Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today.
I doubt it will come as a surprise—to many on the committee, certainly, and perhaps to our witnesses—that I count myself, and New Democrats have counted themselves, among the strong critics of investor-state dispute settlement chapters over the years in trade agreements.
I am going to resist the urge to offer some of the more polemic articulations of that critique today at committee, because I think it's a good discussion. Canada now finds itself, as was mentioned earlier, in many agreements. These are facts that we have to contend with, even if we don't like them.
I want to address my remarks to Mr. Appleton first, and then perhaps if other witnesses want to jump in, they can.
I thought your comment about some of the criticism of investor-state dispute settlement chapters being more about the other substantive content of the deals that they appear in to be an interesting comment. I think there is a fair point there, but it does seem to me that these things are related and that the advancement of ISDS has gone hand in hand with agreements that prioritize a certain way of looking at international trade, agreements that frankly put the interests of large corporations and investors before the interests of working Canadians. I would certainly argue that view; it is hard to tease those things apart.
I think that if you had investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms—or they might need another name if it was no longer solely about the rights of investors but others as well—that had the same teeth to enforce common environmental standards and common standards in respect of human rights, including collective bargaining, you might see more support for those kinds of enforcement mechanisms. It's hard not to notice that the enforcement mechanism with teeth revolves solely around the rights of investors and not anybody else or any other important policy goals.
When we hear calls, for instance, from the Alberta premier to invoke ISDS in response to the recent decision by the new administration in the U.S. on Keystone XL, I think that highlights some of the frustration that people have with ISDS provisions as well. I would argue that the decision on Keystone XL, whether you agree with it or not, represents an important set of issues that have to do with the environment and with the way not just Canada but, in this case, the United States as well treat their indigenous peoples and relate to their indigenous peoples, and the extent to which they respect their rights as well when it comes to major natural resource projects.
Those are not decisions that ought to be taken at an international trade tribunal. Those are decisions that are important. There are a lot of different kinds of values at play, and in a democracy it's appropriate to deliberate publicly about those things and to make those kinds of decisions in a deliberative fashion, preferably in Parliament, but at the very least by a government that is sensitive to those issues and tries to mediate those disputes in the best possible way. That's not the mandate of an arbitrator in an investor-state proceeding.
I am trying to characterize for you a little bit the way critics from the outside see this. It's very much part of a system designed to protect the rights of investors. In so doing, it cuts off debate and decision-making potential for other very important issues. I would say that citizens in general should be concerned to protect their right to deliberate in those ways and to protect the right of governments to make decisions in those ways. The ISDS system doesn't appropriately balance off what is a legitimate concern for investors, who want to have some security that their investment will be protected. ISDS has really put that on such a pedestal that every other kind of issue isn't really even within the scope of the proceedings.
How do you maintain the appropriate space and authority to make those kinds of decisions when you're signing on to quasi-constitutional documents that are narrowing the scope to a very limited conversation about the rights of investors, when those decisions have very clear and far-reaching implications on other issues?
I realize that's a long question, and it's taken up a lot of my time, but if you could begin to hazard an answer, Mr. Appleton, I would appreciate that.