Thank you again for this invitation to talk to your committee. I appreciate it very much.
These are three very important topics. I guess the first one I'll start with is the issue of the WTO waiver. I'm a trade lawyer, a competition lawyer, an American lawyer and a Canadian lawyer, if you get all that.
My own knowledge on this issue comes from the work I've done in the past for a major pharmaceutical multinational that wanted to get its antiretroviral—that's to say its AIDS and HIV drugs—around the world to Africa and other places. I began working with them to help first get the drugs distributed to certain countries for a dollar a day, and then we gradually built up from that to licensing the manufacture to certain producers in India and in South Africa.
That forms the basis for my saying to you that I think a lot of people are talking about the WTO TRIPS waiver, and they're building off that example from the earlier pandemic, the AIDS pandemic.
There are a couple of things I think people need to remember. When we first started licensing, when the manufacturing companies first started licensing, they weren't really licensing the state-of-the-art versions of the antiretroviral drugs; they were expressly licensing the previous versions and trying to get those to the developing countries.
When you think about what we're dealing with now with COVID in the current context, we're talking about vaccines that have basically have gone from nothing pretty much around last year at this time to getting shots in the arm—not so much around the world, but in many parts of the world—and that just isn't a direct comparison to what we had before.
I'm watching the discussion of the waiver. I think it's important because it's one more device to bring the attention of the world to the important task of getting access to these vaccines to developing countries, but in the short term, it doesn't seem to me that the analogy from the work we did in the past on HIV is really applicable and serves as a precedent for that.
I think the Canadian position seems fine in terms of asking for more study of the issue. I think that's fine. As we go forward, as these vaccines become better developed and as the skill set to make them becomes more spread around, I think we're already seeing the difficulties some of these producers that are at the front of pack are having in scaling up from the lab to the point at which they can distribute. We've seen it with AstraZeneca; we're seeing it now with Johnson & Johnson and their contract manufacturers.
You could see how important it is. We're dealing with examples of vaccine hesitancy around the world, including in the developing world. All it would take is one massive mistake to really throw this enterprise off completely. I don't think we're anywhere near the state where we were when we were dealing with molecules to build antiretroviral drugs. We may get there, at which point, if we do get there, I think some of this discussion will be good.
Before I run out of time, to flip to your second question in terms of the trade agreements, my background that I can bring to you on this is work that I did earlier in my life and my career when I worked at the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris. There I was sort of in charge of their work on trade and competition. It was what we call in the trade world “the Singapore issue”.
The reason I bring that up is it seems to me a lot of what we're talking about now highlights the problem of that unfinished agenda from the Doha round and from the Havana charter, if you go all the way back to the beginnings of the international trade organization, which is that there is a link between trade and competition. What we're seeing here, I think, is that one company in particular, AstraZeneca, entered into different contractual agreements with different countries, and some of those appear to conflict. In response to that, the European Union has introduced this monitoring system, which I think probably could be defended with various exceptions in the various trade agreements that Europe is party to, including the CETA.
Depending on how that would turn out—whether a challenge to it would succeed or not—it sure wouldn't succeed on a timely basis. As a practical matter, I don't think the CETA agreement really serves as any way of dealing with that.
To get back to the original point that I was trying to make, I think what we're seeing here is why that earlier agenda of trade and competition didn't stop the discussion. It was just an explicit invocation of an export control or a quantitative restriction on exports. Essentially, if the British and the Americans can do by contract what the Europeans are doing through a monitoring system, I think we're in a whole different world.
At some point, we're going to have to sit down and think about those ideas of the linkages between trade and competition, because it's not working. The European Commission is clearly turning around and saying, “Wait a second. You can't give some money to someone to research something and do a procurement agreement with them and say they have to serve you before they serve us, even if they have a contract to serve us.”
For these reasons, and because of what I'm going to call “unfinished agenda” in the trade community, I don't think trade agreements are really ever going to solve a fundamental distinction like that.
Interestingly, people really haven't gone after the Americans, who are doing much the same thing through their contracts under the Defence Production Act and through Operation Warp Speed, but we can talk about that.
The last comment I would make, on the last topic you talked about, is about domestic production of vaccines. There my background that I would draw from would be my experience as a former legal director of the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and also the Ministry of Research and Innovation. The titles are so long.
In the context of that, the Government of Ontario had a number of programs when I was there. One of them was a biopharmaceutical investment program; another one was called the strategic jobs and investment fund. Those names may sound familiar to you. What I learned from and observed from that is how difficult it is to get the big pharma multinationals to come....
I remember sitting in a committee meeting that we had for the recommendations that would go to the government on various proposals that would come up. I was always underwhelmed, frankly, because they always dealt with clinical trials, which from my vantage point is kind of the low-hanging fruit of pharmaceutical innovation. As a country, if we're going to really get serious about this and want to be part of that world of vaccine production, we're going to have to have a very serious conversation, which we haven't had for about 30 or 40 years.
In the 1970s, we basically decided to build a generic pharmaceutical industry and create one or more national champions. Ever since that day, we have declared, if you like, a low-level or sometimes higher-level war against the research-based or innovation-based pharmaceutical industry. If we want to have those kinds of companies in Canada, producing on a scale that would allow them to think of us as a place where they might want to do this work, we're going to have to think about our intellectual property rules. We will probably have to think about some of our tax rules. We're going to have to have a broader discussion than what we have had to date.
The last part I will leave you with is that when I returned to Canada, having practised for years outside of Canada, my major client was, as I said, a pharmaceutical multinational client. I did global work for them. The long conversations I had with them about returning to Canada showed me an insight into how that industry sees Canada, and it's not always the way that I think Canadians see ourselves. They were pretty clear to me that if the law firm I was coming to in Canada dealt with three firms—they gave me a Canadian firm and two Indian firms—they would be saying goodbye to ever working with me again.
That surprised me a little bit then, but I put that experience in the Ontario government together with, as I said, the biopharmaceutical investment program. What it said to me is that we have to decide, because if you don't go that route, then you're talking about building out a whole new industry, and that's tough. It's tough. If you think of what the British did, they struck a gold mine. They had Oxford university that came up with one of the vaccine technologies that has scored well here, which is the basis of the AstraZeneca vaccine. Here's the key point: They also had a British multinational innovation-based pharmaceutical company, AstraZenca, that was in a position to commercialize that around the world. Whether it succeeded or not is for people to debate, and time will tell.
If you look at the German case, you see that in Germany there was a small biotech company called BioNTech, and when that German biotech wanted to commercialize, they had nowhere to turn. They didn't even turn to the German multinational companies; they turned to Pfizer, a big American-based company with some experience in vaccines. Not surprisingly, they're the one that seems to be most successful in distributing this stuff around the world. If you think of what it would take if Canada were to build a cutting-edge industry for the next pandemic, whenever that occurs, you'd be betting you could either have Oxford or BioNTech in Canada and that you would have the equivalent of an AstraZeneca or a Pfizer that would say they want to produce in Canada or be based here. Those are two big assumptions.
Right now I know we're all in this very nationalistic mode and we want to talk about reshoring and maybe going back and rebuilding this industry. The truth of the matter is that we have contributed in Canada to this very important struggle through two great Canadian companies. One is AbCellera, of Vancouver, which is working with Eli Lilly on the antibody treatment. We also have Acuitas, I think also in Vancouver, which has provided much of the important lipid nanoparticle technology that forms the basis of the breakout mRNA drugs. We shouldn't be shy about our tremendous contribution, but that, I would suggest, is the contribution for an economy of our size, structured as we are.
At some point down the road we might have to ask, just as with the GM and Chrysler restructuring work I worked on in my previous life, whether the approach here might have been to say, as difficult as it might have been to achieve or for many Canadians to swallow, that we should have tried to get in on the ground floor of Operation Warp Speed by buying our way in, just as we bought our way into the GM and Chrysler restructuring. I don't know to what extent the government really pursued that option. Given how we fit as a country into modern pharmaceutical supply chains, it has always struck me that this is what we should have done. I haven't seen very much conversation in Canada about why we didn't do that, but I keep trying to put that on the table. At any rate, that's for another day.
Traditionally, it seems to be that's how Canada fits into this kind of a global issue. At some point I think we're going to have more realistic conversations about how we would fit into that. I think our cost structures are too high, and there's limited export potential. Do you want to go back to the 1970s, when Canada was building pharmaceutical products and exporting to the world? China wasn't on the market then, nor was India. We have fantasies of returning to this world where Canada was a leader in exporting; that's all over. People may not want to hear that today, but we'll have to deal with it later.
In my view, that's a large part of why I couldn't imagine any of the leading companies that have been the market leaders on this so far licensing to produce in Canada initially. As someone who's been on the other side of those negotiations, I would have been demanding a lot of financial contributions from Canada to do that, because I only have a few people, because I have to go around the world and I have to keep up the quality control. I have to move the inputs around the world and to satisfy one country that I'm going to come to, to license them when I'm not going to be able to export it anywhere because it's too expensive. I wouldn't do that, so I'm not surprised that they haven't done that. As I said, that leaves us with the idea of building our own sui generis big pharma industry, hoping for luck in the next pandemic, and that strikes me as very unrealistic.
I probably talked way too long, but those are my three answers to your questions.
Thanks.