Yes, and furthermore, we have a solution to some of the issues that exist. Basically, right now, the allocation model for the TRQ is based on sales performance of both domestic and imported cheeses. In our solution, we recommend that the allocation model should be based on import performance.
As well, in order to solve some of the issues we're facing now with the allocation models that exist in all the agreements, we need viable economic quantities of TRQ to be allocated to individuals or companies that apply for the allocation.
As well, understanding that an allocation is a privilege, if it's not used during the year, we would recommend that the allocation be forfeited for the following years. Simply stated, in order to solve a lot of the issues, we recommend that the allocations in any treaty—even the new treaties that are being negotiated with the U.K.—be given to the parties that are going to actually use the allocation, instead of setting up a secondary market, as my colleague Joe Dal Ferro stated, for trade or for transfer. That is an economic mechanism that will not benefit Canadian consumers; it will increase the prices of our cheeses or of all products for those consumers.