Mr. Bachand's problem is that he has never been in power—and he never will be—and he does not understand the subtlety and the nuances involved. A special advisor plays an extremely important role, and there is nothing in the motion to suggest that this will prevent us from doing our work on the acquisition policy, or that we are going to change everything.
We want to meet Mr. Khan in the context of his duties. He has an important role to play, because he is familiar with the issues in Pakistan. You yourself, my dear colleague, spoke about Pakistan, and you were quite right: this is an extremely important aspect of the situation and one which contributes to the complexity of the Afghanistan file. I don't think we said that we would be convening him immediately. We have work to do on the purchasing and acquisition policy. We will do our work.
In the meantime, we can decide when we want to invite him. It is important to emphasize that he will not be meeting with a lynch mob. If that were the case, we would lend him an even higher profile, and he would try to increase his credibility with that.
That is not our purpose. Our purpose is to confirm that he did indeed do useful work. We are immersed in our report on Afghanistan, we are dealing with data, and information is power. There is information that is essential for the very analysis that must underlie our work. In any case, we do not have to invite him right away. We have work to do, work is already being done at the foreign affairs committee, and we will have time to assess whether or not it would be useful to invite this gentleman here. Saying that we would like to see him without setting an actual date reflects what my colleague Mr. Blaney was saying: we have work to do. We have been charged with examining the acquisition policy, and if there is anyone here who wants this to go forward, it is indeed your humble servant. I think it is relevant in this context to generate a report that will properly reflect the whole range of points of view.
If this person advises the Prime Minister and has been appointed a special advisor because of his understanding of and expertise on a geopolitical situation, this will help to move our work forward. We have not said when we wanted to invite him; we simply said we wanted to do so. He will be going before the foreign affairs committee. In the meantime, we can work on the acquisition policy. We have already changed our February 27 agenda because we will be having a briefing session with Mr. Alexander and another person on the UN and NATO. This could also be a way of examining the situation. This will give us ample time. That being said, we are not here to save time, because if there is one party that is really interested in the matter of acquisitions, it is our party. Consequently, we want to start to work right away. When we can have additional tools that will help our colleagues to draft the best possible report, we will use them.