My views are such, Mr. Chairman, that I raised a point of privilege with respect to freedom of speech—and I explained why earlier.
I am currently quoting the observations made in the Rules and Procedure, and it is my right to accurately quote any and all observations dealing with freedom of speech in the House of Commons and in committees.
The right to freedom of speech is protected by the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Parliament of Canada Act. The statutory existence of parliamentary privilege in relation to freedom of speech dates from the adoption of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Though meant to counter the challenges of the Crown, it also prohibited actions of any kind by any person outside the House against Members for what they might say or do in Parliament. Article 9 of that statute declares that “the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament are not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”.
Generally considered to be an individual privilege, the courts have confirmed that freedom of speech is also a collective privilege of the House.
Therefore, it is also a collective privilege of the Committee.
Motions carried by the House are expressed collectively by its Members and therefore cannot be challenged in a court of law.
Under the section on proceedings in Parliament, it says:
The privilege of freedom of speech is generally regarded as being limited to “proceedings in Parliament”. No definition of “proceedings in Parliament” is contained in the English Bill of Rights and there is no statutory definition in Canada. May defines it as follows:
The primary meaning of proceedings, as a technical parliamentary term, which it had at least as early as the 17th century, is some formal action, usually a decision, taken by the House in its collective capacity. This is naturally extended to the forms of business in which the House takes action, and the whole process, the principal part of which is debate, by which it reaches a decision. An individual Member takes part in a proceeding usually by speech, but also by various recognized forms of formal action, such as voting, giving notice of a motion, or presenting a petition or report from a committee, most of such actions being time-saving substitutes for speaking. Officers of the House take part in its proceedings principally by carrying out its orders, general or particular. Strangers may also take part in the proceedings of a House [...]
We saw that this week—or last—when the President of Mexico was present. I imagine that would be an example.
[...] for example by giving evidence before it or one of its committees, [...]
That is the case when we receive witnesses.
[...] or by securing the presentation of a petition.
The Parliament of Australia enacted the Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1987 which defines “proceedings in Parliament” as follows:
[...] all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House or of a committee, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes:
a) the giving of evidence before a House or a committee, and evidence so given;
b) the presentation or submission of a document to a House or a committee;
c) the preparation of a document for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of any such business; and
d) the formulation, making or publication of a document, including a report, by or pursuant to an order of a House or a committee and the document so formulated, made or published.
From the numerous court cases where the law of parliamentary privilege has been applied in Canada, it is clear that the courts understand the meaning of the term and see it as part of the law of Canada. However, the courts have been reluctant to extend the immunity deriving from the rule of free speech beyond the context of parliamentary proceedings. In other words, despite the fact that the role of a Member of the House of Commons has evolved considerably since the 17th century when the rule was formulated in the Bill of Rights, the courts have, with few exceptions, confined the scope of this immunity to the traditional role of members as debaters and legislators in Parliament.
I come now to the importance of freedom of speech, Mr. Chairman, and this is the key point:
Freedom of speech permits Members to speak freely in the Chamber during a sitting or in committees during meetings while enjoying complete immunity from prosecution or civil liability for any comment they might make.
Freedom of speech permits Members to speak freely in the Chamber during a sitting or in committees during meetings while enjoying complete immunity from prosecution or civil liability for any comment they might make. This freedom is essential for the effective working of the House. Under it, Members are able to make statements or allegations about outside bodies or persons, which they hesitate to make without the protection of privilege. Though this is often criticized, the freedom to make allegations which the Member genuinely believes at the time to be true, or at least worthy of investigation, is fundamental.
What follows is extremely important:
The House of Commons could not work effectively unless its Members were able to speak and criticize [...]
In light of the events we witnessed today, when Liberal and Conservative Members, in cooperation with you, Mr. Chairman, went ahead and called the vote before the other Members had an opportunity to express their views on the motion, it seems quite clear to me that our freedom of speech was restricted.
I will continue the quotation:
There would be no freedom of speech if everything had to be proven true before it were uttered. In ruling on a question of privilege in 1984, Speaker Bosley affirmed that “the privilege of a Member of Parliament when speaking in the House or in a committee is absolute, and it would be very difficult to find that any statement made under the cloak of parliamentary privilege constituted a violation of that privilege”.
This right is also extended to individuals who appear before the House or its committees in order to encourage truthful and complete disclosure, without fear of reprisal or other adverse actions as a result of their testimony. In 2005, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the testimony of parliamentary witnesses fell within the scope of parliamentary privilege because it is necessary for the functioning of Parliament for three reasons: “to encourage witnesses to speak openly before the parliamentary committee, to allow the committee to exercise its investigative function and, in a more secondary way, to avoid contradictory findings of fact”.
In 2004, questions arose as to whether counsel at a commission of inquiry could cross-examine witnesses on the basis of statements made before a standing committee. The House of Commons was asked by a commission of inquiry if it would be prepared to waive parliamentary privilege in order to permit the use of committee evidence in this way. After the matter was deliberated in two standing committees, the House reaffirmed to importance of the privilege of freedom of speech, resolving that the proceedings and all evidence, submissions and testimony by all persons participating in the proceedings of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts continue to be protected by all the privileges and immunities of this House. Upon being informed of the House's resolution, the commissioner heading the inquiry ruled that parliamentary privilege precluded counsel from using that testimony in cross-examination. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Federal Court.
In 2007, the Federal Court again upheld that a witness's testimony before a House committee is protected by parliamentary privilege:
[...] although witnesses before a parliamentary committee are not Members of Parliament, they are not strangers to the House either. Rather they are guests who are afforded parliamentary privilege because, as with Members, the privilege is necessary to ensure that they are able to speak openly, free from the fear that their words will be used against them in subsequent proceedings [...]
The Court confirmed that parliamentary privilege “precludes other entities from holding Members of Parliament or witnesses before committees liable for statements made in the discharge of their functions in the House.”
The Federal Court also determined that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on whether parliamentary privilege applied to police investigations, since such investigations fall under the jurisdiction of provincial superior courts. The Court was reluctant to interfere with the RCMP's decision to pursue a criminal investigation: “It is clear that any issue with respect to parliamentary privilege remains alive and that the admissibility of any evidence which derives directly from the Applicant's testimony before the Public Accounts Committee will have to be addressed when the criminal investigation unfolds”.
Although the testimony of a witness before a parliamentary committee is protected by parliamentary privilege, allegations that a witness has lied or misled a committee are taken seriously and may be pursued by the committee.
In 2006, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts prepared a comparative analysis on discrepancies in the testimony of certain individuals who had appeared before it during the Thirty-Seventh Parliament (2001-04) and also before the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities [...] Thereafter, the Standing Committee adopted a motion to recall some of the witnesses to explain the discrepancies. On June 6, 2007, two of the witnesses appeared before the Committee, made opening statements and answered questions.
If a committee determines that a witness has given untruthful testimony, it may report the matter to the House. In 2003, the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates concluded that the former Privacy Commissioner, George Radwanski, had deliberately misled the committee in his testimony and should be found in contempt of the House.
This is taken from the Committee's Fourth Report, presented to the House in 2003.
The House alone is responsible for deciding if the witness has deliberately misled the committee and is in contempt of the House, as well as for determining the appropriate punitive action.
The House found the former Privacy Commissioner, Georges Radwanski, to be in contempt of the House in 2003 for deliberate misleading testimony before the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. However, given that Mr. Radwanski apologized to the House in writing, no sanctions were applied. In 2008, the House found Deputy RCMP Commissioner Barbara George in contempt for providing false and misleading testimony to the Public Accounts Committee, but did not order any further action “as this finding of contempt is, in and of itself, a very serious sanction”.
If the House determines that a witness has lied while testifying under oath and the House deems it appropriate, it may waive its privileges over the testimony and refer the matter to the Crown to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge the witness with perjury for deliberate lying to a parliamentary committee.
The next part is entitled “Limitations on Freedom of Speech - Remarks Made Outside of Debate”.
The privilege of freedom of speech is not limitless and grey areas remain. Members may be confident of the protection given to their speeches in the House and other formal proceedings, but can never be certain how far their freedom of speech and parliamentary action extend.
By way of example, I will continue quoting this passage:
In 2008, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner was requested to determine whether Robert Thibault (West Nova) had breached his obligations under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons by participating in a review by the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics into the Mulroney Airbus settlement, given that the former Prime Minister had initiated legal proceedings against the Member for libellous comments made during a CTV television show.
(The Code requires Members to disclose any private interests they may have in a matter before the House or a committee and to refrain from participating in debate or voting on the matter.) In her report to the House, the Conflict of Interest Commissioner found that a lawsuit constituted a liability and thus a private interest for purposes of the Code. She determined that Mr. Thibault had consequently breached sections 8, 12 and 13 of the Code, although it was deemed an error of judgment made in good faith. [...] Subsequently, Derek Lee (Scarborough–Rouge River) raised a question of privilege to question the validity of the Code being interpreted in such a way as to limit Members' freedom of speech and right to vote in the House and in committee. In particular, Mr. Lee took issue with the Commissioner's contention that being a defendant in a libel suit was tantamount to having a private interest in the matter. In ruling the matter prima facie, Speaker Milliken stated: “... when the mere filing of a libel suit against a Member, whatever the ultimate disposition of the suit may be, has the effect of placing restrictions on the ability of that Member to speak and to vote in the House and in committee [and that is pretty close to what we witnessed today], it appears reasonable to conclude that the privileges of all Members are immediately placed in jeopardy.” The House adopted a motion to refer the subject matter of the ruling to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs for consideration. The Thirty-Ninth Parliament was dissolved before the Committee could present a report to the House on the matter. The House amended section 3(3) of the Conflict of Interest Code to clarify that a Member is not considered to be furthering his or her own private interests if the matter in question consists of being a party to a legal action relating to actions of the Member as a Member of Parliament.
I come back now to the main text. It states the following:
The parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech applies to a Member's speech in the House and other proceedings of the House itself, but may not fully apply to reports of proceedings or debates published by newspapers or others outside Parliament. For example, parliamentary privilege may not protect a Member republishing his or her own speech separate from the official record. Members should be aware that utterances which are absolutely privileged when made within a parliamentary proceeding may not be when repeated in another context, such as in a press release, a household mailing, on an Internet site, in a television or radio interview, at a public meeting or in the constituency office. Members also act at their peril when they transmit otherwise defamatory material for purposes unconnected with a parliamentary proceeding. Thus, comments made by a Member at a function as an elected representative—but outside the forum of Parliament—would likely not be covered by this privilege, even if the Member were quoting from his or her own speech made in a parliamentary proceeding.
This was one of the main issues in a famous case involving the Hansard which notes: “A Member cannot claim parliamentary privilege for the content of a householder because it is not a publication ordered by the House to be printed.”
See also Speaker Parent's ruling on November 16, 1999.
In that case, a bulk mailing sent out by a Member containing material critical of the Senate became the subject of a civil suit launched against the Member by a senator. The Member claimed that his privilege of freedom of speech had been breached by the lawsuit. The Speaker ruled that since the matter involved information contained in a document not considered to be a proceeding in Parliament, the Member's privileges had not been breached.
I will keep going then:
Telecommunications, including technologies such as electronic mail, facsimile machines and the Internet, should therefore not be used to transmit otherwise defamatory material.
The publication of defamatory material has been considered by most courts to be beyond the privileges of Parliament when such publication was not part of the parliamentary process to begin with. Even correspondence between one Member and another on a matter of public policy may not be considered to be privileged. Courts take a distinctly “functional” approach to the interpretation of parliamentary privilege by relating any novel situation in which a Member may become involved back to the function and purpose that parliamentary privilege was originally intended to serve: the need for Members of Parliament to be able to fearlessly debate issues of public policy in Parliament.
In 2006, the Federal Court confirmed that since communications to constituents are not part of a parliamentary proceeding, they are not protected by parliamentary privilege. The privilege of freedom of speech is an extremely powerful immunity and on occasion, Speakers have had to caution Members about its misuse. Ruling on a question of privilege in 1987, Speaker Fraser spoke at length about the importance of freedom of speech and the need for care in what Members say: “There are only two kinds of institutions in this land to which this awesome and far-reaching privilege extends—Parliament and the legislatures on the one hand, and the courts, on the other. These institutions enjoy the protection of absolute privilege because of the overriding need to ensure that the truth can be told, that any questions can be asked, and that debate can be free and uninhibited.
Absolute privilege ensures that those performing their legitimate functions in these vital institutions of Government shall not be exposed to the possibility of legal action. This is necessary in the national interest and has been considered necessary under our democratic system for hundreds of years. It allows our judicial system and our parliamentary system to operate free of any hindrance.
Such a privilege confers grave responsibilities on those who are protected by it. By that I mean specifically the Honourable Members of this place. The consequences of its abuse can be terrible. Innocent people could be slandered with no redress available to them. Reputations could be destroyed on the basis of false rumour. All Honourable Members are conscious of the care they must exercise in availing themselves of their absolute privilege of freedom of speech. That is why there are long-standing practices and traditions observed in this House to counter the potential for abuse.
During debate, as well as during Question Period and other House proceedings, Members are bound by the Standing Orders and practices of the House with respect to the content of speeches and remarks. For example, Standing Order 18 prohibits the use of disrespectful or offensive language in debate. Moreover, personal attacks, insults, obscene language or words…