I think we're growing to understand that these agreements are not by any means, most of the time, a stopping point. Rather, they're more a starting point to opening up further and better opportunities for our country and for others to do trade more fairly. It concerns me when I hear some of the observations of some of our witnesses, that they seem to view this as all or nothing, that if we don't get exactly what we want from these negotiations, we should pull away, as if to suggest that we could somehow become advantaged by that or advantage our negotiating position vis-à-vis future deals by doing that. Frankly, I find that interesting as an observation.
Finally, you alluded to something.
And, Jean Michel, I believe you alluded to it in your comments.
We'll use the U.S. KORUS agreement as an example: the consequence to Canada of our not signing a deal, walking away, and the U.S. proceeding with theirs. I know it's difficult. You're talking about trying to evaluate a loss that hasn't occurred. It's hypothetical. But what kinds of specific disadvantages exist for Canada in the event that this occurs, that the United States establishes a strengthened relationship with Korea and we fail to do so?