National Defence Committee on Sept. 27th, 2006

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

My second question has to do with your comments about the ideal length of a deployment. The ideal would be six months out of a three-year term. We're currently demanding a tour out of every 18 months from our soldiers, and that ratio is unsustainable.

What impact does that have on our ability to engage in other missions? How is it impacted by that level of deployment, by that frequency of deployment?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I'm not sure I fully understand the question, Mr. Chairman. I'll give a very quick answer.

It's all out of the same pot. The army is only so big, the navy is only so big, the air force is only so big. You can't use them interchangeably. Taking a fighter pilot and putting him into a foxhole in Afghanistan might cause me some humour, but it doesn't really solve the problem. They have different skills. A large part of the load, just by the very nature of the task, falls on the army. The navy and air force can support a tremendous amount, and they are doing more and more in that regard. You're starting to see pilots and naval officers on provincial reconstruction teams and things like that. It's a positive move. That's using what we have as much we can. But the load is on the army.

My personal view is that it's a 5:1 ratio. Five plus one equals six, which means one six-month tour out of every three. So you take the army, and you can deploy one-sixth of it at any one time. You say, well, why can't you do more than that? You can, but what is a sustainable limit? Bear in mind that they have to spend a significant amount of time when they come out of the mission just decompressing and getting over the mission, and then they have to start training to go on the next one. The minimum is six months in both of those cycles. Given weather conditions and all the other tasks, it's probably more.

When we're talking about 2,500 troops in Afghanistan--add up all the missions and call it, in round figures, 3,000--my quick math says we're talking about 18,000 field force troops, and the total number of field force troops in the Canadian army is about 12,000.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

I have a last question.

You also touched on the topic of the national will to stay. In light of your comments about the importance of this mission and the investments we have currently made to the resources allocated to Afghanistan, how do you think we should encourage this national will to stay among the Canadian public?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

That is not a question that one can provide a simple or quick answer to. There are many factors here, not the least of which is the history of the last 50 years and the sense that Canadians have of themselves and their military, which is changing and needs to change.

In my opening remarks, I boiled it down to one thing, and it's called leadership. I'm not pointing fingers; I genuinely am not. I consider myself responsible for that. I did in uniform and I continue today because of what I've done as a professional. I think everybody in the military, every politician--irrespective of political stripe--people in business and academia, all have a responsibility to understand these complex issues and provide leadership to the Canadian people. We have become, in my humble view, lazy and irresponsible in what is really a collective responsibility on the international stage.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much. That ends the first round. Starting our five-minute round, we'll go to the official opposition, back to the government, to the Bloc, and back to the government.

Go ahead, sir.

[Omar Alghabra, Liberal, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, thank you so much for joining us here. Allow me first to take a minute to pay tribute to your service and the service of our military forces on our behalf.

I want you to elaborate on something. I'm getting a sense that you're saying a lot of the soldiers, including you, are having some questions about the cause and what's going on over there.

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I don't believe our soldiers question why they're there, but I believe many Canadians question why they're there. If Canadian will is not firm in saying we should be there and for this reason, then the impact on the soldiers can be significant. I use that as an opportunity to express something here.

The soldiers will do what is required. They'll take the knocks from this mission, casualties and everything included. The fact that there's a legitimate political debate going on about what a nation should do is not a problem. They're not worried about that. They can discern the difference between that legitimate political debate in terms of genuinely asking should we or should we not be there, and what they will perceive as the unwillingness, frankly, to stay the course and to do the hard things.

[Omar Alghabra, Liberal, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Okay, thanks.

You also talked about the fact that you need to have a balance, you need to find a balance between the military role and the humanitarian one, and about aid and gaining the hearts and minds of the locals. In your opinion, and I know you're not directly involved now in what's going on, do you see that balance being achieved?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

The first thing I have to say, quite honestly, is that I have not been in Afghanistan since 2002, and I have been out of uniform for three years. So I haven't seen the details of exactly what's going on on the ground. I'm basing my comments on open-source material in terms of what I am aware of.

There have been difficulties in that regard. In some cases, it is because some members of the international community who have committed to do development and reconstruction work haven't delivered. I'm not talking about Canada; it's an international effort. There are something like, I believe, 36 nations in Afghanistan; there are a lot of people engaged. So there are other people there. In some cases, it's because the security situation in the region doesn't permit it to occur. So there are some imbalances. Certainly in the south, the balance has been heavily weighted in terms of the security issue, which is a concern.

I will reflect on the reality, though, that we only took over in the south in the early part of this year. It's one of the tougher regions of the country. It's a tough nut to crack, and it's going to take some time. Whether, on a day-to-day basis, that balance is right I can't tell you, because you would have to be there to see if that is the case.

[Omar Alghabra, Liberal, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

You said it's going to take some time. How much time do we need to step back and re-examine the strategies we've been applying and maybe identify a different strategy or approach?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

It's hard to put a timeline on it. I would say that you need to be looking at a minimum of six months in the south in terms of what's happening there. We just haven't been at it long enough. One battle does not a campaign make. Just because we've had a bit of a rough go for a period of time doesn't mean the strategy is not sound. Bear in mind that the other guy has a vote. The other guy doesn't want you to succeed. He's going to do everything he can to stop you, so there's that element to it as well.

If you look at the longer-term campaign, step back from this and look at how long ISAF has been there. It went there in 2002-03. Its current campaign of provincial reconstruction teams started in the north, moved to the west, and now is moving south. Ultimately, the next phase is to go to the east. It started with the easy parts, and in the degree of difficulty, it's getting more and more difficult as it goes along. It's taken a couple of years to get this far. Given that the south is a tough nut to crack, it could take several years. It could take a lot longer. I don't want to mislead you, but our expectations need to be tempered with the reality of how difficult these things are.

I was saying you need a minimum of six months to reconsider the strategy. That doesn't mean you change it. Give the commanders in theatres at least six months to figure out whether they have it right or not. They'll normally tell you pretty quickly if they think it should change.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, and thanks for the question.

We'll go over to Mr. Hawn, and then back to the Bloc.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, General Jeffery. I've know you as a straight shooter in uniform, and I'm glad to see that your style hasn't changed.

I'd like to change the line of questioning a little bit. We talked about resilience and sustainability and so on. The Canadian Forces has embarked on a new, more aggressive recruiting program. I assume that you've seen the ads and are aware of the thrust behind them. What's your view of that program? Do you think it can be successful? How do you view that?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I can't resist, Mr. Chair. Mr. Hawn and I would remember the time of recruiting back in the late sixties and early seventies, when the recruiting campaign was a young officer in a nice green uniform getting off a 707 with a briefcase in his hand. It was the sort of the image of the young executive, which is anathema to someone in the combat side of the profession. We've come a long way in that regard.

I have been very concerned for quite some time that the nature of the recruiting advertisement and the effectiveness of the recruiting campaign was not where I thought it should be. This is in part because we have been reluctant nationally to call a spade a spade in terms of what a soldier, sailor, airman, or airwoman is there to do. It goes in line with the myth of peacekeeping, that we're somehow imbued with some sort of special qualities that allow us to do things that others can't. The reality is that it's a harsh world out there, and the military is there to be able to deal with those harsh realities. If one strategic lesson has been learned out of this, it is that what we've allowed to slide over a couple of decades is the ability to do some of the tough stuff.

So in some respects I think it's a positive turn. It's honesty in advertising, and I think it will appeal to certain segments of the population, certainly; whether all segments is another matter. But it will take some time.

The piece of it that I'm a bit concerned about is the accentuation of terrorism as the threat and tying it to recruiting. I believe that terrorism and all of those issues from a broad political perspective need to be addressed, and the Canadian people need to engage in those issues. But it's not the only reason, and it should not be the dominant reason that people join the military. It's just one of many potential missions that the Canadian Forces will have to undertake.

I don't know if I've answered the question.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

No, that's good.

Actually, I have a bit of a follow-on to that, from resilience of the CF now to the resilience of Canadian public and, by extension, the government. You brought up the myth of Canadian peacekeeping. How much has the myth of the Canadian peacekeeper warped or done damage to Canadians' appreciation of the realities of international affairs and what the participation is of Canada and the Canadian Forces in those?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I'm not sure I can put a measure on it, but I would say considerable.

The classic peacekeeping hasn't existed for a very long time--the idea that we have two opposing societies, or states, or portions of the state, and we need blue-helmeted people standing in between keeping them separated until they settle their differences politically. I wouldn't suggest it couldn't occur again, but the reality is that it hasn't occurred for a very long time. It's a much more complex world. If Canadians believe that we can send the youth, the young blood of this country, off to those other regions of the world and that's all we need to do--we don't need to give them weapons, we don't need to give the tools of the trade, as it were, and we don't need to give them the moral backing to do it--we're killing them for nothing. I mean, they will die for nothing.

I remember going into a UN mission where, sadly, I had troops who were not prepared to do that. It was one of those, and many have seen it happen, where we cobbled the mission together for a number of reasons—this is many years ago—and we sent them off to do it and they weren't capable of doing the job. If you did that today, the number of people we've had come home in coffins would have been manyfold greater.

So we can't afford it. It is a myth. You need people out there who are able to look after themselves and use force where it is necessary. It doesn't mean we're going out to kill people. Ideally we can get around it, but you'd better be prepared to.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

You have a few more seconds.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Quickly, what's your view of putting any stock in the comments of a junior officer whose main job is to make sure the general's boots are shined? I'm speaking of Leo Docherty, the aide-de-camp of the British general who keeps getting quoted as some authority on the success or failure of the mission.

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

In every comment you must always consider where the comment comes from. I can't say much more than that. I'm not familiar with the individual, so I don't have a comment.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

That's fair. Thank you.

Back to the Bloc, Mr. Carrier.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Good day, General. Thank you for joining us today.

Earlier, mention was made of striking a balance between armed intervention, reconstruction efforts and humanitarian aid in this country. Do you feel that Canada is focussing enough on reconstruction at this time? During his recent visit, Mr. Karzaï apparently said that Canada should focus its efforts more training Afghan soldiers so that they could take over from the Canadian military. Are Canadian Forces doing enough in this area?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I'm not sure I'm in a position to honestly respond to that in terms of a judgment. I would say that relative to the size of our overall mission, we're doing a considerable amount in the broad area--not just reconstruction, but in the broad development area. We have people in positions that very few other nations have. We have a tremendous amount of influence in Afghanistan, right from the highest political level all the way down, given the kinds of commitments that we have there. We are leading one of the provincial reconstruction teams and, of course, we run one of the major regions in the south, so we have a tremendous amount of influence.

Should we be doing more? Someone needs to be doing more. We could go back to the issue of balance; I think there needs to be more contribution. I'm not in a position to say it should come from Canada, because it's not only our problem. As I said, this is a NATO problem; it's a western world problem.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

You stated that we cannot leave unless our mission in Afghanistan is accomplished. Sooner or later, however, we will have to pull out of Afghanistan. Our troops cannot remain there indefinitely. Countries far more powerful than Canada have had to pull out, just like the Americans were forced to leave Vietnam. Theirs was not a glorious retreat. They pulled out after failing to complete their mission.

If we postpone our pull-out unduly, do the risks not increase and the consequences become even graver?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

Certainement. We certainly could.

There's a risk there--I would be lying to you if I said otherwise--but to my mind it is an issue of will. I mean, if the western world has said Afghanistan is a place where we are going to be counted--that we are going to ensure that this nation will be allowed to prosper, that it is going to be peaceful, that Taliban extremism will not use it as a base of operation and continue to then export it around the world--then we have a collective responsibility to make that happen. I would suggest, looking around the collective international table, that there are a lot of other people who need to look in the mirror in terms of whether they're doing their share, but if we just fall into step with those who would rather not get involved or do their share, are we any better than they are? I'd like to think that we are better than that. That's a personal view, but I'd like to think that we are better than that.

If we continually say it's all too expensive and we should get out before it fails, then I'm sorry, that is not commitment; that is not national will. That, to be blunt, is cowardice.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Pakistan is playing an increasingly negative role in Afghanistan. Consider the fact that to a great extent, this country is responsible for the terrorist activity in Afghanistan and for forcing the Americans to get involved.

Isn't there a danger that the military operation now under way in Afghanistan could be derailed even further, thereby necessitating further military intervention in this country?