National Defence Committee on April 17th, 2008

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We'll call the meeting to order.

We are continuing our deliberations today on our study on the quality of life for our Canadian Forces personnel, with an emphasis on post-traumatic stress disorder.

We've been anxiously awaiting this day to welcome our witnesses. It's good to see you all again. It was just a little over a year ago that we had the opportunity to bump into all three of you, I believe, in a faraway place. So it's good that you're here.

We have with us General Grant, deputy commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command. He was formerly commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan.

We also have Colonel Lavoie, task force commander, Counter Improvised Explosives Task Force, former battle group commander, First Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group.

We have Colonel Simon Hetherington, executive assistant, chief of the land staff, former commanding officer, provincial reconstruction team.

If anybody in Canada can tell us about the stresses our men and women in uniform are facing, I'm sure you three are able to.

I understand you all have opening statements.

General, are you going to start?

[Major-General Tim Grant, Deputy Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Former Commander, Joint Task Force, Afghanistan, Department of National Defence]

I will, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Please, the floor is yours.

[MGen Tim Grant]

Mr. Chairman, honourable members, good afternoon.

I'm pleased to be here today with two of the commanding officers from Operation Athena, rotation 2--Colonel Omer Lavoie and Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Hetherington--to assist in your investigation into health services provided to CF personnel, with an emphasis on PTSD.

I had the honour and privilege to command Canada's military commitment in Afghanistan from November 1, 2006, until August 2007. I arrived in theatre halfway through rotation 2, shortly after the conclusion of Operation Medusa, an operation with which I know you are all very familiar. I stayed throughout the remainder of rotation 2 and all of rotation 3. This tour of nine months set the standard for future rotations of the joint task force headquarters. As you're likely aware, the units of the task force, such as the battle group, provincial reconstruction team, and the national support element, deploy for only six months.

During my time in theatre some soldiers under my command suffered physical injuries, others suffered mental injuries, and others paid the ultimate price, giving their lives for the mission and their country. Regardless of the injury sustained, I believe that each and every soldier received the best care possible. The medical services at every level, from forward operating bases through to the to the role 3 multinational medical unit at Kandahar Airfield, were focused on meeting the needs of soldiers operating in a combat environment.

Soldiers from all the units faced the prospect of physical injury. Whether it was an infantry soldier in close combat, a logistics soldier being ambushed in a resupply convoy, or a CIMIC operator interacting with Afghans, the vast majority of soldiers were in situations where they could have been injured. As a result, all those soldiers were under increased levels of stress during their deployment. How each soldier handled those stresses was, in my opinion, based on the training they received prior to deployment, the help they could expect from their buddies and the chain of command in theatre, as well as the assistance they could expect from the medical system. In hindsight, I believe we were successful in providing the support required by soldiers in this very harsh and demanding environment.

On leaving theatre each soldier participated in a decompression program. For the vast majority this was in Cyprus. At every opportunity, usually at medals parades, I stressed the importance of the decompression centre to the long-term health of returning soldiers. I spoke of the fact that many would not initially see the benefits of the stop in Cyprus, but the feedback that I had personally received from soldiers on rotation 1—that is the First Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry—was that the program was extremely valuable. I have to admit that in spite of my own words, as my chalk touched down in Cyprus I felt that it was the last place I wanted to be. However, in hindsight, the decompression did serve as a valuable service to me personally.

In summary, Canadian soldiers have operated and continue to operate in an exceptionally demanding and dangerous situation and environment in Kandahar. The chain of command and the Canadian Forces Medical Group have acknowledged the challenges faced by our soldiers. I believe that we're providing the assistance that soldiers need in order to deal with their wounds, be they mental or physical.

At this point I'll turn the floor over to Colonel Lavoie and to Lieutenant-Colonel Hetherington for their opening comments.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, sir.

Go ahead.

[Colonel Omer Lavoie, Task Force Commander, Counter Improvised Explosives Task Force, Former Battle Group Commander, First Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, Department of National Defence]

Honourable committee members, good afternoon.

I am Colonel Omer Lavoie. Currently I am the commander for the Canadian Forces, Counter Improvised Explosives Task Force, based here in Ottawa.

Related to this appearance, ending at about this time last year I was the battle group commander for the Task Force Kandahar 3/06 rotation. I commanded the First Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group in Kandahar province from August 2006 until March 2007. The 1 RCR Battle Group was a Petawawa-based unit comprising approximately 1,200 soldiers. However, individual soldier augmentees and sub-units came from across Canada. The 1 RCR Battle Group had a full range of combat arms and combat service support. It included infantry, artillery, armour, combat engineers, reconnaissance, signals, intelligence, medical, and an unmanned aerial vehicle capability.

Training for our mission consisted of approximately ten months of individual, collective, and field training prior to the deployment. Most training consisted of live fire exercises using real ammunition in order to inoculate soldiers to the reality of the modern-day battlefield. Of note, the 1 RCR Battle Group was the first unit to receive training and be validated for operational readiness at the then newly created Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright, Alberta.

My role as the battle group commander was to command the battalion and ensure that our battle group achieved its assigned missions while in theatre. The 1 RCR Battle Group's six-month deployment can be characterized in terms of intense offensive combat for the first third of the tour, defensive combat operations for the second third of the tour, and counter-insurgency operations for the last third of the tour.

Of note, the 1 RCR Battle Group was the lead unit during Operation Medusa, NATO's first ever ground offensive operation. The 1 RCR Battle Group was assigned a mission to defeat a concentrated enemy within the Panjwai-Zhari district. This operation was an intense offensive combat operation of a conventional nature that saw extensive close ground combat supported by significant offensive air support. The 1 RCR Battle Group achieved its mission, seizing ail assigned objectives and defeating a determined enemy.

Most of the combat casualties during our mission occurred during Operation Medusa. Overall, my battle group suffered approximately 140 soldiers wounded in action and 19 soldiers killed in action. Despite these significant losses, the battle group managed to force out and keep out concentrated enemy forces and successfully achieved its mission on subsequent major operations, including the construction of a combat road, Route Summit, and a brigade-directed operation, Operation Baaz Tsuka. I believe that part of the success of our mission can be partly attributed to the high standard of medical support available to our soldiers. I say this not only from the physical standpoint but, equally important, from a morale perspective. Our soldiers, me included, had great confidence that, despite our often being in harm's way, every effort possible was in place to take care of our wounded.

I am extremely proud of the accomplishments of the 1 RCR Battle Group, and in particular the resolve, courage, and professionalism of my troops.

With that, I would be happy to take your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

Colonel Hetherington.

[Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Hetherington, Executive Assistant, Chief of the Land Staff, Former Commanding Officer, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, good afternoon.

My name is Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Hetherington. I'm a field artillery officer by training. However, from June 2006 until late January of 2007, I deployed to Afghanistan as the commanding officer of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, or the PRT.

The PRT, as you know, is an interdepartmental organization consisting of soldiers, diplomats from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, development workers from the Canadian International Development Agency, law enforcement personnel from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and municipal law enforcement agencies and, more recently, corrections officers from Corrections Canada.

The mission of the PRT, as I saw it, was to extend the legitimacy of the central government of Afghanistan through assisting the government of Kandahar in building the capacity to govern and set the conditions for sustainable development. This was a lofty goal, which we soon learned would need to be approached in an incremental and measured manner.

While the mission's objectives and the tasks of the PRT are not the subject of this discussion, it's important to recognize that the type of work the PRT engaged in was not immediately intuitive to many of its members, me included. The bulk of its soldiers who formed the military component of the provincial reconstruction team came from combat arms backgrounds. Working with other government departments was also new to most of us, particularly in such close quarters.

The Canadian PRT had been established less than a year before I arrived in Kandahar and had been operating as part of the larger Canadian task force for only five months. Much of the early work the PRT engaged in during my tour was in concert with the 1 RCR Battle Group, conducting post-conflict battle damage mitigation. At the other end of the spectrum, DFAIT and CIDA staff worked with the provincial government and line ministries on longer-term reconstruction efforts.

Despite some initial uncertainties and growing pains, I can confidently say that at the end of our tour progress had been made, some important projects had been completed, and the members of the provincial reconstruction team had set the conditions for the success of the follow-on rotation.

In terms of discussing the relevance of my appearance before you here today, I will say that I was extremely fortunate that no member of the PRT was killed, and only one was seriously injured during our tour. This injury took place while this soldier was operating with the 1 RCR Battle Group.

I cannot be so certain about non-physical casualties. All members of the camp were witness to the effects of attacks on our convoys and the wounds they inflicted on innocent bystanders. Virtually every soldier in our camp had friends in the 1 RCR Battle Group about whom they worried constantly. Many members of the team were on the roads of Kandahar daily, some days without incident, others not.

You may know that the PRT works out of a small, self-contained camp just inside Kandahar City. Our team was relatively small, and its small size and the small camp we occupied meant that everyone knew each other. We worked together. We lived together. We ate together. We risked together. And we mourned together whenever a Canadian soldier was killed. We had a doctor and medical staff, as well as a chaplain, dedicated solely to the PRT. Through these professionals, we had access to additional help and spiritual care back at the main Kandahar airfield if we needed it.

Even though the PRT was composed of many different units from many different backgrounds and government departments, I believe the cohesion we formed during our period of training, coupled with the small size of the camp and the team itself, was instrumental in dealing with the stressors faced by everyone. I fully recognize that stress affects different people in different ways and that it would be naive of me to think that every member of the PRT returned home unscathed. But I can say that in theatre the resources and support of the chain of command were available to assist those who needed it.

I hope this has helped orient you to what I may be able to add to your consideration of this extremely important topic.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

We'll get into our opening seven-minute round of questions. We'll go over to the official opposition with Mr. Cannis.

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you very much for being here and giving us this briefing.

Today we are to do our study on services provided to Canadian Forces personnel, with an emphasis on post-traumatic stress disorder, if I'm not mistaken. Nevertheless, you're here, and we'd like to ask you some questions, if you'll permit us, as we've heard from other witnesses who have come before the committee, both military and former military people. Along the way, because you've gone into such an elaborate presentation, maybe you've enticed me to ask some other questions as well.

I'd like to open by saying that, first and foremost, all of us ask these questions with the intent of trying to do the best we can in this committee in the support that we've provided to our military as a whole. Sometimes the questions might seem rude, extreme, and obnoxious, but they're intended so that at the end of the day we can come forward with decent recommendations.

We've heard from former military service people who have found difficulty getting services after they've completed their missions. There are comments such as “Medically I know where I am; I've gone through this process. My commander or my superior is just not paving the way or is not giving permission or is not being cooperative”, etc. I don't know if you can elaborate on that or how true or not true it is. Everybody's innocent until proven guilty, as far as I'm concerned, but I find that unacceptable as an individual. It's like my going to the hospital, for example, and asking to be treated for whatever, and the doctor just doesn't want to see me.

Maybe you could just comment on that for me, because the concern here in this study is how do we address this need that former service people have or enrolled service people who have to be treated have? As we've all come to understand, they are treated adequately and then the green light is given for them to return to active duty, either here or abroad.

Have you experienced anything like that, gentlemen?

[MGen Tim Grant]

Sir, I could start by answering your question. First of all, I would say that I'm sure we won't have any rude or unpleasant questions, and I think we share your concerns about the quality of care our soldiers get. It's in everyone's best interest that the soldiers who serve this country do in fact get proper care while they're deployed, and more specifically when they get home.

My comments on this question would be very much based on my time as a brigade commander in Canada and as the commander of Land Force Western Area. In those cases it was exceptionally important for me that everyone had an opportunity to interface with a mental health professional when they returned from Canada.

I'm not sure if you're aware there is a program in place where between three and six months following redeployment everyone must go through--that is the aim of the program--a detailed interview with a mental health specialist.

The aim of that, in my mind, is twofold. One is it allows people to have that opportunity, after they've come home, after things have settled a bit, to be able to get some feedback from a mental health specialist. But perhaps even more important than that, because there has been in the past a stigma for people who are looking for mental health care, this in fact makes sure that every member who has deployed, regardless of rank or trade, is essentially forced to sit down with a mental health specialist.

I think in some ways that actually removes the stigma. People don't have to put up their hand any more and say “I'd like to go and speak to a psychiatrist”. In fact, we make sure that each one of those individuals does have an opportunity to go and speak to a psychiatrist. So there's no more stigma about going to the clinic. Everyone does that. What happens behind the door with that mental health specialist is clearly between the individual and that professional.

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

I appreciate your comments, and I sense the sincerity in responding to me, but just last week we had a mother here on behalf of her son. There are other examples; I'll just use that one. They are not criticizing the military as a whole, but elements of the system. It's not like they were isolating themselves with a so-called stigma, as you put it. They're saying that they were reaching out for help and somehow help just wasn't there for them.

We heard from family support organizations, and I was very pleased to hear that they're there and they're funded. Maybe they could be funded a bit more in the fundraising, etc., that's going on. They're there, but somehow--and I don't know the answer yet, but we hope to get to it--there's an element that's missing to connect them all together so that at the end of the day this young person doesn't have to go through this experience of saying “I'm frustrated, I know I need help”, and not getting that help. It causes them to become isolated maybe.

[MGen Tim Grant]

Sir, I couldn't agree more. The system is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination.

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

General, I didn't expect it to be perfect--

[MGen Tim Grant]

No, but--

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

--but with reference to where the bugs are, all of us are here to try to correct it.

[MGen Tim Grant]

Yes. And certainly my experience in western Canada—and I will suggest that Colonel Lavoie can talk about what happened with his soldiers when they came back—I was accountable to my boss literally in a nominal role to be able to say that every person who had deployed had been through the screening process. I believe we're getting better at it. Every person who falls through the cracks is a failure on our part. I'll be the first to admit that.

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

I've only got about 30 seconds, probably 40 seconds, for a quick question.

How much training does a person receive prior to their deployment abroad to Afghanistan, for example?

[Col Omer Lavoie]

How much training...?

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

How much training prior to their going on active duty abroad.

[Col Omer Lavoie]

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, in the case of our battle group, it was about ten months of comprehensive training from the time the battalion and battle group stood up as a fighting force integrating all the other subunits within the brigade to the time we actually deployed into theatre, sir.

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you. Right on time.

Mr. Bachand, seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome our friends from Kandahar. As it so happens, that is where I met them.

Our study is not focused solely on PTSD, but on the health of our soldiers as well. When soldiers set out on patrol from a forward operating base, different things can happen.

We are not only looking into the mental health of soldiers, but also into the overall health of the members of our military. What happens at a forward operating base when soldiers set out on patrol or leave to patrol villages?

Mr. Lavoie, you stated that 140 soldiers had been injured and 19 had died during Operation Medusa. How long did this operation last?

[Col Omer Lavoie]

My overall operation was approximately seven months in theatre. Operation Medusa was about a three-month intensive operation.