Good question, one that is the subject of expert debate, both in Canada and in the U.S. There were discussions on whether to impose a ceiling or not. The agreements with Colombia and Peru contain such ceilings. It is commonly thought that a ceiling is used only to limit the possible size of a penalty. But from a legal perspective, a ceiling can, in certain situations, be used to raise a penalty. The groups of experts in question have never been faced with these kinds of situations. Imagine a group of experts setting the amount of a monetary penalty with nothing but local legislation as a point of reference. If, for instance, a labour penalty were $50,000, according to local legislation, the panel of experts might consider $100,000 to be an appropriate amount. But if they see that negotiators have set out the sum of $15 million in the agreement, that changes the scale and the point of reference. From our end, at least, it is quite possible that it could lead to an increase in the penalty.
It involves a legal analysis. In the case of Jordan, there was no such analysis. As I mentioned earlier, each agreement is the product of negotiations. We cannot impose the exact same model in every case; it has to be adapted to the negotiations in question. In this case, there was certainly some resistance to the idea of a ceiling for that reason, given that civil society, including the labour movement, often prefers not to have ceilings. Out partner at the negotiating table did not want a ceiling either, and it was a very contentious issue. In this case, the outcome of the negotiations was no ceiling.
It really becomes a technical, legal issue, because there are valid interpretations on both sides, in terms of whether or not to include a ceiling.