Thank you.
Honourable chair and distinguished members of Parliament, thank you for inviting me to appear before the Standing Committee on International Trade. It is a great honour to sit as a witness.
Allow me to begin with a brief review of the recent trade relations between Canada and Taiwan.
Based on the four-year statistics for 2025, both Taiwan and Canada have maintained or reached historic highs in their respective global trade volumes. However, when examining the bilateral trade figures against each other's total global trade, the percentage appears remarkably low.
Taiwan's foreign trade, driven by sustained global demand for AI-related high-tech and ICT products, reached a record high in 2025, with total global trade of approximately $1.1 trillion U.S. Canada's total trade in goods and services, based on data from Statistics Canada, remained highly robust throughout 2025, with total trade of approximately $1.2 trillion U.S. As you can see, the difference between us is small.
According to recent official benchmarks, the annual trade volume between Taiwan and Canada hovers between $6 billion U.S. and $6.5 billion U.S., which is only about 0.5% to 0.6% of Taiwan's total global trade. Taiwan is Canada's 15th-largest trading partner globally and its sixth largest in Asia, yet their bilateral trade accounts for only about 0.5% of Canada's total global trade. Looking strictly at the nominal percentage, the mutual trade dependence between our two economies is below 1%.
Canada's strength lies in the upstream of the supply chain, while Taiwan's strength lies in the midstream to downstream sectors. Over the years, there has been a lack of a direct intermediate processing bridge between us. Consequently, many Canadian raw materials are exported to third countries for processing before being imported by Taiwan, which prevents these flows from being captured in direct bilateral trade statistics.
Does this imply a lack of focus on each other's market? The answer is no. The low percentage is not a result of neglect or negligence, but rather it is a reflection of their long-standing geo-economic structures, or so-called “market gravity”—that is, Canada's focus on the U.S. market and Taiwan's concentration on the markets of China plus Hong Kong, the ASEAN and the U.S.
Is there room for our bilateral trade to grow? Yes, there is immense room for growth, but both are required to engage with each other more. As global supply chains shift from cost-driven offshoring to security-driven friendshoring, we must speed up to undergo a structural shift.
In fact, thanks to the Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy, we have embarked upon that path already with the FIPA, or foreign investment promotion and protection arrangement, which was signed in 2023, followed by subsequent arrangements on supply chain resilience and the STIA, or science, technology and innovation arrangement, which was signed in 2024. These mechanisms provide legal protection and have triggered a noticeable surge in private investment from Taiwan.
The next logical step is to advance a trade co-operation framework arrangement. The TCFA will provide an important institutional framework to facilitate trade, investment, regulatory co-operation and supply chain integration between our two nations.
I would also like to call on Canada to continue to support Taiwan's accession to the CPTPP, which would further strengthen regional economic resilience and Taiwan-Canada economic ties.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to your questions.