That is exactly it. I fully support the development of indigenous Afghan governmental capacity. In fact, by holding the Afghan authorities to the highest standards, liaising with them and following up, we're actually helping them to build up to meet our expectations.
The other thing is that although Alex was talking about problems in U.S. custody, the reason we need protections against onward transfers could hypothetically extend beyond concerns in terms of U.S. treatment. What if the Afghan authorities decided to transfer some of our detainees onwards to Uzbekistan or some other country with a particularly notorious record of torture? Having a right of notification and a right of veto simply ensures that the Afghan authorities uphold our expectations and the expectations of international law in any foreseeable circumstance.
The point I would again like to come back to is that the Dutch, after several months of very intensive work and study in committee meetings just like this, drafted an absolutely fine agreement that we should use as our model today, recognizing that our agreement was negotiated too quickly in the midst of a federal election campaign. It's easy to fix; I've just explained how. The Dutch agreement plus a right of veto solves all the problems, or at least 99% of the problems, and that's pretty good.