In the 2006 article I was doing what a former official loves to do, which is to criticize their former colleagues and indicate that they're not doing enough serious work, and so on. By that time I'd been retired for 10 years, and my colleague in crime, Bill Diamond, had been retired for six years, so we were having a lot of fun at the expense of officials, more than of ministers.
I don't envy Ed Fast and his predecessors in their job. If you look at it, the Minister of International Trade really has three jobs.
The first job is to be the minister of trade promotion and to lead trade missions and so on. Once you've done two or three of those, it's not a terribly exciting thing to do. Sure, officials are constantly looking for ways to get the minister to open another fair and do that kind of stuff, but the minister, from a political perspective, looks upon that as not a terribly sexy activity. It certainly is not going to get his name in the newspaper and so on, so that's not great.
The second thing is he's the minister of trade disputes, and given the way the system now works, that we have a good set of rules and a good set of settlement provisions, we're going to lose more than we win. So he then becomes the minister of losing trade disputes, because that's the way the system works. We are now using the system in order to make sure that some of the sins we have committed in the past are righted. So we're going to lose them. No matter how many nice speeches the minister makes about how hard we're going to work, etc., we're going to lose them—because we should lose them. For example, the recent one on the Ontario FIT program was a loser from day one. Any trade official would have told the Ontario government that, but the federal government has a duty to put on the best face and so on and to try to protect that.
Third, he's the minister of trade negotiations. Their officials are saying, “Minister, if you go here, you can announce this negotiation, and if you go there you can announce that one, and you'll get a lot of good press, people are interested in what you're doing”, and so on. The difficulty is in closing those negotiations. It's very easy to open them, as we've done. The Prime Minister is going to Morocco. What's he going to do there? Oh, well, let's announce a free trade negotiation. Has any homework been done on this? Well, you know, it would help our wheat sales. All right, let's do that. It's the same thing with Ukraine, and one country after another. And the trade minister says “Wonderful, it's activity for me and I'm going to get my name in the paper”, and this is all positive stuff until it comes time to deal with the hard issues, and then we find it very hard to close.
For instance, the Korea negotiation is the biggest of the ongoing ones that are useful—other than Europe. And I won't speak about Europe, as we'll let Charlie have his view on that one. With the Korea negotiation we got off to a good start, and it's hung up by one industry and one interest group in that industry. We should have given up on that a long time ago. We don't make entry-level vehicles; we import them from Korea and Taiwan and Malaysia and so on. Yet that one interest group is strong enough to convince the government not to proceed with it. The Koreans knew that was a vulnerable point and used their own hard knocks on beef and so on to get what they wanted.
Trade agreements, once you get into the smaller agreements where you don't have a broad spectrum of economic interests supporting you, are very hard to close.