International Trade Committee on March 27th, 2014

[Sarah Kutulakos]

There are actually some interesting statistics out lately about the numbers of prime ministerial and ministerial visits from different countries and things like that. Let's take the U.K. as an example. They have a quite comprehensive approach to China. They still have their issues, but for example, they've made London a renminbi trading hub, and there's been a lot of attention paid lately to the fact that they've put in place a swap agreement that was just signed this week.

When their prime minister goes over, he tends to take many more companies with him, and they put forth very big goals. I'll give you an example. We've tried to make sure we can help China to pay attention to Canada, being a relatively small country. Last October when we held our annual general meeting in Beijing, we had about 300 people come to our own activities, but we estimated that there were about 600 Canadians in Beijing that week: the National Art Centre orchestra, provincial delegations from Quebec, and city delegations from Ottawa and Calgary. Minister Baird was there, Minister Oliver was there, and the Governor General made his state visit. I think we did a very good job of bringing things together to make it not look like a one-off visit. At the same time, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Mayor of London were there, and they still ended up stealing all the press in Beijing that week.

It's just a fact that we need to keep coordinating and trying very hard.

[Massimo Pacetti, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Does your—

[The Chair, Conservative, Rob Merrifield]

Okay, I've been very gracious with my time. He doesn't get as much, so I really feel for him.

[Massimo Pacetti, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

It's not fair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rob Merrifield]

To be respectful for the next questioner, we'll go to Mr. Hiebert.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you.

We can continue that conversation because that was going to be the line of questioning that I was going to take as well.

Ms. Kutulakos, welcome here.

You talked about the U.K. and the strategy that they have. That is frankly what I was going to ask. What does a China strategy look like? You said an Asian strategy would be good, but a China strategy would be better. You've suggested that we have a study on China trade relationships. Can you just elaborate on where you think the government should be going in these different areas?

[Sarah Kutulakos]

Well, I think if we look at some of the countries that do have more specific strategies toward China, Australia comes up very frequently. There's been a strategy that transcends individual governments that has been very helpful in continuing to help some policies move forward. There's a goal, for example, that I believe it's 12% of school leavers, people who graduate from schools in Australia, will speak an Asian language. So there are some goals that help to deepen the whole country's perspective on that, and there's been some work done.

Recently there was an Asia competency study done that David Mulroney, our former ambassador, took the lead on. One of the things he noted was that it's more difficult for us to get as many Canadian students to want to travel over to China and study there or live there than it is to attract Chinese students to come here. When they explored that a little bit more deeply, they discovered that those students said, “Well when I go apply for a job upon graduation, the companies who are looking to hire me aren't telling me that they value that experience I would have gained during my semester or my year abroad.” You can see where, if you can have a bit more of a comprehensive approach there, it could be helpful.

If I think about a couple of comments about the U.K. or Europe, for example, I noted recently that the European Union funded a very big project that we noted with interest because we have an incubation initiative to try to help these SMEs to do business in China better. They had done it on a European basis with some very good reports and things like that. The U.K. itself has many more trade offices in China, for example, than Canada does. It also funds quite directly some of the bilateral associations that are involved.

We are completely independent as a council. Our counterpart in Britain is not, and I'm not asking for money from the government, but it just shows a difference in approach.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

You mentioned, not in your former remarks but in an answer to a question, this concept of a renminbi trading hub. I know that you've done some work at promoting that in Canada. What impact would that have on Canadian businesses investing or doing business in China?

[Sarah Kutulakos]

I said that it would have an impact in several ways. In many ways it's more of a marketing initiative than it is some major change to what's happening.

As we talk to the banks, the banks are trading in renminbi, and it's growing all the time. However, right now in North America, not a city has decided that it wants to be a renminbi trading hub. Singapore is doing it, London is doing it, but New York, for example, has not decided to do it. If Canada were to choose one of our cities to play this role, and do it early enough—you can't be late to the party or there's no benefit—it would draw increased trading through our country.

That would have a couple of benefits. For example, right now some of the major banks are already developing those capabilities of their employees to understand the benefits of the renminbi and how you would trade in it, but if we had a hub, the capability would go through many more of our financial institutions. At the same time, a lot of our small and medium-sized enterprises, who we know struggle to figure out how to expand beyond the U.S. to a more difficult export market like China, would able to understand how they could use renminbi in their strategies for bidding on projects for selling. They would be able to avoid the costs of bidding, for example, in U.S. dollars, and then having to trade Canadian dollars to U.S. dollars to renminbi, and be able to go more directly.

None of these are “big bang” benefits, but they would all come together. To be honest, if I think about our political issues that we can discuss with China, this is one that would seem to be relatively uncontroversial. If you think about the items on which we would like to make progress in our political relationship with China, this one might be a nice easy step as we move toward further deepening of our China strategy.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Mr. Neve, you highlighted some concerns from a number of different TPP member countries. In terms of the consultation, this was going to be the third consultation on Colombia, is that correct?

[Alex Neve]

The third review.... The first time there was no consultation, and the second time there was a very limited online consultation that most groups only found out about after the fact, not during the time.

So this is the third experience of the review, and I just described to you the kind of consultation that's been initiated.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Yes, you did. I'm just wondering, in light of the fact that this is the third review, to some degree I think it would have been fair to expect that organizations should have been preparing reports. They know it's an annual event, and they potentially would have had an opportunity to submit. It's not like it came out of the blue, per se. It was something that was expected.

I would like to focus more closely on your comments regarding Vietnam. You talked about some bloggers being imprisoned, Dieu Cay among them. Can you elaborate on what he was communicating, why he was imprisoned, why he was such a threat to the government?

[Alex Neve]

He is a well-known and very popular blogger, an independent journalist, really, in Vietnam. There's strongly state-controlled media in Vietnam. Over the last few years, there's been a vibrant community of alternative journalists who have tried to open up independent space for that. He's been a real leader of that. He's brought together an association of independent journalists to promote freedom of the press and freedom of expression.

My understanding of his blogs, which I don't follow—I don't read Vietnamese—is that they very much talk about social justice and democracy issues. He also is one leading voice that has raised some critical and sometimes challenging questions about the nature of Vietnam's relationship with China. That is a very sensitive political issue in Vietnam. The government is known to very often shut down and stifle individuals who try to provoke debate and discussion about that.

Amnesty International's assessment of his case is that there's absolutely nothing at all the slightest bit criminal that he has ever done. We consider him to be a prisoner of conscience. That's why we're campaigning, and have been for two or three years now, for his unconditional release.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rob Merrifield]

Thank you very much.

Thank you both for your testimony. It's been very valuable and quite diverse. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the questions as well.

With that, we will adjourn.