National Defence Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

It being 3:30, we'll call to order the seventeenth meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence, dealing with our study of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

Today we'd like to welcome, from DND, Colonel Capstick, the former commander of the strategic advisory team in Afghanistan.

Sir, we're very pleased that you could be with us today. If you have some opening remarks, we'd like to hear those and then we'll move into our rounds of questioning.

The floor is yours, sir.

[Col M.D. Capstick, former Commander, Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan, Department of National Defence]

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thanks also to committee members for giving me the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon.

You can now tell why my remarks will mostly be in English this afternoon.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear in this important discussion of the Canadian Forces' portion of Canada's effort in Afghanistan. In these opening remarks, I'll try to provide you with information on a unique Canadian military contribution in Kabul, the Strategic Advisory Team—Afghanistan, or SAT-A. I also hope to provide you with some insight into the major strategic focus of that team, the thing we worked on the most, which was the Afghanistan compact and Afghanistan's national development strategy.

Finally, I'll leave you with my evaluation of some of the major national-level issues that face the elected Afghan government and must be addressed as part of the international state-building effort.

In June 2005 I was appointed by the Chief of the Defence Staff to develop and lead a strategic advisory team that would be deployed to Kabul to provide the Government of Afghanistan with strategic planning assistance. The concept was based on General Hillier's experience when he was commander of the International Security Assistance Force. During that mission he assigned military planners to assist the Minister of Finance of the day, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, at Ashraf's request, with developing a strategic plan for Afghan reconstruction.

The essence of the concept is that the military officers involved would bring the rigour of the well-developed military strategic planning process to the solution of civil and societal problems. The team I led consisted of 15 people. I had seven strategic planners who were employed in two sub-teams, a DND civilian, a strategic analyst, a military officer with expertise in developing strategic communications and information plans, and a CIDA-contracted capacity development expert. I also had three non-commissioned officers in the support role and a small command group that consisted of a chief of staff and me.

On arrival in Kabul in August 2005, the Canadian ambassador of the day, Chris Alexander, as well as the CIDA head of aid of the day, Dr. Nipa Banerjee, worked very closely with me to determine where we would have the best effect. In short order, the Afghanistan national development strategy working group and the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission were identified as good places to be. By early September, we were working in those offices on a daily basis.

In both cases, we worked very closely with Afghan counterparts to provide the tools necessary to develop the plans they need to move the country forward. The ANDS, Afghanistan's national development strategy working group, example is a good one. Our team worked in the same office--picture a room about twice this size--mixed in with young Afghan staff who were charged with putting the strategy together.

The ideas and programs were fed into the group from a variety of sources: Afghan leaders, ministers, international organizations, and individual academic experts. We assisted the Afghans in putting these inputs together into a strategic framework that would then be used to sequence activities, coordinate projects, and allocate resources. In essence, we acted as the mechanics that helped the Afghans put their invention together.

We used essentially the same method in the civil service commission, and after helping them prepare a strategy, we then redeployed a team to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to help develop that ministry's objectives into an actionable plan.

After we became familiar with ANDS, we realized that we could assist the International Security Assistance Force to align its activities with the national strategy. To that end, we worked on a concept that would allow the commander, General Richards, to shape his campaign plan to the ANDS and help direct provincial reconstruction team tactical level actions so that they would be connected to national priorities and would be more coherent throughout the country.

General Richards and his staff have spared no effort in this regard, and we in fact provided him with the appropriate chapter on Afghanistan's national development strategy for his provincial reconstruction team manual, his direction to provincial reconstruction teams. So that was the team, and that's what we did.

I'd now like to take a bit of time to provide you with some context in terms of what Afghanistan has accomplished in a few short years and briefly discuss the plan for the future.

Despite the pessimistic tone of much commentary, Afghanistan has seen some remarkable progress in the last four years. As part of the Bonn process, which was the road map that established the basic political framework necessary for good governance, Afghans agreed on a constitution. They held very successful presidential elections in October 2004. And they held very well organized and well-turned-out parliamentary elections on September 18, 2005.

I had the honour of accompanying the Canadian ambassador and observing polls, and it was a remarkable feeling, like being a witness to history.

These achievements should not be underestimated. Thirty years of conflict has not only destroyed the basic structures of the state and much of the physical infrastructure, it has also inflicted serious damage to the social fabric of the country. This kind of damage is almost impossible to see, but it is probably more significant than the kind of damage that can be photographed and measured.

Massive population movements have all but destroyed many of the traditional methods of social regulation and conflict resolution, and constant fighting has left the population with a collective case of essentially psychological disruption—they are really tired of the conflict and the fighting. The success of the Bonn process in effect signalled the collective commitment of the people of Afghanistan to replacing the power of the gun with democratic processes.

In addition to this impressive political process, Afghans and the international community have established basic security in about three-quarters of the country. Hundreds of thousands—I think the number is in the millions now—of children, including girls, have returned to schools. Clinics, roads, irrigation systems, and countless other development projects have been completed and many more have been started. Much of this work has been completed with little fanfare or media attention.

The focus of Canadian leaders, the media, and our citizens has understandably been on combat operations in Kandahar province. These are the most intense combat operations the Canadian Forces have been engaged in since the Korean War, and of course they warrant Canadians' attention. That said, looking at Afghanistan only through the lens of combat operations in Kandahar is like looking at Afghanistan through a straw: a far too narrow field of view is presented and it misses much of the bigger picture.

With the end of the Bonn process, the elected government and the international community turned their collective attention to developing a comprehensive and robust plan for the future. This plan is articulated in two major documents that were presented at the London conference on the future of Afghanistan in February 2006: the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan national development strategy. These are in essence the vision--that's the compact--and the plan, the national development strategy, that will determine the future of the country. The compact is a political-level mutual commitment between the international community, including Canada, and the Government of Afghanistan. It is a clear declaration of international support and the reciprocal commitment of the government to perform. ANDS is, in short, a strategy for achieving that commitment.

On February 15, 2006, the UN Security Council endorsed the compact and welcomed Afghanistan's national development strategy. This resolution is both a unanimous declaration of international support for the elected government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a mutual commitment to the future of the country. Both documents address the problems of Afghanistan using a strategic framework that includes three pillars or lines of operation: security; governance, rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development.

At this juncture I'd like to make two important points. The first is that the compact and ANDS together is the plan for Afghanistan. This is an Afghan-led plan and its execution is jointly monitored and coordinated by the Afghan government and the international community under the leadership of the United Nations assistance mission in Afghanistan. Secondly, all elements of the official Canadian contribution to this mission—military, diplomatic, and development—work together in all three of the pillars to accomplish the common goal. Time precludes an in-depth examination of how the whole-of-government or three-D concept works on the ground, but the provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar and strategic advisory team for Afghanistan in Kabul are two of the most obvious examples.

Although remarkable progress has been made in all three pillars, much more needs to be done. Afghanistan is at or near the bottom of every single UN human development indicator. Grinding poverty, illiteracy, very high infant mortality rates, chronic undernourishment, and massive unemployment are but a few of the problems that Afghans face every day. ANDS does address these critical areas, as well as the rest of the problems that must be overcome to attain the vision of a stable, secure, and prosperous Islamic state. Even though it is a comprehensive and robust plan, it will take sustained international engagement, resources, time, and patience to accomplish its ambitious goals.

I'll now use the compact strategic framework to conclude with a few remarks on some of the most pressing national-level issues that must be addressed in the near term.

The insurgency in the south is clearly the biggest issue in the security pillar. It has retarded development in that region and presents a threat to the progress that has been made in the rest of the country. The Afghan government and NATO have responded with initiatives such as the policy action group, a joint Afghan-international body that is now directing all aspects of the national-level strategy for the south. Other initiatives, such as the Afghan development zone concept, are intended to establish close links between security and development. That is the only formula that will stabilize that part of the country.

Afghan national security force development is another major issue that is crucial to the future. Afghan National Army reform is seeing good progress, but it needs to be accelerated. Afghan National Police reform has been more problematic, and that institution has not earned the trust of the population for any number of reasons, including widespread corruption and a lack of professionalism as we know it in terms of how police operate. The international community has recently enhanced this program, but much more needs to be done, and it will take time.

In the governance, rule of law, and human rights sectors, much has been accomplished, as I described earlier. That said, corruption is still an issue, and that and the general lack of an effective judicial system are major concerns. The Government of Afghanistan has recently taken some important anti-corruption measures and has also made some significant arrests in an effort to impede the corruption.

Recent changes to the Supreme Court are promising in terms of judicial reform, but the lack of an effective judiciary at lower levels is serious. Afghans basically lack confidence in the system, because of things like arbitrary arrest, detention, and the inability to access courts to solve basic social problems. Again, this is not something that is going to fixed overnight, and work is being done on it.

Finally, in this sector, reform of the civil service and of government assistance has been very slow and has not been very well coordinated. Public administration reform needs a major effort like the one applied to the army.

In the economic and social development sector, a major effort to achieve coherence and urgency is necessary. Several major official development agencies from other countries do not use the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund or the ministry of finance to move the money to programs and projects. Others use only contractors of their own nation to deliver. This results in excessive overhead and security costs.

Finally, the entire development program could be considered by some academics as under-resourced. Carl Robichaud of the Century Foundation has determined that the per capita aid expenditure in the early days of the Bosnian intervention was $649 U.S. per person, while in Afghanistan, left in a far worse post-conflict situation, the commitment is only about $57 U.S. per capita.

Clearly, coordinating and aligning the development effort with ANDS is an area that needs sustained international leadership. The Afghan state-building project is complex and complicated, and the problems are serious. But the problems can be overcome by this concerted international effort that was pledged at the London conference. Patience, resolve, and perseverence are essential, if the people of Afghanistan are to see the results of the promises made in the last four years.

Personally, after a year in Kabul I am optimistic about the outcome, but realistic about how tough this really is. We should have no illusions. Much remains to be done in Afghanistan, and the future of the country is by no means assured.

Finally, again personally, I am proud of the effort that Canada, the Canadian Forces, and each and every sailor, soldier, airman, and civilian has made to keep the promises that the international community and our country have made to the people of Afghanistan. I'm proud to have served with these outstanding Canadians, and the army, navy, and air force regular, reserve, and civilian people whom I had the honour and privilege of commanding in Kabul speak very well for this country.

All of us left there believing in the mission, and all of us left there with enduring images of a people determined to make their children's lives a little better than theirs.

Thank you for your time, and thank you for your interest in the mission and the outstanding work that your fellow Canadians in Afghanistan do in the name of our nation every day.

If the chair is willing, I'm ready for questions or comments.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Good. Thank you very much.

We have a pretty structured way of posing questions. We'll go around with a seven-minute round, and then the next round will be for five minutes.

We start with Mr. Dosanjh, and then Mr. Bachand will be next.

Go ahead, Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you, Colonel, for being with us today.

I want to ask you to comment on what I say. We've been hearing a lot about the reality on the ground, and we know there has been intense fighting for some time in Panjwai and places such as that. You tell us today and simply confirm that the police are largely corrupt in Afghanistan, and there are all kinds of difficulties.

In fact Brigadier General Howard said that CIDA funding is not flowing to the PRT, and he said that the operational budget was being put into the PRT.

We have your comments, which I believe were reported on October 5, when you said that “the amount of international aid that has poured into the country (like the number of soldiers, not enough) is often invisible, what is sometimes called ‘phantom aid.’” So I'm assuming you share the concern that the aid isn't as much as it ought to be, or isn't getting to where it ought to go.

Then you have a situation where in terms of the security situation, our minister for CIDA wasn't even able to see the aid projects we're responsible for, and Afghan press couldn't attend her press conference in Kabul. Basically that tells me we are in a very difficult situation.

We also have Mr. MacKay's words reported today. Minister MacKay says essentially that the aid workers are not allowed to go do what they need to, because of the limits that have been placed on them after Glyn Berry's death.

Quite a lot of literature tells us that the eradication of poppies, particularly emphasized and pushed by the U.S., creates enemies on the ground, and in fact creates hungry families there. I'm told it creates a situation where particularly men in those families would be willing to fight on the side of the Taliban, given small amounts of money. Some estimates tell me that there are about 80% to 90% of those men in areas such as Kandahar province and Helmand who are hungry because of the destruction of their crops—with emaciated children I've seen in some videos—who would be willing to fight on the opposite side.

The reason I mention all these things, and there are many one could mention, is that I really want you to take us behind the scenes. You've been in Afghanistan; you have a better sense than I could have, never having been there and only reading about these things. Tell us what's happening beyond the stories that we hear of victories or defeats. What's happening on the ground? Are we winning the hearts and minds of ordinary people, or is it true that 80% of them—this is not a scientific estimate—might fight on the other side? I'd really like you to unvarnish the coverage for me and tell me what's happening.

[Col M.D. Capstick]

I'll try. It's a very comprehensive question. I'll try to start where you left off.

As I said in my opening remarks, somewhere around 75% of the country is relatively stable and secure—stable and secure enough for development to occur. Of course incidents occur: suicide bombers here and there, and some old factional elements who will come out of—I almost said the woods, but most of the place was deforested—the hills and try to create a disruption for their own purposes, generally related to some kind of criminality or other. A number of things happened over the previous four years to help create the conditions that gave us the current situation in Kandahar, in Helmand in particular, and in a couple of the places in the southeast.

In most of the country, things are happening. When you drive through the streets of Kabul, you can hardly move. Kabul was about 350,000 people when the Soviets invaded in 1979. We think there are somewhere between three and a half and four million people there now. The good news is that this has fuelled a fair degree of economic development. Of course, it has also created unemployment and congestion, disrupted traditional social structures—it's being worked.

In the other areas, in the north and the west in particular, it is very stable. You have to get the picture in your mind's eye that “stable” in Afghanistan is not downtown Ottawa. There are people out there who are bad guys; it's that simple. But development is occurring, and small enterprise is picking up, and millions of kids have gone back to school, including girls. It's pretty impressive to see. Most of the schools in Kabul, for example, run three shifts during the school year, to get all the kids through. That is very upbeat and optimistic.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Let me ask you a simple question—

[Col M.D. Capstick]

If I could, sir, I just want to get to that poppy one and those farmers, before I lose my train of thought—I'm a pretty simple soldier here.

We have to be careful about drawing direct linkages between eradication and starvation. In the first place, there is a lot of mythology about the Afghanistan counter-narcotics strategy. I don't have it at hand, but there is a comprehensive strategy, and eradication is not the main focus of that strategy; alternative livelihoods are.

But it's more complicated than that. To create alternative livelihoods you have to have roads that can take crops from the farmer's field to the market centre, and you need a market, both internal and external, etc. It's a complicated economic process.

Whether the poppy is eradicated or not, or whether that guy is growing it or not, the farmer is at the bottom end of the poppy-growing food chain in terms of the money. The economic model is like post-U.S. Civil War share-cropping at the end of an AK-47. The cartels provide the seed, the fertilizer, and what's needed to grow the crop. Once the crop is cut, they come and get it, so the farmer doesn't have to worry about all that stuff. But he's in debt for all of it. And when the crop comes off, he gets a certain amount of money, enough to basically keep his nose above water and feed his family at subsistence levels until the next cycle starts again. These guys are trapped, and it's very complex. So eradication is really the last resort, and I guess I can leave that one there.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Yes, Colonel. We're going to have to move on, in the interests of time, but maybe you can get back to it later.

And now we have Mr. Bachand for seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

I have here a study by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers that you supposedly conducted. The study mentions Colonel M.D. Capstick, and two series of letters come after your name. The first series is OMM. Could you tell me what that stands for in English?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

It's the Order of Military Merit, sir.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

And what about the letters CD?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

That's the Canadian Forces Decoration.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Wouldn't you say that lends some weight to your arguments?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

Not a great deal.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

In your study which I read through carefully, you talk about three pillars. I'd like to start with a few brief questions. There's no need for you to go into detail. I just want to know if I've understood your study. More than likely you looked to this study for inspiration when making your presentation.

Your study refers to three pillars: security, that is reforming the national Afghan army, police reform and the dismantling of armed groups. As far as you're concerned, the chief mission of Canadian Forces is security. True or false?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

What I meant, sir, is that in the context of the official Canadian government contribution to Afghanistan, the Canadian forces have the lead. We are the lead agency in the security pillar. We do most of the work in the security pillar, and that includes those areas you spoke about, plus the actual stability operations.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I see.

In so far as the second pillar is concerned, you seem to be saying that it encompasses governance, the rule of law and human rights. This includes reform of government and the justice system and the fight against corruption. You also mentioned the poppy-based economy and seemed to say that this issue should be the responsibility of Foreign Affairs.

Do you still maintain that position?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

Yes, sir.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

The third pillar is economic and social development, over which CIDA should have responsibility, in your opinion.

[Col M.D. Capstick]

Yes, sir.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I see. Getting back to your presentation, you mentioned the SATA, or Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan. Let me read something you said in ...

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Mr. Bachand, we've lost the translation. I'm not sure what's happened.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Will you stop the clock, please?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I will stop the clock.

We're fine now.

You have four minutes and four seconds.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

Here's what you had to say about the SATA. I'll read it in English:

...it is a team of strategic planners that has been assigned to the Presidency to assist in the development of the kinds of plans necessary to achieve the vision described earlier in this paper.

That's what we were talking about a few minutes ago.

In short, it applies generalist military planning skills to the solution of civilian problems. SATA is an Afghanistan-Canadian bilateral arrangement that does not come under the command of either ISAF or the U.S.-led coalition. Instead, the team leader takes his direction from the senior economic advisor to the President, in consultation with both the Canadian Ambassador and head of aid, and its operational focus is squarely in the other two pillars.

I have many questions about this. We're always hearing how our forces' mission is becoming far too defensive in its approach. Now I learn that the SATA is comprised of military planners who are trying to resolve civilian problems. I have a problem with this and I have three related questions for you. Perhaps you could jot them down and then answer all three in quick succession.

First of all, how do you feel about military planning as an approach to resolving civilian problems?

Secondly, bilateral arrangements between Canada and the United States seem to suggest that Canada will be pulling out of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF. If in fact the ISFA, which is now in total control of Afghanistan, adopts a certain position, the SATA could well argue that it doesn't have to go along with what NATO Command is saying.

Thirdly, why target these two pillars? You've just said that Foreign Affairs should have responsibility for one of the pillars, and CIDA, responsibility for another. Now, we're hearing that the two can be replaced by the SATA committee, which endorses President Karzaï's decisions.

These are my three questions.