Let me just say a few things.
First of all, trade diversion is bad. Trade diversion means that there is an excellent producer of a product, a service, or an agricultural good, and because of tariffs or non-tariff barriers, those rules act as a diverting effect for the customer to purchase what is really the product from the most efficient producer.
What we're really looking at here in the WTO, in the TPP, and in our suite of bilateral initiatives is making sure that governments are not in the way, that rules are not in the way between consumers and the best products. Anything that distorts markets such that inefficient producers end up getting to sell to customers is bad.
What's also bad, unfortunately, is seeing our competitors conclude agreements more rapidly than Canada. For example, I'm sure the United States looks on CETA with great jealousy. We're very excited about the opportunity to create a truly transatlantic marketplace, knitting together NAFTA and CETA with common regulatory standards that also allow governments in all those nations to protect consumers and their public with their own domestic rules, but rules that create a common market.
But when our competitors conclude agreements more quickly than we do—for example, in South Korea—it made it imperative that Canada have a bilateral agreement so that we weren't displaced by Australian, EU, or U.S. competitors who did have agreements with that country.
As countries have and develop closer relationships with China, we're going to have to look at that. China is third to the U.S. and the EU in terms of our export and import relationship. Chinese producers have displaced Canadian products in the U.S. market. We have to look at that very carefully. We have to have a strategy for China. It's just too big not to.