Those are two very big questions.
Effectively, carbon contracts for difference are forms of production subsidies. They guarantee that the value of, for example, the carbon sequestration from a carbon capture project will be backstopped by the government.
In Canada, we obviously have a carbon pricing system. Presuming that system has longevity into the future and that the price increases as predicted, it will create a certain value for carbon. However, that carbon is not really known because this is not just about the regulated price. The voluntary markets and credit markets also determine the value of carbon as a tradable commodity.
A carbon contract for difference would eliminate that uncertainty by having the government be the holder of the contract guarantee. If the market does not deliver a certain strike value—one required to make a project investable—the government will provide the shortfall. Conversely, if the market outperforms, the government could end up actually receiving money, depending on the structure of the contracts. Effectively, this allows investors to do what they can now do in the United States: calculate the return on investment for any given project in that space.
On the border carbon adjustment piece, we will ultimately get to a point where that becomes a necessary and important tool. I understand that the EU, after much negotiation, finally agreed to a border carbon adjustment for a limited number of commodities, including cement. Certainly, we see it as a potentially important tool when it comes to protecting the competitiveness of our sector from imports from jurisdictions that don't have similar carbon pricing pressures.