In terms of why we like to include the investor-state dispute settlement in our model, I'll cite a few reasons. This is not an exhaustive list but a few of them.
The first is that an investment chapter with investor-state dispute settlement provisions has proven to be an investment attraction vehicle because it provides a combination of things. It provides a stable, predictable environment for Canadian investors when they invest abroad. We've heard from stakeholders that it's quite important to carry on doing that.
Another reason is that, if we're to have a set of obligations in an investment chapter, which is the way we approach things, we feel that it's also important to have a means to enforce those obligations, and investor-state dispute settlement is a means to do that. It's quite important to have the two. Again, our stakeholders have said quite clearly to us that, if we're going to have a set of obligations, it's important to have a means to enforce those obligations.
A third reason is that, for the set of obligations you would find in an investment chapter, the only means to enforce them is through the treaty-based mechanism. I'll take an example in an existing agreement, the CETA, our agreement with the European Union. In the future, if a Canadian investor were to attempt to invoke the obligations under that treaty before a court in one of the European Union countries, it couldn't do that, because the treaty itself states that that's the mechanism to use, and those domestic courts don't have the legal competence to hear those claims. But for that mechanism, there would be no means to enforce those obligations.