National Defence Committee on Sept. 20th, 2006

[LGen Richard Evraire]

The debate over the contribution of resources to Afghanistan by NATO nations, of course, is ongoing. We recognize that there has been less than a rush to the gates to provide additional troops and equipment.

I should point out that if we look at the history of NATO since its inception in 1951, we should not be surprised that there appears to be a crisis right now in the response that is expected of some of the NATO nations. Crises, I think, have peppered the history of NATO from its very beginning, and interestingly, the alliance has managed through very difficult times--in the Cold War and since then in the changes to its mandate--to survive and survive rather well. It has undertaken in former Yugoslavia, for the first time in its history, offensive operations and it is continuing to do that in Afghanistan now.

Yes, indeed, we recognize that the response is slow. All we have really heard of, to my knowledge at this point, is an additional potential contribution from Poland, and we can only hope, following the upcoming series of ministerial meetings, that more will be offered.

I should point out as well that despite the increased number of member nations in NATO, some of the newer members are not necessarily in a great position to provide assistance in the sorts of operations that are going on in Afghanistan. Counter to that, of course, is the rather amazing and delightful contribution of Romania, a very small country, admittedly, and in terms of military capability one that we're delighted to see there. But I think we in Canada are probably a little disappointed at the response of alliance members. I can only repeat what I said a moment ago that the sorts of difficulties within the alliance are almost a standard feature of discussions and that these discussions will continue, no doubt, with the express purpose of eliciting from those who have not yet responded, in terms of increase in their contribution, to do so.

I would also point to the fact that the very large percentage--the majority of the NATO nations--are in some form or another contributing to the conflict. And counter to the argument that some--a very small number of NATO nations--are doing most of the heavy lifting, I guess it's almost our turn in the sense that over the years, during the Cold War certainly, where we initially presented quite a strong contribution and later decided to reduce it substantially, others were doing the heavy lifting. It's not only a question of it being our turn, but certainly I think it will be recognized fairly soon that if this NATO mission is to succeed--and I'm sure the alliance would expect that to happen--others will come forward.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Wetaskiwin, AB]

That kind of leads into my next question. There are numerous other NATO allies there who have fairly restrictive caveats placed on what their troops can and cannot do. I was wondering if I might get an historical perspective, perhaps from Mr. Maloney, on whether or not that's traditionally been the case, and I think I've already heard a little bit of that. Perhaps it is Canada's turn, but maybe there are some other NATO allies who have to take a turn as well, who haven't perhaps shared much of the heavy lifting in the past.

Where do you see the future of these caveats? You know, if NATO is going to be an effective organization in the future and it's going to work at bringing about some stability against the threat of terror internationally, does NATO need to maybe reconsider its own structure and its own governance so that sometimes these caveats might not be so restrictive in allowing the commanders who are in the field to actually produce the results that we expect of them?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

The first time I heard the term “caveat” used was with ISAF in Kabul. I know that the concept existed before, particularly in Kosovo, and in prototypical form probably in SFOR. But the first time I really started to hear it and the restrictions on the various national contingents was in ISAF, when I was there in 2004, and this was a huge problem. This reflected national control over national forces, and it was completely legitimate, given the nature of the alliance. It was up to the commander of the force to apply his resources, given the limitations he had at the time. That caused a number of problems.

As I understand it, once we handed off Enduring Freedom to ISAF in the south, this hasn't quite been the case. The countries that don't want to be committed into that environment are committed elsewhere, particularly in RC West in Herat, and RC North. The people who want to be able to contribute in a robust way will go down to the south.

This becomes an issue of diplomacy on the one hand, and troop motivation on the other, in these various countries. Without having access to the information, it would be interesting to see, from the various members of NATO, how they assessed the motivations of the various forces in this environment or any other environment. In fact, if you do an historical analysis you'll find that the so-called heavy lifting has been borne by the ABCA countries, and usually The Netherlands. So it's been America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, The Netherlands, and sometimes Germany.

You'll find that ABCA and New Zealand are always there. You can track those guys in almost every operation. I think I did it in an article somewhere. Then some people will show up and some people won't. I just have to take it as the state of affairs. That's going to form the core of any force going in, and all sorts of other things will attach to it.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

We'll go to Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I heard recently somewhere that the Taliban fighters, as Dr. Maloney said, come from different backgrounds. Many of them are Pashtuns, but there are others as well. I understand--and correct me if I'm wrong--that Chechen fighters, who are much better trained and organized, are now beginning to appear on the ground as part of the Taliban.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

They just leave and then come back. There have been Chechens there since 2001.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

They never left?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

No, there have always been Chechens there. This is not new for the region.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Are Chechens part of the flow back and forth from Pakistan?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Yes. Chechens were part of al-Qaeda's conventional formations when the take-down took place in 2001. Some of those remnants were there, but they were augmented with other Chechens later.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Are there more Chechens flowing in from Chechnya?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

I don't have the specific numbers, but they are part of a general jihadist inflow. There are other nationalities doing this, but they are one of them.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I believe I saw General Jones on television today, and he was talking about the request to various NATO allies for the 15%. He was saying this was not an act of desperation; it was already in the plan. But the fact is that there are no commitments for that 15%.

The question is awkward, but would it be prudent for NATO to go all out in the kind of combat we've seen, believing the fulfillment of that 15% was important to the battle or battles, and yet not have firm commitments from NATO allies before the expansion into the south and the kinds of battles that are taking place?

[Col Brian MacDonald]

The commitments were on an alliance-wide basis. The actual delivery fell at about the 85% level. General Jones said a week or two ago, “You have promised me 100%; you have delivered 85%; I want the remaining 15%.”

Can you mount operations at less than 100%? Of course you can. You can't do as much with 85% as you can with 100%, but you can certainly achieve the objectives over a specific area. In order to achieve all of the objectives, you need that 100% and possibly more, because you then have to deal with the flow of reinforcements to replace casualties. But you can go forward with less than 100%.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

But the question is, was it prudent, knowing what you know now that the calls are becoming more frequent for the quota or the 15% to be filled? Under the circumstances—I'm not asking you to second-guess people on the ground, but as an independent observer sitting far away—would it be prudent to go into the kind of dangerous combat we are in, in southern Afghanistan, without the full contingent?

[Col Brian MacDonald]

There is an old saying in the military that no plan ever survives first contact with the enemy, and I think here we are seeing, of course, changes in the actual tactics that are employed by the Taliban. The calls for specific capabilities reflect the realization that since the facts on the ground have changed, then our response to those have changed as well. I'd also come back to my earlier statement that of the most recent Canadian additional commitment, a good chunk of it was directed towards animating the provincial reconstruction team, as opposed to simply providing the additional combat power.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I have one more very brief question. I'm going over old territory covered by my colleague.

You have seen the piece by one of your colleagues, General Manson, “A Rational Exit Strategy for Afghanistan”. He lists a certain number of indicators that he believes ought to crystallize before a rational exit can take place, and he says that in fact he can't tell how long it would take.

When I read these indicators, which indicate the Taliban decline, security being restored, the Afghan army and police becoming effective, market economies locally beginning to flourish, human rights increasing dramatically, central government control spreading, the development of infrastructure, democratization—all of these things that we know in the west to be important preconditions for a stable society—I'm not asking you to look at your crystal ball, but would it be fair to say this could take 20 to 30 years in Afghanistan?

[Col Brian MacDonald]

The short answer is yes. Over time during the course of that 20 or 30 years, the requirement for forces at the level they are at now would decline, and the national resources then supplied could result in a decrease in the military resources supplied and an increase in the developmental resources that are supplied. I would see this as an evolutionary process: that once stability has begun to be achieved, then it continues to move.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

And I may agree with you; I'm not an expert on these issues. But for security to increase, you would agree with me that stopping the flow, the leaking back and forth, through the Pakistan border is essential; that if we cannot stop that porous border from providing additional supplies and additional personnel to fight on behalf of or as part of Taliban, we may not succeed for a much longer time.

In that context—not that I am asking you to pass judgment—I have not seen international initiatives, initiated by either our government or the United States of America or by NATO, to rein in Pakistan. What does that say about our preparation and deliberate forethought before expanding operations the way we have?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

A quick response is that's an American prerogative, because of their special relationship with Pakistan. And there's a lot of stuff that goes on behind the scenes that the public doesn't see.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

But it's our men and women dying too.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Exactly.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

So why is it not our obligation to initiate that discussion, both publicly and privately?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

How do we know it hasn't been done privately?

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Nobody has ever told us that. Those are questions that we ask in the media, just as you do every day.

Thank you.