During the seven years of negotiations, the three successive governments in Quebec had concerns that reflected the vulnerability of the governments in the liability between investors and governments. At the time, we thought we had found the answer to these concerns in the initial text, which limited the ability of investors to sue governments for expected profits. It basically limited their demands strictly to proven actual damage.
We thought we had responded to this issue by doing so, along with a much clearer opening of the process. As Mr. Valasek said, these are no longer completely secret processes. What we had provided for in the 23 pages of the chapter about the regulation on investor-state claims in certain circumstances essentially responded to the Government of Quebec's concerns.
That said, it was not enough for the European side for the reasons that Mr. Valasek explained very well. There were prejudices about the arbitration mechanism. There was, I believe, some doubtful information in some cases as to its description. However, behind all that, there was a kind of aspiration to institutionalize this arbitration in the public process. That is why Canada finally came to an agreement on the Investment Court System.
Canada did this because there was a European consensus in favour of the system, meaning that the organization would be permanent. Of course, the problems Mr. Valasek raised may still occur. The organization will be funded from state coffers, while the previous mechanism was funded by the civil party and by the states that were prosecuted.
I would say that although I was—