The Grant decision was an adverse decision. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was sought in that decision, but not granted by the Supreme Court. It wasn't a constitutional issue, however, so it wasn't a matter of the striking down of sections. And in that case, the court noted that it was providing a remedy specifically tailored to that case. My challenge, as the superintendent of the military justice system, is that I have to look at the broader application of a decision such as Grant in terms of the whole legislative scheme.
So as I mentioned in my opening remarks, one of the hallmarks of our two-tier system of justice is that an accused at a summary trial can ask to have the full protections of legal counsel and an independent judge who hears the case or a panel. Or, if during a summary trial the trying officer starts to hear the case and hears the evidence, the trying officer may decide that it is a matter that really should go to court martial, that it needs to have the full hearing. Ordering it back to summary trial doesn't take into account the larger questions that might arise once the summary trial starts.
So the focus of the amendments, as has always happened—and this is the first case I'm aware of where the order was to summary trial—is that the Court Martial Appeal Court will in fact order a new court martial. And it's clear under military law that there is no right to a summary trial. So the fall-back would be that you would get the full trial with all the rights and privileges that you have to put forward.
And the other amendments are clarifying different parts of the law. For instance, one refers to “after a charge” has been laid, but in fact you can't have a charge unless it is laid. It's at that level of clarity.