Regarding the DDR scene and setting the counter-narcotics priorities, I mentioned in my presentation that the Afghanistan Compact mentioned this. It is truly critical because in order to sustain peace you need to have economic dynamics favourable to establishing a peaceful solution.
The Afghanistan Compact, the UNDP, and the World Bank have all set up programs that are much more balanced in how they manage this phasing out of opium, the basic idea being that the production of opium is not necessarily being directly attacked so much as its relative importance within the economy is being gradually reduced.
What that entails for the local Afghan who is growing poppies for his livelihood is that the crop is not being hacked down by the army and westerners, and then the next morning he has to feed his family, and the Taliban turns to him and says, we offer protection, this is a legitimate livelihood, and anyway it's for western consumption, etc.
This is related to your other questions, which is just how difficult phase three was for NATO. Personally I have many doubts regarding private military companies, most of which have to do with accountability. We've seen all sorts of problems in Iraq regarding this, and I would tread very carefully here. That being said, phase three has been extremely difficult, and phase four promises to be extremely difficult as well. How do you solve these problems? We might have to go through that, but let's be very cautious here.
I'm not sure I understood your second question about the level of Taliban and extremist activities.