Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I should really reconsider my stock portfolio and add some Canadian mining export companies.
Mr. Chair, it's a pleasure to be on the Hill again. I will be making my statement in English, but I would be happy to answer members' questions in either English or French.
[ Witness speaks in Spanish]
It's indeed a pleasure to be back here with the committee talking with you about trans-Pacific trade and the Pacific Alliance, for I believe the second or third time. It is indeed, then, the third or fourth time that I've spoken about this issue in Parliament. I'm delighted the committee is considering this issue and that you've had me here again.
This is an issue that is of importance to Canada. It is probably the most important issue in terms of real potential to impact our prosperity agenda, economic growth, trade, and anything else that we're considering right now, including the EU free trade agreement.
Let me get that point out first. I say this because I've actually been studying and working on the Pacific Alliance and trans-Pacific trade ever since Canada first became involved with the alliance and its precursor back in 2007. For the past six years as the Government of Canada has worked with the varying situations of the alliance and followed it, I've been reading everything written on it in Spanish and English.
Unfortunately, there isn't anything in French right now.
I've also had extensive conversations with foreign governments, foreign ministry officials, and think tanks working on trans-Pacific trade and working particularly on the alliance, both in Latin America and in Asia.
In fact, one of the issues that the committee faces and that those looking at the issue of the Pacific Alliance face is the lack of information available in English on the subject. Indeed the only paper in English over three pages is something I've been working on for the past few years. It's not ready to be tabled and still is not ready to be released, but I will be able to use the research and analysis in this to touch on two things: a bit of the history of the alliance so you can understand exactly what it is and why it's important; and then look at four reasons as to why this is important for Canada. I'd like to leave a major issue on the table.
To begin with the history, six years ago, in 2007, Australia was hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Australia. There were worries raised in Australia quietly and not so quietly among the Asian countries as to whether or not the next year's host for the 2008 meeting, Peru, was capable and ready to host a meeting of the cooperation forum. Indeed there were also worries in Latin America about this.
In response, Peruvian President Alan García announced a bold new initiative. He wanted to link all the Latin American countries facing the Pacific into a new integrated group to better prepare the region to trade with Asia. This came from two realizations. One was that Latin America, despite its tremendous political and economic progress, had not been able to close the gap with Asia. The second reason, stemming from the first, was that the current set of integration agreements that Pablo and Laura described were not capable of bridging the gap. They had failed in moving Latin America, in helping Latin America.
There was also the realization that while countries compete bilaterally, they tend to succeed as blocs or as groups of countries. Indeed, if you look around, in the European Union, Britain benefits not so much individually, but by access to the full range of markets, resources, and everything the European Union has. In North America we benefit from that relation with NAFTA, and Mercosur in Brazil. There was a realization that current integration agreements weren't cutting it and something new was needed.
Originally García hadn't thought to invite Canada and Chile hadn't thought to invite Canada, but fortuitously, the Prime Minister was invited to take part in the first meeting where this was discussed, and the government has followed it ever since and positioned us extremely well to take advantage of what's emerging.
There are two points about the history. One, you have to understand this as a break from everything else that's occurred in Latin America. The alliance, or the Arc of the Pacific, which was the first iteration of the group, started with an incredible work plan, an incredible agenda put together largely by the Inter-American Development Bank.
A lot of serious work, a lot of heavy lifting, has gone into the agenda, looking at rules and regulations, best practices. The amount of work and heavy lifting that the Inter-American Development Bank has done is extremely impressive, and you can see it today in the work plan for the alliance that has been carried over. That was the good news.
The bad news was that not all 11 countries could agree on the agenda. There were different levels of political advancement, different theories about economic development, and not all the countries were on the same page. Not all had FTAs with each other, so after a year and a half, the four leaders of the Arc of the Pacific—Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico—decided to break off and to form a new group, the Pacific Alliance, taking with them the other two serious members of the Arc, Panama and Costa Rica.
You have to understand that every integration attempt in Latin America before had been based on everything and anything except actually advancing integration. The Pacific Alliance represents a clear break with that past. It's an attempt to formulate a serious agenda, and what they've done to implement it is unheard of. It's unprecedented. We have never seen this serious an agenda. We have not seen such expenditure of political will and capital anywhere in this hemisphere, not in South America, not in Central America, and currently not in North America.
The other bit about the alliance is Canada's privileged position. We were an observer at the Arc, and we continue as an observer at the alliance, something no other country is doing.
Now, very quickly, I'll tell you why this is important.
With respect to integration agreements, we compete globally bilaterally, but we succeed as members of blocs. Think about our relations within North America. In North America we no longer talk about a Canadian automobile sector or a Mexican automobile sector. We talk about a North American automobile industry. We are able to compete globally because of our access to Mexico, to the United States. The U.S. no longer talks about U.S. energy dependence. The U.S. speaks of North American energy independence.
This is a major shift and it is important for us. We have benefited from our relationship with the U.S. not because of the free trade agreement but because of things we've done beyond that. NEXUS was not part of the free trade agreement. Beyond the Border was not part of the free trade agreement. The free trade agreement was a gateway to working on more important integration issues.
Trade does not capture the importance of the relationship. Think about this fact. Every dollar the U.S. imports from Canada contains 25¢ of U.S. input, content services. For every dollar the U.S. imports from Mexico, it's 40¢ of U.S. goods and services. For the next country on the list, you have to go all the way down to Malaysia at eight cents. China, Brazil, and the EU come in at two to three cents.
The importance of integration for competing globally for real economic growth has to be understood. That's the importance of the alliance. It gives us a second kick at the integration can. No one is really happy with the pace of integration in North America. We're stuck with a United States that keeps saying, “No, maybe tomorrow”, but in the Pacific Alliance we have a group of countries saying, “Yes, let's do something.” It changes the dynamic and this is important for Canada.
The second reason is the liberalization agenda. The question for Canada, as committee members have asked, is not about what we're going to liberalize. All the easy free trade agreements are done. The question nowadays is when we're going to liberalize what's left and under what conditions. The Pacific Alliance is the best scenario for doing this.
I have an analogy useful in thinking about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the EU agreement, and the Pacific Alliance. Imagine working with the Pacific Alliance as a bar, with four countries with whom we're very close friends yelling and screaming about things but never going much beyond yelling and screaming. Now imagine the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership as going out the back door of the bar into an alley, and waiting for us in the alley are New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, each with a baseball bat or a pair of brass knuckles that say “Canadian dairy” and “Canadian agriculture”. Everything we do beyond the alliance gets more difficult. If we cannot work on liberalization with the alliance, I wonder where we can work. This is the easiest path that we're going to face of our liberalization agenda.
The third reason is Asia. We're more attractive to Asia as part of the alliance. Indonesia is not asking the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to begin negotiations with Canada. They're asking them to begin negotiations with the alliance. We look better as part of the alliance. The alliance looks better with Canada.
It's also a forum where we don't have to worry about the U.S. sucking the air out of the negotiating room when we walk in.
The fourth reason is the Canadian private sector. The committee has asked questions about why the private sector doesn't trade more. You can't ask the government; you have to ask the Canadian private sector. They're the ones who trade. The reason they're not trading more is they still have access to easy money in the U.S., but globally we can see how this is changing. The EU is falling apart, and there's slow and sluggish growth in the United States. Markets like South America, like the four countries of the alliance in particular, which are, in essence, another BRIC, as large as Brazil, are important. At some point in the future the Canadian private sector is going to come to the government of the day and ask why aren't we in the Pacific Alliance; why didn't we take the opportunity; why was this another TPP where we had an opportunity to get in early, but instead we're now faced with begging our way in? Again, we have a huge advantage, and we need to think about that.
Finally, I would hate to say that I have words of advice, but this is an idea. The alliance is the most serious integration scheme we see going on. There are clear benefits to Canada that benefit us as we have benefited through NAFTA. Indeed, the questions about whether we can work with these countries are eerily reminiscent of questions we asked about Mexico and NAFTA. Yet, if you talk to John Manley, Michael Carrigan, and other critics of working with Mexico, you hear what they're saying now: “My God, I was wrong. We need to do more with Mexico. We've wasted opportunities with Mexico. We need to do more.” It's kind of odd that we're having these same discussions about countries like Chile, which has, I think, more free trade agreements than everyone in the Americas put together, but they're similar arguments to those we had with Mexico.
Here's the issue: the seriousness of the agenda by the government has been good to this point. We were there at the beginning. We stuck with it. It's a demonstration of seriousness that stood us well. I would argue that going forward, the Prime Minister really has to be in Cali next month for the summit of the alliance. The Spanish president and prime minister will be there. We've got to be there.
For the alliance, if we're serious about an agenda for Canadian growth, for economic prosperity for Canadians, this has got to be something that's supported by the whole of government. The issue with the alliance is that it's been a national project, not the project of one party, so I would suggest that Mr. Mulcair would have to go with Mr. Harper to Cali, not physically, but in spirit.