Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
In this particular amendment, it's clear that we're not looking at a removal of this provision, which is something that I'm supportive of. I think it's unfortunate that we can't see a full removal of it, but what I'd like to propose in the amendment are some improvements to this process, because it is largely unaccountable.
The amendments I've put forward here would make the membership of the chapter 28 dispute resolution panels more broad-based and accountable. It wouldn't leave the power solely with the minister. The minister would have to refer to separate parties, separate bodies, and provide opportunities for public participation.
If Canada is going to continue down the path of including this type of investor-state provision, why is there not an attempt to improve these provisions? Why isn't there an attempt to bring them into the public eye, as we heard from Ms. May and as I believe one of the officials referenced earlier said that others are doing? This really speaks to the ability, first of all, to remove that power essentially from one minister, a power that we think is not responsible or in the best interests of Canadians, but ultimately we would be able to have these panels, at a very bare minimum, be more broad-based and accountable, and as I said, provide those critical opportunities for public participation.
The main criticism we've heard, other than the cost and the cooling effect it has had on provincial legislation in trying to implement some things in Canada—and I'd say the cost in the cases is significant—is the fact that it's in secret. There is no ability for the public to engage in this process whatsoever, and I do not believe that Canadians support this type of secretive panel, appointed by the minister, meeting without Canadians having knowledge as to what we're being sued for, why we're being sued, and the amount we're looking at. That's anti-democratic.
This amendment speaks to that, and I hope I'll find some support for this amendment in the committee.