National Defence Committee on Sept. 20th, 2006

[Col Brian MacDonald]

Mr. Chairman, to respond to that question, the number of main battle tanks that have been added to the force has been said to be between four and fifteen. Regarding tactics, the army has taught for years, based on its own very lengthy experience, that you must have a combined arms battle team that consists of infantry, artillery, and heavy armour. The interaction between these three components is critical to the success in any tactical battle because each of them brings unique characteristics to the battlefield.

If you attempt to engage in conventional operations, for example in attacking a dug-in fixed position, you will find that using artillery and infantry alone makes for a very long process, particularly at the attack point. In such a case, the infantry, as it approaches the objective, is supported by the artillery, which fires on the objective, preventing the soldiers on the other side from directly firing at the infantry.

At some point, the infantry will get so close to the artillery that the artillery must stop firing because the fragments that come from our own artillery then threaten the lives of our infantry. At that point, in a space of about 300 metres, the other side is then able to emerge from its trenches and direct fire on our attacking infantry. At that point the infantry takes the majority of its casualties.

In order to reduce that further, main battle tanks move forward with the infantry, equipped particularly with machine guns and their main armaments, to provide the intimate fire support when our supporting artillery is forced to lift, and to continue the process of suppressing the defensive fire from the other side in order to place our infantry successively on the objective.

Most recently, neo-Taliban forces have changed tactics from using what might be described as hit and run operations to actually adopting fixed dug-in positions. It was the assessment of the commander, General Fraser, then, that if this is to be a possible line of tactics of the neo-Taliban in the future, he will require main battle tanks in order to be able to deal with such a situation.

I might observe as well that in addition to that squadron of tanks, the drafts of new additional troops being supplied to General Fraser include a number of combat engineers, particularly experienced officers who understand that as well as doing combat engineering things they can also supervise construction tasks. Those officers have been provided to act as project officers to deal with the small development and reconstruction tasks emerging, since these have been identified by the local people as something they require. The provision of these combat engineers plus additional funding through CIDA, through the provincial reconstruction team, allows them to deal with the smaller-scale reconstruction details that may include such things as driving wells, cleaning out the irrigation ditches that are involved, repairing roads, and doing that sort of thing. In addition, some of their own engineering armoured vehicles have been deployed with them. These are tract vehicles with the dozer blade on the front, and an arm that looks very much like what you'd find on a civilian backhoe, allowing them to do those sorts of tasks as well.

This additional deployment has a component directed towards improving the tactical balance of the Canadian Forces under General Fraser's command; an additional company provided to allow greater security for the joint civilian-military provincial reconstruction teams; and specialist engineer officers who are capable of undertaking and supervising these reconstruction projects, including hiring local labour to be part of that.

I would emphasize that this is an additional set of resources, ranging from those designed to deal with combat scenarios to those that are now dealing with practical, smaller-scale development scenarios.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Just because we're nearing the time, I would like to give Dr. Maloney an opportunity to respond to the question put.

If you would like to add any comments, sir, go ahead.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

One of the problems we have in the public domain debate over what we're doing in Afghanistan relates to the artificial distinction between combat operations and developmental aid and the continuum that exists between the two.

On the ground, the enemy--and the enemy is not just the Taliban, there are a number of enemies that work together--employs a variety of techniques to accomplish its objectives. I could go through the list, but fundamentally you're familiar with them: suicide attacks, political mobilization, and political intimidation--what we would call guerilla operations. They use a variety of techniques; they do not use a singular technique.

Each one of these techniques has to be met with a different tool. To emphasize one tool over the other at a particular time is not a useful exercise. You have to have a variety of techniques at your disposal, and we have those. In this case we've just decided to add a few more. The techniques we have in theatre are very good. The enemy has had a hard time trying to crack our system, if you will. But I personally don't view the addition of firepower resources as detracting from the Vietnam-era term “hearts and minds campaign”. I wouldn't call it that. I'm even hesitant to call it a reconstruction campaign.

Then we have to get into the heads of our constituency on the ground, and we have problems with metrics in that area.

So the mere presence of a certain piece of firepower or kit on the ground is not necessarily going to have a detrimental effect on our other efforts. We're dealing with a culture that's been at war arguably since 1979. They're used to levels of violence. They're used to equipment being present. They're even used to civilian deaths. Again, the presence of this particular force package is not necessarily going to have a detrimental effect on what we're trying to accomplish vis-à-vis the population. Indeed, the opposite could be the case. If we do not employ our forces effectively, we may in fact lose respect from certain parts of the population.

So I'd ask you to keep those things in mind when you're dealing with issues relating to Afghanistan and not focus on a particular piece of equipment, because that is only one part of the package.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Thank you very much, Mr. Maloney.

Go ahead, Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Chairman, I often say that the Vietnam war wasn't lost in Vietnam, but in the United States, because of people's perception of what was taking place in that country.

At this point in time, Canadians and Quebeckers believe that 95% of the mission is devoted to hunting down the Taliban, rather than to achieving security objectives. It's not that they object to our military hunting down the Taliban, they just don't want that to be their exclusive mission.

We should also put ourselves in the Afghan people's position. As a military historian, you know that the Afghan people have always resisted invaders. I'm not implying by this that NATO countries are invaders. On the contrary, I think of them as liberators. However, there is a risk that the Afghans may no longer look upon NATO forces as an army of liberation, but rather start seeing them as an occupation force. The fact is that they have not seen their day-to-day lives improve since the arrival of the ISAF.

Personally, I have some concerns about this mission. When we held a debate in the House of Commons last June, I recall that virtually all political parties stressed the importance of the reconstruction efforts, namely building hospitals, restoring infrastructures, building schools, and so forth.

Today, Canadians and Quebeckers have the impression that our forces are not involved in reconstruction. Moreover, you clearly described the military instruments in your possession. A growing number of people, myself included, are beginning to doubt if ever democracy can be restored and the country rebuilt solely by resorting to weapons.

I'd like to hear your views on the subject. My comments reflect what many of our constituents in Quebec are thinking. Some maintain that we need to withdraw our troops, while others say we must stay the course. However, we're not going to win over the hearts and minds of people by killing as many Taliban as we can or by hunting them down in Pakistan, if need be. I think we need to take another approach, but I'm not sure if we're ready to yet.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

We have just five minutes. I want to remind you that it's seven minutes between questions and answers, and if we want our panel to have time to respond we have to be cognizant of that.

Dr. Maloney.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

I'm sure I can address that on a number of planes.

One of the problems we have is that many Canadians have a vision of what's going on in Afghanistan through the media and not actual ground experience. Part of the media's problem is that it tends to focus on the more exciting aspects and not the unexciting aspects of it, which involve the things you're talking about, such as school construction, etc. However, if you have enemy forces wandering around--and I've encountered this myself--they will assassinate doctors and cut the heads off schoolteachers unless there's some form of security. This is what I was talking about before. There's a yin and yang here between combat operations, non-combat operations, and how all this fits together.

So the media has not done its job in conveying these unexciting aspects. We have tunnel vision on a number of issues here.

Let's talk about democracy for a minute. The Afghans have their own form of government at the district and village level that is almost like ancient Greek democracy. We don't want to tamper with that and we're not trying to. So there are already governance mechanisms there that are not Taliban-like and that we don't even have to encourage.

Indiscriminate use of firepower will cause all sorts of problems with the population. That's what the Soviets ran into, and that's what the Americans ran into in Vietnam. We're not doing that here. It may look indiscriminate, but again we're dealing with a media perception of it through a camera lens or somebody describing it. We don't have people who go out and try to get into the heads of the people who are on the ground, in terms of the media, and then convey that to people in Canada. So I think we really need to be careful about the information we're deriving from these perceptions.

We're not out there just to generate a body count, but sometimes you have to kill these people. You have to kill them effectively and give them a bloody nose. How are you going to do that? You just cannot have reconstruction and development unless there's security. It all works together.

[LGen Richard Evraire]

Mr. Chairman, clearly it's not just Quebeckers who perceive the situation this way. We've noted it across Canada and elsewhere in the world.

I tend to agree with Mr. Maloney when it comes to the media reporting on incidents in Afghanistan. All I'm saying is that there have been some major changes since 2001. A total of 4.8 million children, one third of them young girls, are back in school; 12,000 villages now have access to clean drinking water or to funding to secure clean water; 63,000 soldiers have been disarmed; 11,000 pieces of heavy equipment have been secured or put out of commission; 3.7 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these developments are not reported on by the media.

In terms of governance, two elections have been held since 2001, including parliamentary elections in which 25 per cent of the representatives elected were women, the country has a new constitution, provincial councils, and so on.

If these developments could be relayed to Quebeckers and to Canadians through this committee, in my opinion, that would help us convince Canadians that this mission is important and although admittedly a difficult one, that considerable progress is being made.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

We've got 35 seconds, Dr. Maloney, if you can fit something in there. I'm just giving you the exact time, but this committee has been known to be very generous.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

I've been to this country, as I've pointed out, on numerous occasions. When I was there in 2003 in Kandahar, there was virtually no justice system. Justice was cutting somebody's throat and hanging him from a bridge with a sign saying not to fire rockets at the camp. We don't have that now. We have pretty much clean streets, with street signs, in Kandahar. That didn't exist before. The irrigation systems I've seen up in the hills have dramatically improved since I was there in 2003.

So I can see signs of progress every time I go over there. But they're incremental. And again, we're dealing with a Canadian population that wants it now. We want success now, so we can get out of there now. Well, it's not like that there. The concept of time in Afghanistan is completely different from the concept of time here. To try to force aid down people's throats--and I've watched this--is extremely counterproductive. There has to be some form of natural evolution, given existing structures. This has me greatly concerned because there are a number of organizations, in Canada and elsewhere, trying to accelerate development of this country. It's their country, and they should be the ones deciding how far that progresses, and when.

We actually assist it. You never hear about this. The media never reports about Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan, and how Canadians have been able to assist the Afghan government in creating the Afghanistan national development strategy, which was critical for the buy-in of the IMF, so the IMF could provide money. But you know, having SAT-A's influence in the course of Kabul was dependent on the blood of our guys on the ground. It all works together. We wouldn't have that influence if we didn't have guys on the ground down south, or people in the provincial reconstruction team, or special operations forces, whatever. The package gives us the influence to do that.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Maybe the media doesn't report it because they're not communicating effectively with the professional analysts who could advise them, and they're reporting wrongly.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

It will take 50 minutes to explain this to my students, but....

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Thank you.

We'll go to Ms. Black.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you to all three of you for coming today and sharing your expertise with us.

Dr. Maloney, you indicated that you've travelled several times and watched the evolution in Afghanistan over the last several years. In your opinion, is this a counter-insurgency mission? If it is, what have been the lessons from history about the best tactics to use, particularly with regard to the civilian population and the issue of taking prisoners.

I'm also interested in your opinion on the role of Pakistan. Do you think they will ever be in a position to prevent the insurgents from crossing back and forth across the border? It's a continuing problem, and I'd like to know what you have to say about that.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

What do you want to tackle first?

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

You can choose, I'll just get them out there.

The last thing I wanted to ask you--I have three questions to ask you--is this. Are we now seeing a shift from guerrilla tactics--I think you alluded to this--into a more conventional positioning of the Taliban staying in one place; and if that's what's happening, what does that mean for the mission?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Okay, we have a bunch of diverse questions. Which one do you want me to talk about, the first one?

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

It's up to you.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Let's talk about what the enemy are doing. Are we seeing a shift? We see constant shifts in Afghanistan in terms of how the enemy do business. We've seen this over the past several years. They'll try to move back and forth between different levels of violence and different techniques to try to counter what we're doing, because we're constantly evolving as well.

So in one case, in this particular case of Pashmul, you may have seen a shift for that particular zone. But that doesn't mean that is going to translate to that type of defence elsewhere in the south, because of terrain and the nature of our forces. They're going to adjust, depending on what we're doing. So I wouldn't view this as a linear shift. There's a Maoist construct where you go from essentially a guerrilla type of operation to a more conventional operation. I don't see that model applying yet. I have yet to see evidence that the Taliban thinks like that. I think they're more Viet Cong-like, where they're going to apply the types of resources that they think will provide the most disruptive effect on us in theatre, and then for the largest impact outside of theatre, specifically the Canadian public and our allies' publics as well.

I don't personally view this as a grand shift in everything they're doing. I think they have attempted this particular technique in this particular place. If we saw this all over the place, maybe, but I haven't seen it all over the place. This is a counter-insurgency mission, absolutely.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

And what are the lessons from history?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Let me describe what I mean by counter-insurgency. There is a lot of confusion in the electorate, particularly, about the terminology we use to describe missions. The way I teach it at RMC is this.

On the spectrum of what we're dealing with, there is interpositionary peacekeeping, which would be like Suez in 1956, where we have two countries and we have, by political agreement, a UN force that's lightly armed separating them. It is interpositionary.

The next phase you have is a stabilization operation, which we got into mostly in the 1990s. Unfortunately, people call stabilization “peacekeeping”, so it confuses everybody. Stabilization operations tend to be within a country that's fragmented and where there aren't necessarily representative governments. You have to use different types of techniques and higher levels of force than you would in interpositionary peacekeeping.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

I was asking you specifically about the civilian population and the issue of prisoners, as well.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

I'll get to that.

The next phase, counter-insurgency, is a particular mission type that closely resembles stabilization operations but in fact uses higher levels of force, has a much more integrated approach, and like in Afghanistan, is usually in support of a sovereign country. That's as opposed to stabilization, where you have a country that's broken up and the international community is intervening. That's the way I distinguish between the three. We're engaged in counter-insurgency in Afghanistan.

The impact on the population depends on where we're talking about in the country--in the north, south, east, west, or in Kabul.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Right now we're--

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

You're talking about where we're operating in the south?