Thank you.
Just changing the course of the questions here a little bit, I'd like to get back to some of the discussions regarding the positioning of the operations in Afghanistan and the perceived problems with the border with Pakistan.
You mentioned in your testimony that there were opportunities for al-Qaeda or the terrorists--the Taliban, for example--to regroup in Pakistan. It's very difficult terrain, and I know the Pakistani government has deployed about 70,000 to 80,000 troops there. The Government of Pakistan is under considerable political pressure from the United States and its allies in this war on terrorism, and in its effort through Operation Enduring Freedom, to make sure we root out this evil.
Also on the ground in northern Pakistan, I believe it's not exactly the most conducive place, from a domestic perspective, for President Musharraf to be able to exercise his will. So he's torn between trying to appease international allies on that front and keeping the domestic peace where he doesn't have the command and control he would like to have.
I'm just wondering if that's true, if you could elaborate on some of the difficulties. Without being able to get rid of or to stop the migration of people and arms and other things like that across that border, to be successful, are we looking at a much larger role for the Government of Pakistan?