There are two issues there.
The first one is the chill effect. In my view that is very much present. It's on the record in New Zealand now in terms of the anti-tobacco issues. They wanted to pass the exact same legislation Australia did, and the health minister in New Zealand said straight out, on the record, that they weren't going to do it until they saw the results of the cases against Australia and Uruguay brought by Philip Morris. We see that chill effect.
I saw it in Canada both when I was a lawyer in the government and after I left the government. It's there. It exists, even in Canada. Because of the uncertainties, it becomes very difficult to say with precision what kind of measure will or won't, and in what circumstances it will or won't be a breach of an agreement. That uncertainty is the problem. We can manage it if it is clear, but again, it's the MFN provision that allows the reaching back. That unknown third box on FET takes away the certainty, the clarity, and the predictability, and that's the issue.
In terms of the cost, this draft of CETA is actually intended to include a provision requiring investors to pay the government's costs when they lose an arbitration, so that will assist on the second issue.