If I may just correct something in terms of specifics, the exercise we did in the nineties was prior to 9/11, obviously, and we were trying to analyze what kind of world we were going into. We already believed that we were going into a much more complex world, and that with the end of the Cold War we were going to see asymmetric warfare emerge: a lot of little guys trying to beat up the big guys, if you want to put it in simple terms. It changes the very nature of conflict. The tactics all change, and you have to adapt the army to that. That drove a lot of our thinking.
In early 2000 we actually developed an army strategy that saw us fundamentally shift the kinds of operations we'd undertake. In many ways General Hillier of CDS has carried those ideas on. So you're seeing that change.
It came home to us in spades early after 9/11 when we started to face that reality. Afghanistan was the first encounter of that. At that stage I would not have termed it counter-insurgency as an operation; it was counterterrorism and search and destroy, to be very blunt. It was that kind of operation. But if you want to put a label on it, what is going on in Afghanistan today is much more classic counter-insurgency operations.