I'll answer the second part first, with respect to what it does to the FIPA. That would depend on how the government reviews that section.
Currently in the treaty, as I understand it, even if this comes into force, the FIPA protections for existing investors remain in place for 10 years. That would be to challenge events that occurred before the signing of the treaty. That might be another thing the committee could consider—taking out that long sunset clause. Obviously, the FIPA is very much like the current investment chapter in many ways, and it should be diffused, I think, as well, in the interest of Ukrainian postwar recovery.
I would say also, with regard to the first point, that the inclusion of this chapter is inconsistent with Canadian policy on investment protection, as well. We heard about the CETA. We heard about removing this arbitration-based investor-state dispute settlement from CETA to put in place this new so-called “investment court system”, with a standard sitting body of arbitrators, for example, something that has an appeals mechanism. This was supposed to be the top-of-the-line version, according to the government, for investment dispute settlement. It's something that we were getting away from in the old model.
The other alternative, as Monsieur Vaillancourt said, was the NAFTA model, whereby we simply removed ISDS. We said that the investment chapter's substantive protections remain, but we don't need investors to be able to directly invoke those protections through arbitration where we cannot guarantee that we're going to get consistent results and where the awards are outrageous and whatnot, and all the other problems.
Some kind of state-to-state option would be preferable, I think, in the Ukraine situation, and it would be consistent with Canadian policy.