Thank you.
Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
My name is Michael Worry. I'm the CEO, CTO and founder of Nuvation Energy. Founded in 1997, Nuvation designs and sells battery management systems. All of our design and manufacturing are right here in Ontario. These are the control electronics at the heart of modern energy storage systems.
A battery energy storage system uses large batteries to capture electricity and store it for later use. Energy storage assets help meet peak demand and reduce the need for generators to increase power output.
Fundamentally, energy storage is needed for grid reliability and stabilization. It is also required for the growth of artificial intelligence. AI has very high uptime requirements as well as large power fluctuations, so these AI data centres require energy storage, and the grid was not designed to handle that.
Canada's energy storage market is expanding at extraordinary speed. Between 2019 and 2024, national capacity grew by nearly 192%.
I'd like to highlight that last week, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Public Safety and the Communications Security Establishment issued a joint advisory warning that foreign adversaries are targeting critical infrastructure across “power, water, health, finance and transportation”.
For those of us building these systems every day, this was not new information. Modern energy systems depend on relatively small and inexpensive control electronics that regulate power, manage batteries, connect to the cloud and interface with the grid. These components, which are the kinds of things that Nuvation makes, are the brains of the system. Today, too many of these originate from suppliers aligned with countries whose behaviour poses serious national security concerns.
Canadian companies in this sector face pressure on two fronts. First, foreign state-backed competitors export control electronics at artificially deflated prices that no Canadian manufacturer can sustainably match. Second, tariff uncertainty means that we increasingly cannot offer the price certainty needed to win U.S. contracts as their integrators look to us as a secure option to protect their infrastructure.
The result is a catch-22: We can't win in the United States because of pricing uncertainty, and we can't win in Canada because ultra-low-cost foreign products win our own procurements, leaving both countries vulnerable to high-risk components.
Even when governments try to select Canadian suppliers, origin loopholes and white labelling allow foreign manufacturers to route their products through Canadian or allied intermediaries. Under CUSMA's point-of-origin standards, final assembly here can legally qualify a product as Canadian-made, even when the most sensitive components come from elsewhere.
It's important to note that not all components carry the same risk. We should focus our emphasis on the high-risk components to match up supply chain realities and protect our energy storage industry. For example, a battery cell is a relatively low-cost commodity. However, control electronics, inverters, firmware and communications hardware are high-risk components because they enable remote access, remote updates and deep visibility into system operations. If compromised, these devices can allow a foreign actor to harvest sensitive operational data, disconnect equipment from the grid or even trigger a lithium battery fire.
The reality is that there are a wide range of examples that I'm happy to give during further questions. Sometimes these are large marquee attacks, and sometimes we're seeing foreign adversaries attack even fairly small examples.
The challenge is about to scale up dramatically. The Prime Minister has announced plans for a national east-west electrical grid, which is awesome, but if such a project proceeds under today's procurement and origin rules, we actually risk embedding those same vulnerabilities across the entire backbone of Canada's future energy system. A national grid could be a generational opportunity or the largest expansion of foreign-controlled access to our infrastructure that Canada has ever seen.
Ontario has already been in great action. Bill 5, Bill 40 and Bill 72 give the province the authority to restrict high-risk foreign suppliers, require economic resilience considerations in procurement and prioritize Canadian products, but most provinces and municipalities lack the resources or expertise to address these risks, so federal leadership is essential.
Our recommendations are the following.
First, enact a mandatory national security review for public procurements involving control electronics, inverters or grid-connected systems to identify and exclude high-risk components from foreign adversaries.
Second, to ensure Canadian industry can still source what they need, distinguish between high-risk components and low-risk components in any policy change on this issue.
Third, improve point-of-origin definitions for critical infrastructure components, whether within CUSMA or otherwise, so that adversarial suppliers cannot hide behind a simple final assembly.
Fourth, audit existing installations of grid-connected control electronics to identify vulnerabilities that are already in place.
Chair and members, Canada's energy transition and the rapid growth of our data centre and AI economy cannot be built on control systems that we cannot trust. Canadian companies cannot scale without being undercut by state-supported imports priced to buy access to infrastructure rather than to compete on innovation.
Last week's advisory made it clear that compromised supply chains are a cybersecurity threat. We must move from telling operators that they should prioritize security to giving them the policy and legal tools to do so.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.