Evidence of meeting #23 for Medical Assistance in Dying in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was disease.
A video is available from Parliament.
10:40 a.m.
The Joint Chair Hon. Marie-Françoise Mégie
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My question is for Dr. Beaudry.
Because you brought up two reservations and explained them earlier, would you have an additional safeguard to recommend for advance requests?
10:40 a.m.
Associate Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
Thank you very much.
I will answer you in English, if you don't mind.
In terms of specific solutions, I have not yet reflected in depth on that very difficult issue here, but where I do see my own research going and what people I think would benefit from looking at is the distinction that has been drawn, for instance, by the Council of Canadian Academies between the different scenarios: advance requests made when the patient is already eligible for MAID; advance requests made after the diagnosis but before MAID eligibility; and advance requests made before any diagnosis.
For sure, the last case would be the one where my argument would apply most strongly, where the continuity between previous wishes and current wishes is no longer there. Really, it would ring some alarm bells to many people within the disability community, I gather, to hear how dignity is correlated to wearing a diaper or receiving help with hygiene care, and how we can stipulate.... Many arguments that I have just heard right now—and I find them so interesting—would open the door to respecting people's autonomy, but that's my whole point: It's not the same person in meaningful ways.
If it's very recent, it's a different issue. If it's distant, we don't give anyone the power in Canadian society—not even if everybody agrees democratically or anything else—to make life-and-death judgments on the basis of potentially ableist or ageist judgments about someone whom we should care for and for whom protective regimes are usually, in our law, set up to work to protect the person, considering, of course, their residual autonomy and their past autonomy. But if we consider their past autonomy as encompassing something as specific as “when I'm not able to do X”, where that assessment would never fly if we are thinking about the welfare of someone and we are trying to think of a well-being so dismal that it calls for death, which is such an intensely personal choice that requires an ability to consent, it's a bit puzzling.
I've written on this in the case of non-voluntary euthanasia, and I think some of it applies to this case. I'm happy to forward it. Because it's such a philosophically dense topic, I'm not able to do it justice here, but I'm happy to forward that to the committee.
Thank you.
10:45 a.m.
Liberal
The Joint Chair Liberal Marc Garneau
Thank you, Dr. Beaudry.
I'm afraid that time is our enemy here. We are at the end of the panel, but let me thank all of you.
I want to thank Dr. Beaudry.
as well as Dr. Sokolowski and Dr. Wiebe.
Thank you for giving of your time today, and in the case of Dr. Wiebe very early in the morning, I believe, as you're probably out in British Columbia.
Thank you very much. We appreciate your candour and your passionate views on this very difficult subject.
With that, this panel comes to a close.
This meeting is now adjourned.