I think first of all the investor-state provisions that we've talked about cause a policy chill for government. Governments, at both the federal and provincial levels, that are worried their public policy measures may result in a lawsuit from a foreign investor will start to change their policies and not proceed with policies they would like to proceed with. A famous example was the Government of Ontario in the 1990s that had campaigned to implement public auto insurance—as a form we have in B.C. and many provinces in the country—and they were told if they did that, they would be facing a NAFTA lawsuit from foreign insurance investors. They decided not to implement public auto insurance.
I think this policy chill is significant. I think it's also that the entire paradigm of these agreements is deregulatory, supply management being one example, and that the entire emphasis is to reduce the regulatory choices of government. Those are not choices being made by the elected government. Those are choices imposed on them by the strictures of this international agreement. You mentioned the public service. I think a concern for those concerned about public services is that these arrangements make it more difficult for governments that wish to end the privatization arrangement to do so. There's nothing in these arrangements that compel a government to privatize a service. Once it has contracted out or privatized, or entered into a public-private partnership for a service, there's a very real—and there's a number of studies that indicate this—risk that foreign investors will sue if the government decides to bring it back into the public sector to re-municipalize or.... I think that's a concern for the public sector and the public service as well.