The fundamental problem with the non-tariff barriers on the Korean side is that they're very flexible and very opaque. It's very hard to identify what precise non-tariff barriers are limiting your market sales at any point in time. Therefore, it's going to be impossible to determine, on the basis of a promise the Koreans make when they sign the free trade agreement--and I can assure you they will make the promise that non-tariff barriers are going to be removed--whether they are still there or not or whether alternative non-tariff barriers have been erected in their place.
For us, if you like, the proof is in the pudding. We will know that the Korean market has been effectively opened when they're buying stuff from us. That's why the main thrust of our recommendations to the negotiators has been to argue that any expansion in Korean imports of automotive products or other strategically identified commodities must be offset by Korean purchases from us. They have to be buying from us, it has to be a two-way street; otherwise the quantitative access to our market has to be limited.
We will try to skip the whole issue of whether the NTB is there or not and cut straight to the chase. Are they buying from us? If so, we'll expand trade. If not, we'll limit trade.