Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Good morning, everyone. Thank you for the invitation to speak with you about CETA on behalf of CUPE BC.
CUPE BC is the B.C. division of the Canadian Union of Public Employees. CUPE BC represents more than 80,000 workers in 170 local unions across many sectors. CUPE members in B.C. work for municipalities, school boards, post-secondary institutions, and similar employers, mostly at the local level. Nationally CUPE represents 627,000 Canadians.
We have many concerns about CETA, the proposed economic and trade agreement with the European Union. Over the last few years CUPE's national president, Paul Moist, has repeatedly raised objections to the proposed treaty, and in 2011-12, toured 16 communities across the country to speak about his concerns. CUPE BC's recent past president Barry O’Neill and current president Mark Hancock have been doing likewise here in B.C. CUPE does this work in concert with a broad range of civil society groups under the umbrella of the Trade Justice Network.
For my part, I've been on the research staff of CUPE here in B.C. for the last several years, and my assignment included CETA. I've helped develop our analysis and have travelled twice to the European Parliament to meet with elected and civil society representatives there. I'm recently retired from CUPE staff now but continue to assist them with this topic.
CUPE's critique is based on extensive analysis of various leaked texts and now the 26-page agreement in principle summary released in October. Although it goes without saying that we support increased trade with Europe and the whole world, we think that trade arrangements between Canada and the EU should mostly focus on reducing tariffs rather than locking in sweeping investor rights protections that constrain the ability of elected governments to act on behalf of citizens.
Among other things, we're concerned about a big increase in pharmaceutical drug costs in Canada and now the potential federal subsidy of the drug companies through compensating payments to the provinces. We're concerned about restrictions on the ability of local and provincial governments to support local businesses and create local jobs through procurement and purchasing. We're also concerned about job losses in manufacturing sectors, the threat to public water, intellectual property, Internet issues, and that your committee, and Parliament, are reviewing and planning to endorse CETA based only on a 26-page technical agreement in principle and without the benefit of any actual text. To learn more about our analysis, I recommend committee members review the extensive body of CETA background information available on CUPE's national website, cupe.ca/ceta.
We have only a few minutes here today so I'd like to focus in my remaining time on one element of the proposed CETA that is especially worrisome and that is also the matter of intense debate and review in Europe right now. That is the matter of investor-state dispute settlements.
The European Union has an economy larger than that of the U.S. It is home to some of the world's biggest and most powerful corporations, companies such as private water giant GDF SUEZ, pharmaceutical giant Bayer, and oil giant Royal Dutch Shell, just to name a few. Canada needs to think very seriously about the implication of extending new rights to these European corporations and others to sue elected Canadian governments, suing them not in front of our long-established and respected courts, but instead at an unaccountable and secretive and non-appealable commercial arbitration panel.
If Canada does this, we will further reduce the ability of elected governments to act and regulate on behalf of Canadian citizens and it will increase pressure to privatize public services. Both the Canadian and European court systems are well developed and respected. Investor arguments against elected governments should be handled in the regular court system and not in these obscure, yet powerful, dispute chambers.
We now have lots of experience with this type of investor-state mechanism through Chapter 11 of NAFTA. It has not been positive, especially in the context of NAFTA's very broad definitions of investment, right of establishment, compensation for direct and indirect expropriation, minimum standards of treatment, and prohibitions against performance requirements—all things I recommend your committee study in CETA.
We've paid out over $160 million in taxpayer-funded damages on NAFTA claims, and Canada has borne the bulk of corporate suits. Right now, for example, there are eight active complaints against Canada versus three each for the U.S. and Mexico. If all of those eight were successful it could cost Canada some $2.5 billion.
Most important, we've been under unrelenting pressure to change public policies in response. Examples abound, including Mobil Oil's successful challenge to the research and development requirements of the Newfoundland government; Mercer International's current $250-million suit against BC Hydro's industrial power rates; the $130-million payment to AbitibiBowater by the Canadian government because Newfoundland exercised its provincial water and timber rights; Lone Pine's $250-million suit against Quebec's fracking moratorium; and perhaps most egregious, drug giant Eli Lilly's $500-million challenge of our generic drug rules in a case that the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear.
It's not right that the NAFTA investor-state system is being used to circumvent decisions of the Canadian courts, and we certainly shouldn't expand that to Europe. Meanwhile, the U.S. is yet to lose a NAFTA Chapter 11 case, and all three North American governments have incurred tens of millions in legal costs.
Barrie McKenna described it well in the November 24 edition of The Globe and Mail, “Chapter 11 has become a way for companies either to bypass domestic courts and regulatory agencies, or to get restitution denied through normal channels.” The question is, why would we consider expanding to Europe a NAFTA dispute settlement model which has been so detrimental to us? If one accepts that we need an investor-state dispute system outside of the regular courts, why isn't Canada taking advantage of the CETA negotiations to insist on a system that better suits our interests?
Interestingly, it's just these kinds of questions and that kind of approach that caused the European Commission to announce on January 21 of this year that it's suspending investor-state dispute settlement negotiations with the United States while it undertakes a comprehensive consultation with the European public. The commission will publish proposed investor-state language in March, and then receive submissions and comments from citizens and member states.
What a contrast to the approach in Canada. As I noted earlier, I've been to the European Parliament a couple of times to discuss CETA. I must say it is much more open and transparent in these matters than in Canada where, for example, the federal government recently denied a freedom of information request for a copy of the working CETA text.
The European Commission made this review decision after extensive representations from civil society and hearing from the S&Ds, the second-largest group or caucus in the European Parliament, that the S&Ds oppose any inclusion of investor state in an EU-U.S. deal, and will vote against any deal that has it in it. The S&D caucus currently has 184 members, and they're supported in this position by the third-largest, which is the Greens-European Free Alliance. So a very significant chunk of the European Parliament is raising concerns, and the commission has been responding. Among other public inputs, the parliamentarians in Europe against investor state have been informed by a broad, four-year-long civil society engagement process that culminated in November's release of a new trade strategy for Europe, called The Alternative Trade Mandate, which I recommend to you.
The common critique both inside and outside the European Parliament is that implementing NAFTA-style investor-state dispute settlement with the U.S. would be bad for democracy and not in Europe's interest. Canada needs a similar examination of whether the NAFTA investor-state paradigm will serve our interests with Europe. The European Commission review of this in its deal with the U.S. will inevitably have implications for CETA, the details of which are still being negotiated. Our economy is closely integrated with the U.S., so it would be strange for the Europeans to agree to a model of investor state with Canada that is significantly different from that which they will agree to with the U.S.
It's not only in Europe that investor-state dispute settlement is being actively debated. Both Australia and South Africa have decided not to include the mechanism in their future trade agreements. Many South American countries are also opposed, including a big economy like Brazil, which has never included investor state in any trade deals.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development released a comprehensive briefing on the global status of investor-state dispute mechanisms in May 2013. It found that 58 new cases were filed against governments worldwide in 2012, a record number. I recommend that resource to you as well.
We need much more public debate of this in Canada, similar to the active process in Europe. CUPE BC urges your committee to ask for information about the European review of investor state and to give Canadian negotiators your advice about it. Ultimately, our view is the same as the S&D group in the European Parliament. We think we have advanced and respected court systems in both Canada and Europe, so there's no need to expand the undemocratic investor-state dispute system in CETA. A trade treaty dispute should be between trading partner states, not a special tool to benefit private parties.
Thank you for the opportunity to present today. I provided the clerk with my speaking notes, which include hypertext links to the sources that I've mentioned in this overview.
I welcome your questions later. Thank you.