Just to speak specifically about eradication policy, manual eradication policy, from a counter-narcotics policy point of view, manual eradication is a legitimate part of a counter-narcotics strategy where there's an alternative livelihood. If somebody's growing poppies for opium out of greed, and they could be doing something else, you should go in there and eradicate the crop manually, not chemically.
Even the UN agrees that when there is no alternate livelihood it's not the appropriate response. The United States helped Turkey switch to opium for medicine; the United States and the UN in Thailand had a grace period and they transitioned to alternative livelihoods. There are lots of examples. What we are proposing for Afghanistan has been done by the United States elsewhere, under their counter-narcotics strategies. So it's not that we're coming up with a radical idea here, folks. We're just repeating to you a U.S. counter-narcotics strategy that's used elsewhere that we think should happen there.
There are parts of the war on drugs that absolutely don't work, have never worked no matter how much money you put into it, and there are parts--if you call Turkey, India, and Thailand part of the counter-narcotics strategy--that worked. So let's try to find something that works is what we're saying, from a counter-narcotics policy point of view.