Thank you very much.
Good evening, and thank you, Madam Chair and committee members, for the opportunity to present the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation.
By way of introduction, we go by “CIGI”. We're an independent, non-partisan global governance think tank based in Waterloo, Ontario, and we conduct policy-relevant research exploring global economics, security, politics and international law, with a focus on digital economy issues. Given this background, my comments will relate to Bill C-4 and data and intellectual property.
Canada has focused substantial resources and effort on new trade deals to reinforce the rules of the game in international trade, and rightly so. Trade is at the heart of our prosperity. New trade agreements are necessary to open up new markets and preserve old ones, and revised rules are necessary as economies change and to minimize trade frictions.
We fully understand that trade-offs were necessary in negotiations of CUSMA and that hard choices had to be made. We believe that the ratification of this agreement will remove some of the trade uncertainty that has dampened economic growth, and my remarks are not designed to hold up ratification.
Rather, my objective tonight is to highlight how commitments made in CUSMA related to data and intellectual property may inhibit Canada's ability both to innovate and to develop our own domestic policies. Then I'll offer some suggestions on the way forward.
In particular, CUSMA fails to consider the implications of how the nature of trade is changing, moving away from scale and cost efficiencies to, first, intellectual property creation; second, the rise of big data as an economic and social asset; and, third, the resulting imperative of asset protection.
What Canada agrees to in these areas has very wide-ranging repercussions for Canada in many forward-looking areas, including our ability to harness data in new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as fundamental domestic policies related to privacy, security, intellectual property, foreign direct investment, competition and innovation.
Yes, that list is long, and it touches upon all aspects of our economy, and indeed our daily lives, yet we are dealing with these issues currently largely through a trade lens, via a trade agreement that is dominated by U.S. interests. I would also note that the recent mandate letters charge the ministers for ISED, Heritage and Justice with the main task of coordinating new digital and data rights, which recognizes that there are substantial societal issues related to the use and monetization of personal data.
Indeed, data is an extremely valuable resource. Statistics Canada—and very good for them—has placed the value of Canadian data at over $200 billion, which is about two-thirds of the value of our oil assets. This number is extremely large, but it pales in comparison with other countries, namely, the United States. For example, the market cap of U.S.-based Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google is about $4 trillion U.S., and that high valuation results from their monopoly positions and huge data stores.
Further, these companies are cementing their market positions each and every minute with their continued acquisition of all varieties of data through user engagement with their platforms and fierce protection of their assets by a combination of the de facto rule-setting in the absence of national regulations; trade deals that enshrine open data flows; strong intellectual property protection of their data and AI assets; takeovers of innovative firms through their vast reserves of cash; the acquisition of top talent; and, the powerful information asymmetries that they gain with their data and their technologies.
The bottom line is that the data is their intellectual property, and their interests are behind the digital chapter in CUSMA.
We have three examples of some of the commitments in that trade agreement that favour them.
The first is the treatment of data localization. This part of the agreement is short and not so sweet. It says, “No Party shall require a covered person to use or locate computing facilities in that Party's territory as a condition for conducting business in that territory.” From a commercial perspective, that makes a lot of sense, but this is problematic for many non-economic dimensions. For example, if we took the smart city partnership in Toronto that's proceeding right now with Sidewalk Labs, which is a subsidiary of Alphabet, Canadians may well desire that their detailed data that will result from that city remain in Canada and not be transferred to the U.S., but Canada may be limited in its ability to do so.
Second, under CUSMA, localization is permitted if organizations collect, hold or process that information when those activities are undertaken for or on behalf of a government. However, for national security reasons, if the data were held by a private organization, then CUSMA would technically require the government to allow those data to be released to the other two partner countries.
Third, CUSMA contains a safe harbour provision to liberate digital platforms from responsibility for the content that they carry. On the one hand, free speech advocates see this as desirable. On the other, some see the weaponization of platforms like Facebook and YouTube during recent votes such as the 2016 U.S. presidential election as indications of the unwillingness and/or the inability of the digital platforms or governments to regulate content. This is a trade issue because the platforms' business model is supported via massive cross-border data flows.
ln summary, it is not clear how much policy flexibility CUSMA will ultimately allow the federal or provincial governments in adopting new laws and regulations to achieve objectives like those to protect people's privacy, prevent algorithmic bias, protect critical infrastructure, ensure national security or promote domestic innovation.
Let me now conclude with three recommendations on the way forward. First, trade negotiators need to be more fully briefed on the wide-ranging implications of the data-driven economy and the implications arising from existing digital measures in CUSMA and those that could arise going forward with the negotiations that are about to begin at the WTO on e-commerce. We need to be mindful that there are vested interests pervasive in the digital realm and that regional trade agreements are an entry point to manage policy space for areas that go well beyond digital trade.
Second, we need new international rules of the game for trade, for foreign direct investment and for intellectual property. As part of this, what Canada could do is push for the creation of a new global organization to set international governance in these areas. Drawing on the experience of the Financial Stability Board that was created in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we have put out a proposal to create a digital stability board. Such an organization would develop standards, regulations and policies across the many realms that digital platforms touch; advise on policy actions needed to address vulnerabilities in a timely manner; and ensure that this work feeds into other international organizations such as the WTO.
Finally, we should use the six-year review built into CUSMA to rectify some of these issues that I have outlined.
Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to any questions you may have.