Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed we did come prepared with a statement. It was going to run about ten minutes. I'll try to abbreviate it to keep it to within five minutes.
I'll dispense with the introductions. The team can be introduced as called upon to answer questions.
I do appreciate this opportunity to come again before the committee to provide an update on the Canada-Korea FTA negotiations, following my appearance in June of last year.
On Tuesday Minister Emerson spoke before this committee to the importance of our bilateral FTA agenda and the steps we were taking on this front. He stressed, in particular, the aggressive bilateral activity of our competitors and the need for Canada to maintain a level playing field. Nowhere is this more clear than in the case of South Korea, a point that was implicitly acknowledged by the Standing Committee on International Trade when it recommended in April of this year that the government should, among other things, complete the FTA negotiations with South Korea.
Indeed, South Korea has already implemented FTAs with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, and the countries of ASEAN. In June this year the United States and Korea signed their bilateral FTA known as KORUS. The agreement is politically controversial in both countries, but most observers believe that it will be ratified, given its importance in each country.
Meanwhile, Korea is in the advanced stages of negotiating an FTA with the European Union, Korea's second-largest trading partner after China. There are indications that this could wrap up early in 2008.
Korea is also negotiating FTAs with Mexico and India. It may soon revive its talks with Japan and China, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and others waiting in the wings.
Clearly, if Canada were not also pursuing an FTA with Korea, we would be running the risk of Canadian companies finding themselves, over time, at a greater and greater competitive disadvantage in this market.
Consequently, Mr. Chair, we are trying to reach an exhaustive, high-quality free trade agreement with Korea that is ideally of a scope similar to that reached between Korea and the United States, that is to say Korus.
The purpose of this initiative is essentially to maintain and reinforce opportunities for Canadian businesses to face the competition on an equal footing in one of the most dynamic markets in the world. Korea has a socially upwardly mobile population of nearly 50 million inhabitants and an economy in the order of $1 billion. Not only does Korea rank second among the most prosperous economies, it is also strategically located among the regions experiencing the strongest economic growth in the world.
Korea is already Canada’s seventh largest trading partner. Canada exports $3.3 billion worth of goods to Korea every year, more than all Canadian exports to Brazil and India together.
Korea is also becoming a big market for Canada's service sector, which exported more than $650 million worth of services in 2005. In addition, bilateral investment between the two countries now exceeds $1.1 billion.
An FTA with Korea could generate much more two-way business by dismantling the tariff, regulatory, and other barriers to commerce that limit opportunities. Preliminary macroeconomic modelling results, which are available on our website, indicate that on the basis of tariff elimination alone, our exports to Korea could have been nearly 60% higher in 2005--the reference year of the study--and that our GDP could have been $1.6 billion larger the same year, had we had an FTA in place. The reason is that Korea maintains relatively high tariffs--13% on average versus about 4% for us. The elimination of tariffs in an FTA would therefore generate substantial opportunities for Canada.
The Korean market is particularly important for the agricultural and resource-based segments of our economy, with FTA gains expected in areas like agrifood, fisheries, metals and metal products, a wide range of forestry and wood products, coal, and other minerals.
We also expect gains in a variety of industrial and manufacturing sectors that provide high-value jobs in Canada, including chemicals, aerospace, and urban transportation equipment, fertilizers, auto parts, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, prefab buildings, environmental goods, and machinery and equipment, to name a few.
We see ample opportunities in the service sector of the economy, as well, where 80% of new jobs are created today in Canada. Some examples include financial services, high-tech and environmental services. An FTA would also provide a more secure and stable climate for Canadian investors in Korea and assist in attracting Korean investment to Canada.
Let me now turn to the auto sector, the area of the negotiation that has attracted the most attention in Canada. To improve the Canadian auto industry's access to the Korean market, Canada is seeking to eliminate Korea's 8% tariff on autos and auto parts and to establish the most extensive, robust, state-of-the-art provisions Canada has ever sought in an FTA with respect to Korea's non-tariff barriers in the auto sector. Canada has also proposed an innovative dispute settlement mechanism for autos.
At the same time, Canada's auto industry has expressed concerns regarding the potential impact of eliminating Canada's automotive tariff. Members of this committee may be aware that in September 2006 the government released two studies that concluded that any negative impact on the automotive sector from an FTA with Korea would be very limited.
The first study, by Industry Canada, estimates a decrease in Canadian production of fewer than 1,000 units per year on average, which represents 0.04% of the 2.6 million vehicles we produce each year. That assessment was supported by a second study commissioned by this department and carried out by Dr. Van Biesebroeck of the University of Toronto, a respected academic who specializes in economic analysis of the automotive industry.
Professor Van Biesebroeck also concluded that a Canada-Korea FTA would only have a modest impact in terms of additional imports from Korea--less than 10%--and that this would come largely at the expense of other imports. The expected result was only a fractional decrease in Canadian vehicle production of about 2,000 vehicles, or 0.08% of production. Among the reasons is the high level of imports already in the Canadian market, about 75%, and the very high percentage of Canadian production, about 85%, that is exported to the United States, which would not be affected by an FTA between Canada and Korea.
At the same time, the study projects that Canadian automotive parts exports to Korea stand to benefit from tariff elimination, and forecasts increased Canadian exports of between 8% and 12%. Both studies are available online.
Where do we stand now?
Since negotiations began in July 2005, we have held 12 negotiation sessions with Korea. Our most recent meeting was last week in Seoul. In principle, the next meeting should be held in Canada in March.
Presidential elections will be held in Korea later on this month, and the new president will enter office in late February. We have made major progress to date, but as the end of negotiations approaches, we are definitely facing the toughest issues. Among other things, Canada is seeking greater access to Korea's agricultural, fishing and forest industries, which are highly protected sectors.
Korea, for its part, is seeking faster reductions in Canadian tariffs in the sensitive manufacturing sectors, such as the automotive sector.
These issues are very difficult, and Minister Emerson has clearly made it known that we prefer a satisfactory agreement with Korea over a quick end to negotiations.
To conclude, the government's view is that there are compelling commercial reasons to pursue an FTA with Korea, both to protect our current business in the face of Korea's other negotiations, and to strengthen our position in this vital economic region of the world.
At the same time, while we know that all FTAs inevitably result in some economic adjustment, the best available economic analysis indicates that the overall impact of this FTA in Canada would be positive and that the negative effects in our areas of sensitivity would be very modest.
Of course, in the event negotiators are able to reach an agreement, it will be up to ministers in the first instance to pass judgment on its merits before any agreement could be signed, and then parliamentarians would ultimately need to decide whether or not to pass the implementing legislation required to allow for ratification and entry into force of the agreement.