It is worth remembering that this is largely on the U.K. The U.K. made the decision to leave the European Union, so the U.K. is the demander in all of these things, including their discussions with the EU and discussions with third parties like Canada.
In my view, the U.K. hasn't done a very good job in outlining its priorities. They're poorly defined, and it's a difficult party to negotiate with. It doesn't have a lot of capacity. The trade negotiations have been conducted by Brussels for the last 40-plus years. They have been doing their best to build up their capacity, but it's not there.
There are a couple things. First is that I think there was a remark that we aren't doing anything while the U.S. and other countries are negotiating, but we have been doing things with them. We have been discussing a rollover agreement, a CETA-like agreement that would be put in place in the event of a no-deal scenario. However, as I mentioned, the U.K. government unilaterally said they're going to remove all import tariffs. That's a huge piece of what would have been negotiated, which was negotiating away those tariffs, so we could get it for free. We don't even need to negotiate an agreement to get that tariff reduction. That changes the dynamics.
Also, the idea that the U.K. is going to strike a deal with the U.S. this year is not very realistic, with an election campaign and the difficulties of getting the deal through Congress.
I think we need to keep the lines of discussion open with the British. We should be having concurrent discussions with them, but we're going to have to face the reality that there are going to be some chapters of a potential Canada-U.K. deal, which will look like a CETA deal, that we won't be able to close before we know what the U.K. and the EU are going to agree on. First and foremost on that is how much a regulatory approach is going to diverge—