Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for having me here.
As you heard, my name is Mark Mancini. I'm a professor of law at Thompson Rivers University in Kamloops, British Columbia.
I'd like to speak to you today about primarily three things. Number one is about constitutional barriers that potentially exist to establishing frictionless free trade across Canada. Number two is existing problems with some of the tools that governments have reached for in light of those barriers. Number three is what the Constitution might permit us to do instead.
I make these comments today based on a report that I co-authored with my colleague, Professor Paul Daly, for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Professor Daly will be here to speak to you in the next hour.
Let me start with the constitutional landscape and why it presents somewhat of a problem for frictionless free trade in Canada. The Constitution—wisely, actually—divides economic authority between Parliament and the provinces. Provinces hold broad jurisdiction over property and civil rights in the province, professional regulation and trade.
The result in a federation like ours is an inescapable web of non-tariff barriers: different product standards, different licensing regimes and different certification requirements for important professional jobs. Even well-intentioned regulation of this kind, by its nature, creates constitutional friction. Despite the fact that this is inevitable, these approaches can be duplicative and wasteful.
Parliament's jurisdiction over trade and commerce is broad, but it can't override this constitutional reality. The Supreme Court of Canada has been clear: Federal legislation cannot descend into the day-to-day regulation of goods and professions reserved to the provinces. Also, the court unfortunately has narrowed other interpretive pathways to a frictionless national market, most notably in the “free the beer” decision.
This background explains why existing recent statutory efforts to encourage regulatory harmonization, while positive, are not complete. The Canadian Free Trade Agreement, for example, despite recent positive efforts on that front, is voluntary and, for its benefits, still contains lists of exceptions on goods and labour mobility.
The One Canadian Economy Act, recently adopted, represents a major step forward, but of course it can apply only when federal and provincial laws naturally interface. It cannot compel cross-province acceptance of regulations among the provinces.
Moreover, many of these efforts, including those in the provinces, rely on a constitutionally suspect method of breaking regulatory impasses. They depend on so-called Henry VIII clauses, named after that old Tudor king, which permit individual cabinet ministers or the cabinet as a whole to amend primary law. The executive, under this mechanism, purports to exercise a quintessentially legislative act, blurring the lines of accountability. While the Supreme Court has held that these mechanisms are constitutional, they exact a cost in politics, because they distort accountability and they depend on executive action changeable at the stroke of a pen, creating an unstable policy environment for regulated entities.
That brings me to what we do going forward, and that's the subject of our report. There is a constitutionally sound escape valve from all this. The solution we propose in our paper is a joint federal-provincial agency created through matching legislation passed at both levels of government.
This agency would do three things. It would mandate mutual recognition. If a good, service or professional credential is lawful in one province, it would be lawful in all. Second, it would develop national harmonized standards and a means to enforce them through the agency. Third, and maybe most importantly, it would systematically identify barriers and recommend their removal, with provincial ministers acting on those recommendations through tightly constrained and accountable executive powers.
This is not technocracy or bureaucracy for the sake of it. This proposal is designed to coordinate and reduce the duplication of national and provincial regulations. We take the world as it is. We live in a highly regulated economy, and we want to leave space for jurisdictions that choose to simply remove regulations outright, while continuing to coordinate regulatory responses at the national and provincial levels.
With this in mind, our Constitution need not be a counsel of despair. Parliament and the provinces can build a regulatory solution that works within the division of powers and does not depend on inherently unstable executive action. The law here, in other words, is not an obstacle. It can be a solution.
Thank you for your time today. I welcome your questions.