If I may, I will address ISDS first.
If you were Mr. Stanfield's family and you had bought a plant, invested, and expanded in facilities in the southeast U.S., and the state made a massive change in laws and regulations that seemed clearly to undermine your investment, you would want a place to go and you would want a place to fight. That's the purpose of ISDS, because your own government may not always be there to back you. It may not be worth it for them.
Likewise, you need an end for the process or you never get there, and that's why we came up with a tribunal system, as deeply imperfect as it may be. After the tribunals, state sovereignty has not, in fact, come to an end.
I have a quick word on the Bilcon case. If you read the tribunal, I found the dissent quite compelling. In my opinion, having read it very carefully, it was a wrong decision through its reading of the law. This is where the ball is back in cabinet's court, if they wish to pursue it.
On the size of gains, we've seen a range of numbers. I may have commissioned one of these studies myself. What they do, in fancy talk, is marry a computable general equilibrium model to a global trade model. It's the best you can do and it's state of the art. When you look at the dollar numbers for Canada, because we already trade with so many of the TPP countries, you get a small number in the long run when using those models.
What those models are not good at capturing, because they're just not built in, is the dynamic impacts, firm entry and exit, the impacts of productivity, new products, new technologies, reorganization of trade along new lines. The economic models just extend the existing framework that we see. They're not good at, and they don't capture, the dynamic impacts that trade flows have in the broader world.
If we have time or a question, I'll carry on to supply management.