First and foremost, I was not the army commander at the time the decision was made to extend the mission. My remit is to bring them in, through the good work of Chief of Military Personnel; to grow them in terms of culture; to train them; to work with a whole bunch of folk across town to equip them; to ensure that they reflect the army and the Canadian Forces ethos; to supervise their training activity; and then, at certain stages in their process, to give them a really cold, hard look as to whether or not they're ready to go off and do that which the Government of Canada wants them to do. To do that, we have an army-managed readiness system that is extraordinarily complicated, as you might anticipate or imagine, for an organization that, between the regulars, reserves, and soon-to-be the Rangers, is about 45,000.
The conveyor belt that leads us to actually generate battle groups, based on six-month deployment cycles, started many years ago and goes forever into the future. The variable that causes stress on the army is the size of the commitment--the actual number of soldiers it's sending overseas, and that which they're doing.
The reason I'm taking a bit of time to answer your question is, of course, that it asks three interwoven and complicated questions.
Vis-à-vis the numbers of soldiers we're sending overseas to do specific activities—and of course General Howard has already briefed you and you know far better than I—like security, development, and capacity building, we are sending more assets out to do security, development, and capacity building than we have in the past. In terms of the numbers and the ability to sustain and generate these forces, about half of the army's strength is currently comprised of reserves. I have visited many of the reserve brigades, many of the reserve units. There is an increasing enthusiasm for those great young folk to come and join us in the good work we're doing not only in Afghanistan, but also at home.
With regard to the reduced number of improvised explosive devices in attacks, they are made up of fairly crude technology, and of course that countryside is shattered by now close to thirty years of tragic war. Indeed, if you look at their sweep of history for the last two millennia, it has only been at rare times when that part of the world, as crossroads of empire, has not been subject to a variety of incredibly tragic circumstances. They need angry young men to operate those rockets, those shells, those mines that are buried in the roads or carried in vehicles or set up in mud-walled fortresses beside transit routes.
The result of Operation Medusa was the elimination of a significant number of those who operated close to Kandahar. I submit to you that one of the reasons we've seen fewer attacks in the short term is that the opposing forces have essentially now been knocked back on their feet. That does not, however, mean they are out. I think that over the course of the subsequent weeks and months there's a probability that the number of attacks could grow.
With regard to the Afghan development zone, it's an idea, an intent that was circulated first amongst NATO partners. I know that way back in 2003, when I was the Canadian mission commander in Kabul and I was discussing such issues with Mr. Brahimi, who was the special representative of the Secretary-General and arguably one of the world's great men.... Way back then, the idea was articulated as essentially being a bubble of development activity below that of the PRT. For example, in Afghanistan, we have one PRT—provincial reconstruction team—and you know it's in Kandahar. In the province itself, there would be five or six focus areas for development work. So that idea has always been extant. I just haven't seen it articulated in any coherent form until the last five or six months.
Such activity has already taken place in the provinces of Gardez, Badakhshan, Mazar-e Sharif, Hirat, Helmand, Khost, and now Kandahar. I would argue that it's a positive sign. It gives an area of focus for reconstruction work to occur. But keep in mind, of course, that the real reconstructors are not the soldiers. Those are the great folk from CIDA and the various international organizations, like the World Health Organization and the United Nations.
Sir, have I answered all three of your questions?