Just as a prelude, let me say, withdrawal is not going to happen quickly. Withdrawal will take a generation.
To withdraw fully from the obligations we have assumed under existing treaties, my view is that our general stance should be to prioritize withdrawal, where possible, depending on the treaty and depending on the context, and certainly not to agree to ISDS anymore.
How will this affect our investment relations, and how will it affect Canadian investors abroad? I think it's so hard to predict how investment relations and the economic benefits of investment, which are clearly tremendous, are affected by current ISDS treaties, let alone future ISDS treaties and the prospect of withdrawal.
I would say the risk of negative impact simply from withdrawing from ISDS treaties would be low, and we can keep it even lower if we do it in a quiet, unprovocative way, which was essentially South Africa's approach when it withdrew from its bilateral investment treaties that allowed for ISDS in the last 10 years or so. They did it in a way that reassured foreign investors there were other protections available, and new legislation was passed to make those protections more robust in South Africa.
For Canadian investors abroad, yes, you're not going to have access to the treaty ISDS anymore, but for many investors the most important Canadian investors' assets we're concerned about are the really big ones, the multi-billion dollar assets that we do not want to leave completely open to abuse by some government abroad. Here, there is always a very complex set of contracts between the foreign investor and the state entities in the host country. A large multinational is sophisticated in its ability to negotiate contracts that protect its interests, including by providing for ISDS. You could have ISDS under a contract; it leads to essentially the same process. I think that is preferable for a host country because you can be more selective in when you're making these extraordinary concessions of your sovereignty and your regulatory flexibility.
That has to be one component of a gradual plan to withdraw, which is to make sure the contract-based ISDS is well-known to major Canadian investors abroad, and that they have capacity to pursue that means of protection.
Secondly, political risk insurance is available. Mr. Warner has referred to it. It could be state-backed, it could be in the marketplace. It's far from perfect. I would stress that the insurers are much smarter than the drafters of the treaties because they limit the obligations. You don't get an obligation to insure for breach of fair and equitable treatment in a political risk insurance contract. You get safeguards against the more obvious and more controllable risks, like nationalization and expropriation, which we absolutely should be protecting investors against.
I think Canadian investors will have some setback. They will not be as well off, but if you look at it in terms of the benefit to Canada, overall, what we pay monetarily, what we pay in our loss of capacity to respond in a future crisis.... I am telling you, when the future crisis comes, government officials will be thanking the heavens if they don't have to worry about ISDS risks in the billions of dollars. That will be well worth it to ensure Canadians can be protected even when one multinational, for whatever reason, fights really hard behind the scenes to stop our doing what's right for Canadians. We just need to get that obstacle out of the way.
I think a Canadian investor who sits down and looks at the quid pro quo will say, we can manage to protect ourselves with governmental support, and we're Canadian too and we can see the value of protecting our country against these broader risks.
All that sounds a little provocative, I'm sure. I don't mean it to be provocative. I've been banging on about reform of ISDS for a long time. I have just come to the view: keep it simple, withdraw and then reform ISDS. Don't stay stuck in it.