Let me start by saying that we're not going to be in position to prevent harm. What we can do is try to reduce it.
Let's assume that the scenario is no negotiations are successfully concluded and litigation—let's call it broadly—is initiated in October. There are a lot of steps that we've already been working on for the last year or more. I would group them in three broad categories.
The first is data preparation, if you will. There's a lot of work to make sure that our numbers are in order. That's involved working at the federal government level with provincial governments, with experts, and stakeholders to make sure that we have the best situation, in terms of the numbers, to address potential claims.
Second, there is the legal preparation with our U.S. counsels, not only the Canadian federal government's U.S. counsel, but also the U.S. counsel for the provinces and territories and for industry groups. Essentially, it's U.S. litigation. With a process starting in the U.S., it involves how we could best initially respond to the investigation, how we could put our best case forward, how we could challenge it in the first instance under U.S. law and then further under NAFTA processes, which are essentially an elaboration of U.S. law.
The third element is more strategic, if you will. That would be looking at ways whereby we can challenge elements of the existing U.S. practice and the way this practice might be applied in the future that is inconsistent with international law obligations but consistent with U.S. laws. That concerns primarily the World Trade Organization. We're presently intervening in a number of cases brought against the United States and some others for a variety of reasons. One of the primary reasons is to make sure, or try to do our best to ensure, that the law is more favourable to us on various issues. I can get into the technicalities of that, but there are various practices of the U.S. that we want to reduce.