Thanks very much to the committee on behalf of the CCPA for the opportunity to present here on the CUSMA ratification legislation.
The CCPA is Canada's longest-standing independent research institute. In fact, we're celebrating our 40th anniversary this year. From our earliest days, the CCPA has rooted its policy recommendations in values of social justice and environmental sustainability. That goes for our trade and investment research as well. We've been recently working internationally on the NAFTA negotiations with some friends in the United States and Mexico as well.
I'd like to start by agreeing with something that Michael Geist said to the committee last week, which is that the most important thing here is maybe not the implementing legislation itself, but the impact that the agreement is going to have on Canadians and Canadian public policy in the future. This is something that I think multiple witnesses have brought up as well.
At this point, Parliament obviously has little leverage to alter the CUSMA. Still, there are steps that Canada can take on its own without reopening the deal to enhance the treaty's positive features and to mitigate the harm from its worst. I'm going to briefly list some of those here today.
The first issue is making medicines more affordable. The original intellectual property rights chapter in CUSMA would have required Canada to increase data protection term limits on biologic drugs from eight to 10 years. Biologics are increasingly important for the treatment of Crohn's disease, rheumatoid arthritis and many other illnesses. The Parliamentary Budget Officer predicted that the original CUSMA data exclusivity extension would have increased their costs through public and private drug plans by about $160 million a year.
Thanks to U.S. Democrats, that change was dropped from the agreement. The Democrats also successfully removed provisions in CUSMA that would have facilitated patents for new uses on existing drugs—the evergreening issue—which blocks cheaper generics from hitting the market.
Canada should build on these victories to get serious about the high costs of medicines here in Canada. We can do this by moving forward on the proposals to improve the way that we regulate brand name drug prices. Health Canada estimates, for example, that simply by removing the U.S. and Switzerland from the basket of countries it uses to determine prices in Canada, we could save, on average, about $1.2 billion a year in drug costs.
Second, I think we should swiftly adopt a universal, single-payer pharmacare program, as recommended by the government's expert panel on pharmacare, since this would significantly reduce drug costs by increasing the bargaining power of public buyers. Both of these measures are already in the sights of the USTR, for example, which is looking to pressure Canada not to introduce these things, because their pharma industry will take the hit on them. So I think we need to move fast.
The second issue is on enforcing labour rights in the new CUSMA. As the committee has heard from several witnesses already, CUSMA's labour provisions are a significant improvement on NAFTA. The challenge to all three countries now is enforcement.
Beyond a commitment to receive and consider public complaints of labour violations in Canada, Mexico or the U.S., CUSMA's labour provisions are enforceable only through government-to-government dispute settlements. For a number of reasons, this isn't ideal. Governments can't always be relied on to bring cases forward on behalf of workers.
A way that Canada could address this would be to set up an independent, domestic complaint process that would allow labour unions, citizens and citizen groups to initiate complaints when international labour standards are violated. There should be an impartial body that could hear these complaints in the same way that impartial bodies hear procurement complaints under other parts of trade agreements. If they're credible, the complaints will move forward no matter what.
On environment and the climate emergency, we would say that the new NAFTA is decidedly less satisfactory. This reflects, obviously in part, the fact that we were negotiating with a climate-denying U.S. administration. Still, the CPTPP, the trans-Pacific partnership, and the EU trade deal are not all that much better on the environment, so not all of the blame can go on the obstructionism of the U.S. administration.
CUSMA's environmental chapter is technically enforceable through state-to-state dispute settlement, but again, what's the likelihood? Its obligations are so weak it really hardly matters. Outside of a few hard rules regarding matters like fisheries subsidies and wildlife trafficking, the chapter's commitments are mostly vague and voluntary. It also contains a gigantic loophole in the sense that it only applies to three federations, three federal states. It only applies to the federal level in all three countries.
CUSMA's most significant step forward on the environment was getting rid of ISDS, the investor-state dispute settlement process. Canada has faced dozens of ISDS cases, more than any other country in the NAFTA region, and many of those have challenged legitimate, lawful and non-discriminatory environmental and resource management decisions. The elimination of ISDS in CUSMA is indeed important, as Minister Freeland told committee last week, and it should be precedent setting. The challenge now is how Canada removes ISDS from its many dozens of investment treaties with other countries.
I want to speak a bit about deregulation in CUSMA. CUSMA's chapters and annexes dealing with how governments regulate in general have gotten relatively less attention in all three countries than other parts of the agreement, yet they may prove to be as significant and controversial as ISDS became in NAFTA. Remember, we didn't know much about investor-state dispute settlement when NAFTA was signed or how it would operate. The same logic is at play with the good regulatory practices chapter, which, for the first time in any free trade agreement, locks in a very specific ideology about regulation, which says that commerce should reign supreme and precaution should take a back seat or be thrown to the wind.
Central regulatory agencies, for example Treasury Board here or OIRA in the United States, are required in CUSMA to ensure that federal agencies avoid unnecessary restrictions on competition in the marketplace when they're deciding on appropriate health or environmental protections. There is significant potential for multinational companies to abuse a new notice and review process in CUSMA, which requires regulators to seek and respond to any recommendation to modify or repeal a regulation that is set to create a burden on business.
Global producers of chemicals, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, GMOs, cosmetics, tobacco, food additives, etc., are continually disputing good science on the risks that their products pose to human health and the environment. Now under CUSMA, a government could be taken to dispute settlement, by another country on behalf of one of its industries for example, for sustained or recurring unwillingness to heed corporate complaints about public interest regulations. The so-far voluntary Canada-U.S. regulatory co-operation council, a process that is now enshrined in CUSMA, can lead to delays in removing known toxins, known carcinogens, bioaccumulative compounds and endocrine disruptors from consumer products due to pressures to harmonize across borders for the sake of commerce, again, built up into the good regulatory practices chapter.
As the CCPA's former executive director Bruce Campbell has expertly shown, such pressures led to the downward harmonization of rail safety standards in Canada and aviation safety standards, leading to the tragedies of Lac-Mégantic and the Boeing disasters. In theory, CUSMA's good regulatory practices chapter leaves the door open for government to regulate in a more cautionary, protective way, however the primary objective of the chapter is clearly to reduce the burden on business. In fact, regulatory co-operation is defined in CUSMA as, first and foremost, a means to facilitate and promote economic growth, not as a means to enhance public protections.
It's more important than ever, therefore, that Canada counterbalance the deregulatory pressures in this agreement and other free trade agreements by enshrining the precautionary principle in law. A directive reasserting our regulators' authority to give the benefit of the doubt to protecting public health; removing potentially toxic substances from circulation, plastics for example; protecting animal populations; etc., would fit most Canadians' understanding of what good regulation means.
In conclusion, CUSMA is a mixed bag, at least from a progressive point of view. But is it a model for future Canadian trade deals? We would say no, not at all. Canadians recognize that securing this deal was a defensive measure. Despite the new agreement, just like NAFTA, our access to the U.S. market remains precarious. The U.S. is the most powerful country in the world. It will do what it wants to do. There is no way out of this reality for Canada. Canada's challenge now is to find ways to work around and outside of CUSMA to improve working standards and environmental protections across North America, lower drug costs for Canadians, rapidly decarbonize our economy in line with the Paris Agreement commitments and fully recognize the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on a path to real reconciliation.
Thanks very much.