They're slightly separate cases, not because.... Both cases belong in the same hearing because they both represent an opportunity and, at the same time, a potential risk or threat.
Of course, there's a huge difference of scale, and that is a big deal. Dealing with China is just different from dealing with Qatar. You have to take, effectively, a national decision about how closely you want to embrace China commercially because, ultimately, it will come to have influence in any country with which it has a close trading relationship. I think, for example, that it'll be much harder to negotiate a treaty with China that in any way cramps its freedom of action. It won't be ready to do so because it considers that it is negotiating from a position of strength, as, if you like, the “rising economy” of the world.
Qatar is much smaller. It's therefore much easier to deal with, as long as you concentrate on it. The difficulty with Qatar has always been that people have been rather complacent about it, saying, “Well, what could the problem be?” With a small country like Qatar, if they want to invest in Canada and want Canada to be a friendly partner in foreign policy.... At a time like this, for example, when they've been hit by Iran for no good reason, in the context of the current hostilities in the gulf region, they want western friends, western partners and capable NATO members like Canada. When you are dealing with something like Al Jazeera, with the Qatar Investment Authority or with a large Qatari investment in some sensitive sector of your economy, you are entitled to drive certain conditions and say, “There are areas in which we reserve the right to make sure that we are not giving away our sovereignty over some area of particular sensitivity.”
