Thank you very much, and thank you for inviting me back. As I said when I came the first time before Christmas, these briefings are very important for everyone to have an understanding of what's going on. I am happy to be able to provide an update to the committee here today.
My presentation today is based primarily on reportable security issues from November to January 2008, updating what I have done previously. I'm prepared to follow my presentation with any clarification or answers to questions as appropriate. I'd like to begin with a short explanation about operational security and its relation to our mission in Afghanistan.
Our operations in Afghanistan have generated a growing public interest for information. This appetite for information about the Government of Canada operations serves positive and lawful objectives required of a parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, significant amounts of the information requested are operationally sensitive, and its release could prejudice the success of Canadian Forces' operations and endanger the lives of our soldiers, members of the whole-of-government team, and the Afghans with whom we work. Canadians expect the department and the Canadian Forces to protect the security of Canadian troops who are in harm's way and to mitigate the risks they face as much as possible.
We recognize the importance of providing the information to the public and work hard to meet those obligations within the limits of the law. There must, however, be a balance between our responsibilities to make information available to the public and our responsibility to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform. The safeguarding of some information specific to the mission in Afghanistan is fundamental to the safety of all Canadians working in Afghanistan and the coalition personnel with whom we work side by side each and every day.
Over the past months, there have been a number of operations conducted, with ISAF forces, the Afghan National Army, and the Afghan National Police each playing an important role. The operations were very successful in improving the mobility of the security forces and contributing to the level of stability in our area of responsibility, and consequently extending the reach of the Afghan government further throughout their territory.
Our approach in Afghanistan is a whole-of-government team effort based on the three pillars of governance, development, and security, in that each pillar affects the others in a dynamic interaction. Security enables development; effective governance enhances security; and development creates opportunities and multiplies the rewards of improved security and good governance. In this circle of cause and effect, security is an essential condition of good governance and lasting development. Joint Task Force Afghanistan has completed a number of development projects, which I'll also discuss in my presentation.
I would caution in these introductory remarks that although we're achieving success, Afghans still need our support and presence because they have not achieved the required level of self-sustainment yet.
Since February 4, 2007, the United States has directed the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force, under the direction of General Dan McNeill. The next commander appointed will also be an American, General McKiernan. He's currently in Europe, in Heidelberg. The date of the change of command has not yet been confirmed.
An overview of the countries taking part in the International Security Assistance Force mission will make it possible to put international efforts in this area in context. The strength of the International Security Assistance Force is approximately 42,000 soldiers from 39 different countries, including 26 NATO member countries.
In Regional Command South, the main effort is providing security of the region by disrupting the insurgents and thus setting the conditions for further development, particularly in Kandahar City and the Kandahar Afghan development zone, which extends all the way over to the Pakistan border. This slide shows the Regional Command South, and it depicts the lead nation in each of the provinces. It's important to note that a Canadian army general officer, Major-General Marc Lessard, now commands Regional Command South, a NATO command. He took over just this past weekend.
General Lessard commands approximately 11,600 soldiers, including four provincial reconstruction teams. This represents an incredible opportunity for both him and for the Canadian Forces to play a visible leadership role in what is Canada's highest foreign policy priority right now.
I like to call this next little section “the enemy has a vote”. So that there's no confusion when I say “the enemy has a vote”, the enemy has a say in what's going on in Afghanistan, and I'll explain further. Insurgents have continued their attempts to disrupt, to frustrate, and to destroy the process of establishing peace and security in Afghanistan. However, they have achieved only limited success to date.
During the reporting period, RC South has continued to see high levels of insurgent activity. Insurgents have largely limited their operations to asymmetric tactics like the use of IEDs. We recognize that the central Government of Afghanistan has made significant progress over the last six years, but their lack of influence and authority outside of major district centres continues to contribute to the ability of the Taliban as they attempt to expand their influence.
As President Karzai put it to our Prime Minister when he visited here, in Afghanistan they are trying to accomplish in five years what we in Canada have done in 100 years. They're in a hurry, and they need the kind of help that we can give them.
The insurgents' last low-scale conventional operation was conducted this past November, in the Arghandab district of Kandahar province. A Taliban attempt to establish a foothold to the northeast of the city was defeated by Afghan forces supported by ISAF. Note that I said “defeated by Afghan forces supported by ISAF”, and not the other way around.
In response, the insurgents continue to target the Afghan police, whom they consider to be a soft target. On November 23, they attacked and killed seven policemen and overran their checkpoint. But fewer direct engagements against ISAF and Afghan national security forces have occurred as the Taliban continue to suffer heavy loses any time they engage directly. They have, however, continued to employ IEDs and indirect fire in an increasing effort to achieve some success against the pro-government forces. In many incidents the insurgents have increased the risk to the civilian population by hiding among them, operating from civilian dwellings, and using civilians as human shields.
The Taliban have used children and other innocent Afghans to discourage ISAF operations. They will attempt to exploit any opportunity to discredit the Government of Afghanistan, or ISAF, and will continue to attempt to intimidate the local population through using propaganda, executing those they identify as traitors, and attacking police stations and government district centres. The use of these tactics is a reaction to the successful operations by pro-government forces over the past few months.
I draw your attention to the map on the board. ISAF produced this map, and it took them over two years to put all the information together, because it's something that's obviously very complex and growing. It shows the real security problem areas in red. Those red areas are only 10% of the country's districts, and 70% of the violence in Afghanistan occurred in those red areas.
The dark green areas represent 31% of the districts in Afghanistan. In 2007 there was no hostile activity in those areas, and 30% of the country's main roads were free of violent acts as well.
The light green areas represent 44% of the districts in Afghanistan. Those areas saw no more than one hostile event per quarter for every 10,000 people living in those districts. Fewer than half--47%--of the main roads in those districts have less than one hostile event per month.
The yellow areas represent 15% of the districts in Afghanistan. Those areas saw no more than one hostile event per month for every 10,000 people living in those districts. Fever than one-quarter--23%--of the main roads in those districts had more than one hostile event per month.
Only 10% of the districts in Afghanistan had more than a dozen hostile events per month per 10,000 inhabitants. Granted, 70% of the violence in those areas we've already mentioned.
So there are about 40 problem districts in total. Of those districts, 19 have populations of less than 20,000 people, and the total population of those 40 problem districts is less than 6% of the total population of Afghanistan.
So even though in 2006 and 2007 violence increased in the problem districts, the situation overall in Afghanistan is calmer. Stats for 2006 and 2007 tell us that the insurgency is not spreading across the country, as has been stated in some reports that we have read.
With regard to Regional Command South, 5 of those 40 problem districts are in our area, which is why we have from time to time a pretty hot go of it. Let me assure you that Joint Task Force Afghanistan is concentrating its forces in those areas and we are progressing well, mainly because of our combined efforts with the Afghan national security forces.
Our mission in Afghanistan is to conduct military operations in the area of operation assigned to us, to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in establishing and ensuring a safe environment with the full support of the Afghan National Security Force, so as to enhance the government's authority and influence and thus to promote Afghan development and regional stability.
Since my first appearance, Joint Task Force Afghanistan has conducted a number of missions in Zhari, Panjwayi and Arghandab districts. Those missions benefited from the success of the missions conducted in September and October 2007. During those missions, members of the International Security Assistance Force, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police combined their efforts to establish strong points and police sub-stations. Their efforts have made it possible to exercise better control in the Zhari region and greater controls in the Panjwayi region. As a result, we are in a better position to prevent insurgents from moving freely in the major centres of the districts and, in so doing, to reduce the number of incidents.
The most remarkable improvement is that members of the Afghan National Security Force are now responsible and more capable than previously of securing these new strong points. Consequently, the Joint Task Force Afghanistan can expand the security bubble and the Afghan development zone.
In November, the Afghan National Army completed a number of operations to increase security in the Zhari district of Kandahar province. This operation was executed by the Afghan National Army, working with our Joint Task Force Afghanistan and other elements of the NATO-led international security force. The intent was to drive the insurgents out of the territory surrounding an important crossroads in the Zhari district and to establish a strongpoint; in other words, a fortified compound from which the Afghan national security forces would both control the crossroads and maintain peace in the area, as we'd done in other locations in October. But in this case, they were doing the business.
The operation's first kinetic phase, which was a ground assault, took the insurgents completely by surprise. With no time to mount an organized response, the insurgents were compelled to withdraw after a short but intense firefight. On the night before the assault, the soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal 22nd battle group and elements of two Afghan National Army kandaks, or battalions, infiltrated the area around the crossroads.
This battle was the second joint land operation conducted by the Afghan National Army, from the initial planning stages all the way through to successful completion, and it was the first that involved more than one kandak in the same operation.
Canadian artillery and ISAF tactical aircraft were also engaged in the battle, ensuring that the Canadian and Afghan ground troops could not only secure the objective but also open a supply route to permit the construction of the strongpoint. As soon as that objective was secured, the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd battle group engineering squadron began building the strongpoint. The project took seven days.
Taking territory from the insurgents and building a strongpoint on it from which the Afghan forces will control the area is only part of our overall strategy to set the stage for a lasting security environment in that Canadian area of operation. As we train more ANA troops and position them over a larger territory, we will leave the insurgents with fewer areas to operate in and move about.
As a follow-on, Joint Task Force Afghanistan has conducted similar operations in three different locations within the Panjwai district. Those operations, either led by Joint Task Force Afghanistan or by the Afghan National Army, are good examples of the Afghan National Army's ability, capability, and continued growth.
While success in Afghanistan can only be measured over a long period, the success of these recent operations has increased the stability and security throughout that Zhari-Panjwai area, resulting in a good progression for the Government of Canada's governance and development objectives there.
The Afghan National Army's development into a capable and competent fighting force continues. There are marked improvements in their ability to plan operations, and their significant gains in their ability to undertake operations are evidence of their steady and positive growth.
Afghan National Army combat units continue to improve, with over half of them—these are the ones working with us—being considered capable of performing counter-insurgency operations with external support. Collective combat skills also continue to improve; however, work still remains to be done in the training of headquarters and the support units in order for the Afghan National Army to eventually achieve a true, independent capability.
We currently have operational mentor and liaison teams working with three infantry kandaks, or infantry battalions, which are each the equivalent size of one of our battalions: one with the combat service support unit and one at the brigade headquarters in Kandahar province. In fact, Canada has had a direct impact on the training and development of the growth of a professional and credible army, which is now at more than 41,500. At any one time, we're training and mentoring 2,000 soldiers with our operational mentoring and liaison teams.
With members in every province in every district, the Afghan National Police are often the most visible face of the Afghan government to its people. Canada is utilizing an integrated approach to police reform that focuses on four areas: one, training and mentoring; two, infrastructure and equipment; three, coordination; and four, police salary support. The Afghan National Police reform is a major challenge, but it is ultimately critical to promoting long-term stability and the rule of law in Afghanistan.
The Canadian Armed Forces, together with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Correctional Service of Canada are committed to the success of this reform.
In addition, the Canadian Armed Forces, together with their supervision and liaison teams, are working to improve the capacity of the National Afghan Police in the Kandahar region. These teams supervise Afghan police activities around the clock in order to teach Afghan police officers the essential survival qualifications that will enable them to operate and survive in an unstable security environment.
To date, approximately 615 Afghan police officers have received this training. These tactical successes of recent months are a clear indication that our current mandate to increase the capability of security forces is working well.
In general, progress has been made on all fronts and in areas where it counts, such as Kandahar City and the Zhari-Panjwai district, a view expressed by the population in surveys and in the Afghan national security force capacity-building.
We have set the conditions to deepen and broaden security governance and development in areas where 90% of the population of Kandahar lives. However, this is tempered by the give-and-take nature of the environment. For example, the ISAF presence in Zhari-Panjwai has disrupted the insurgent influence in that area. To counter this, the insurgents have conducted attacks in surrounding districts in an attempt to distract ISAF from its efforts in Zhari and Panjwai. So while progress is being made in Zhari-Panjwai, violence may rise in other areas, but this cannot cloud an appreciation for significant strides that have been made since last year.
The following are some concrete examples of the progress.
A poll conducted for several major news media organizations—ABC News, ARD, and the BBC—indicates that a vast majority of Afghans approve of the ISAF and U.S.-led coalition presence in the country. Specifically, 72% of the respondents approve of the coalition presence, 67% support the ISAF presence, 68% said that the international troops are doing a good job, a full 92% of Afghans are opposed or strongly opposed to the Taliban, 75% of those polled said the attacks against ISAF and coalition forces are completely unjustified, whereas jihadi fighters from other countries are opposed by 83% of the respondents. So this poll and others previously released clearly show that the Afghan people are behind our efforts, as we work to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to rebuild the country after so many years of conflict.
Joint district coordination centres have been established in Zhari-Panjwai and in Spin Buldak.
With a concept put forward by a number of stakeholders, including Battle Group Headquarters, the Joint District Coordination Centre is establishing itself by making the population aware of the merits of this service. For example, the Joint District Coordination Centre can quickly establish a rapid response team consisting of a mix of Afghan police officers and members of the Afghan National Army, depending on available resources, instead of waiting for coalition forces.
In the lefthand corner of the slide, you can see Captain Guy Noury of the civilian-military cooperation team of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team speaking with Zhari district villagers to explain the concept of the Joint District Coordination Centre to them.
In this slide, we see Canadian representatives attending a shura in the Afghan district north of Kandahar City as a show of support to the newly appointed district leader, Kareemullah Naqibi. Community leaders from across the district attended the shura, where they not only expressed their concern about security but also sought assistance with road construction, the installation of electricity, and flood prevention. Corruption is being recognized and reported more often now by the locals, and 10 of 17 districts now have elected community development councils.
With Canada's assistance and through the Kandahar provincial reconstruction team, Kandahar University once again has access to locally sourced well water. The work that began back in June of 2007 has seen numerous technical setbacks and was completed just before Christmas.
Originally the university had a well. However, a broken pump and subsequent collapse of the original well forced them to truck in water at great expense to supply their needs. The completion of this new well will permit the university to focus its funds on education rather than on having to pay for water to sustain its 1,300 students. The joint effort by our CIMIC team and the specialist engineering team at Camp Nathan Smith helped to improve the quality of life for those Kandahar University students and faculty. In this slide, you see two members of the engineering team performing their final inspection of the well installation as they turn it on.
Early in 2007, the PRT civilian-military cooperation team visited the farming village of Kharut in the northern Panjwai district southwest of Kandahar. They found the community cut in half by an irrigation canal. That little picture you see is the canal that cut the town in half. You can see the rudimentary bridge they had put in place. This was not only inconvenient and risky for the builders, but it was a security problem, as only part of the village south of the canal was easily accessible to police vehicles.
After consultations with the village leaders and a local detachment of the Afghan National Police, Joint Task Force Afghanistan decided to design the new bridge, and hired a local contractor to provide the site supervisors and the key tradesmen from Kandahar City.
As you can see in the slide, the bridge is reinforced concrete on a stone masonry foundation. With almost all of the work being done by hand, the bridge was completed in about a month. The total project cost about $20,000 Canadian.
The new bridge was completed in December. It now allows the farmers to travel safely between the village and their fields, and it allows the Afghan National Police detachment to patrol the entire village and its outlying areas. The irrigation canal does its job and the crops are growing. The village elders are satisfied.
Next is Operation Causeway, which you would have seen in the news when this broke in early January.
The causeway that you see on screen was opened on January 8. We've built a gravel surface on this causeway, which consists of 175 concrete culverts laid against each other on the bed of three rivers. The causeway will link Highways 1 and 4 and will encourage the local economy and help the population.
As regards security, it will be easier for the Provincial Reconstruction Team, the Brigade Group, the Afghan National Security Force and the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team advisor to provide a security presence across Kandahar province. The project provided employment for more than 50 Afghans for approximately three months. This passage over the Arghandab River will improve travel between two major towns, for security and economic development purposes.
I crossed that river at the site where the causeway was put in, both when it was a dry bed in the summer and there was nothing there and also at Christmastime, a year ago, when the river was high. When the river was high and in the flood zone, nothing but the heaviest vehicles could make it across. In effect, we had a drought there for seven years, and when the rains came, the towns were cut off. There was a period of almost six to eight weeks where you could not get across unless you had a heavy vehicle such as a tank--a real heavy vehicle. If they tried it with their carts, small trucks, and cars, they would just get swept away. This causeway has made a huge difference to the lives of these Afghans in that area.
The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police have begun to plan and conduct their own operations—I mentioned this earlier. The establishment of police substations and strongpoints have created nascent progress in the Afghan National Police capacity, consequently helping us to increase the security zone.
With a current strength of 75,500 personnel, the Afghan National Police requires more police mentor teams, which are an essential element in achieving success. Joint Task Force Afghanistan welcomes the focused district development program that the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan has developed. That's the American-led command that plans the development for both the ANA and the ANP. The program aims at enhancing Afghan National Police capabilities and transferring that police force into a service that is loyal to their people and to Afghan national interests.
During a recent visit to Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General Mike Gauthier, the commander of our Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, presented a ceremonial C7 rifle to Colonel Abdul Basir to symbolize Canada's donation to the Afghan National Army. We provided the ANA with 2,500 C7 rifles, ammunition, and training, which will improve the long-term security capability and help with their stabilization efforts in Kandahar province, as the AK-47s they were using are older, heavier, and less accurate than our Canadian C7 rifles.
Working with our government partners—Foreign Affairs, CIDA, CSC, and the RCMP—as well as ANA and ANP, Joint Task Force Afghanistan maintains its focus on improving joint planning and execution as well as inter-agency coordination with our Afghan allies. But the mission is not without its challenges, and this is what I want to finish with.
Notwithstanding the efforts in improving the security situation in the Zhari and Panjwai districts, non-government organization efforts towards development and reconstruction continue to be delayed in some areas of our responsibility due to the insurgent threat.
The security situation should improve as the newly built police substations increase their area of operation and their effectiveness. We have seen a significant increase in our security footprint since the month of October. As noted earlier, Joint Task Force Afghanistan and the Afghan national security forces have built and manned eight new police substations and several checkpoints.
The Afghan national security forces have allowed us to move into unsecured areas, to set the conditions for success in leaving behind a capable Afghan force mentored by small police mentoring teams. In order to continue this security area expansion, we need more Afghan national security forces allocated to our area of operation.
Very good news for Regional Command South was the announcement by the U.S. of 3,200 marines heading to southern Afghanistan for an assignment this spring. It is evident that increasing the number of soldiers by more than 25% will significantly boost ISAF force projection in Regional Command South.
The Afghan National Police pay system and the lack of equipment still undermine the effectiveness of Afghan police. Joint Task Force Afghanistan is still working with the Afghan government to resolve the situation. It is important to note that the strength and capacity of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police Force are increasing day by day. Three years ago, there was no Afghan National Army. Today, it has nearly 42,000 members, including a large number conducting operations alongside the International Security Assistance Force. The Afghan National Police Force is now considered a force that is growing day by day. It is an essential factor in the expansion of our security zone.
We must be able to communicate our achievements more effectively to Canadians and Afghans, particularly in the areas of reconstruction and development. This is a major challenge because the media tend to focus more on security issues to the detriment of reconstruction and development, as a result of which too much importance is attached to security and there is thus a misperception of the actual security situation. We are striving to improve our communications in Afghanistan. Joint Task Force Afghanistan is working with the embedded media to set up a workshop to make the Afghan media more professional. The training session will be given on site in early February.
As you know, the Taliban will still be trying to spread this information among the local population and will still conduct disinformation operations in order to downplay our successes.
I'd like to conclude my presentation with these four quick points.
We are improving security by supporting democracy and democratic values in Afghanistan. We are improving security by enhancing the legitimate government's capacity to rule justly and effectively. We're defeating the Taliban by fostering economic and social development, and we're defeating the Taliban by building Afghan security forces so that Afghans can defend their government and their citizens from violent extremists.
Thank you very much. I will take any questions you have.
