negotiators the proposition that these may be very serious issues that can be dealt with through negotiations and see if they can be dealt with in that fashion. It is not, however, to simply assert that the NTBs, in some kind of vague, scary way, without any possibility of verification...using it more as a stumbling block to the agreement than an opportunity to address those problems.
The second point I would make, of course, is that the Americans, in their concluded negotiations, not ratified, have apparently addressed some of these NTB issues. They have established a working group with the Koreans. They have outlined a number of areas in which the Koreans have committed to address non-tariff barriers in the auto and auto parts sector.
We have to ask ourselves, how did the Americans do that? Should we not be aiming for the same conclusions?
The Americans also, I would say, have negotiated a very interesting snap-back arrangement where, if there is a determination through the dispute settlement mechanism that the Koreans violated their commitment to deal with NTBs, the tariffs in the U.S. would snap back to the MFN rates in an automatic fashion.
Again, what I am trying to say here is let's think about NTBs not as the reason to end negotiations but the reason to continue negotiating.