Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to address your committee on the matter of Canadian Forces resources in terms of Arctic sovereignty.
This quote from Wikipedia is probably a good representation of the perception that many people at large have of Canada's ability and willingness to defend its Arctic sovereignty.
I would like to put into some perspective the size of the challenge and the inadequacy of the Canadian Forces assets, because most Canadians do not appreciate just how large the Arctic is. The total of Canadian Forces regular personnel in this area today is probably smaller than 250, to look after an area larger than continental Europe.
This is a representation of the Canadian internal waters in the Arctic Archipelago. Those are the waters and land that must be protected adequately. Other countries do not see it this way. They define our territorial waters using the 12 nautical miles. When doing so, many areas of the Arctic are considered to be international waters. Furthermore, many countries claim that the Northwest Passage and the airspace above it constitute an international strait.
The yellow line is the classic Northwest Passage, whereas the red lines indicate other options to transit the Arctic. The air space above and the waters below each of those routes could be argued to be part of the international strait. Do we want Russian bombers to use those routes, or nuclear submarines to transit across the Arctic, or North Korea to ship ballistic missiles through the Northwest Passage? How do we even know that this might be taking place today?
During my command appointment I came to the realization that nobody was really looking after the security of the Arctic. The standard answer I was getting was that we are not funded for it. By default, National Defence is the department that is best equipped to protect the sovereignty and security of the Arctic. But even the Canadian Forces lack the equipment, personnel, and training to protect the Arctic adequately. More specifically, they lack surveillance capability and the ability to respond in a graduated manner to a security situation in the Arctic for a major search and rescue event.
The state-to-state threat has receded, and it can be considered low, despite recent Russian activity and Chinese interest. However, we must be ready for future challenges. Major military assets take more than 10 years to acquire. What prevails now is more of a concept of human security. At this moment I believe the greatest threat to human security in the Arctic is to the environment. The Arctic is a very fragile ecosystem, which must be protected with the full weight of Canadian laws. Too many international protocols have failed to protect the environment. Providing security is the first duty of a nation state.
Our forces must have the capability to operate 24/7, 365 days, anywhere in Canada. You will note that the navy does not have that capability. The air force still has a significant capability through the north warning system, but unless I am mistaken, there is only one forward operating location for CF-18s, in Inuvik, that has been left operational.
The army has no permanent unit in the north, and the amount of training taking place there is insufficient. The Ranger program is a great program, but their capability in the Arctic is extremely limited and their expertise is slowly being lost. We still have Canadian Forces stationed at Alert, which plays an important role, and a joint task force headquarters in Yellowknife.
Note on this slide that north of the north warning system there is no air space monitoring in an area where there are increasing polar flights. Given the new polar routes, we have in excess of 125,000 international flights over the Arctic every year.
Search and rescue is one of the missions of the Canadian Forces, and yet they do not have any primary search and rescue assets north of 60, despite the fact that we have increased maritime activity and that the traditional air corridors have shifted from east-west to north-south.
The probability of an accident in the Arctic is not a theoretical exercise. In 1996, the cruise ship Hanseatic ran aground near Gjoa Haven. Fortunately, there were no casualties or oil spilled. Had the accident been of a catastrophic nature, we would have been hard pressed to deal with it. You all know that last year a Canadian cruise ship sank in the Antarctic.
You'll also recall that the Exxon Valdez oil spill cost in excess of $2 billion U.S. to partially clean up. Although we have the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, it is akin to posting speed limits on the 401 at a time when everybody knows that the police have no radar and no patrol cars. We must protect the Arctic Archipelago, and the best way to do this is within our internal waters. We must also make NORDREG compulsory to have a better idea of what goes on in the Arctic.
Global warming is the cause of the changes taking place today. The worst-case scenarios have been exceeded. The real question now is what we do about it. It is opening up the Arctic that was protected by year-round ice. Cruise ships now transit the Northwest Passage, and natural resources harvesting is increasing. A new maritime route between Asia and Europe through the Northwest Passage is a distinct possibility. Somebody has to guard the gates to the Arctic. We need to act now, given our slow and politicized procurement process.
There is some urgency in addressing the issue because global warming is opening up the north faster than predicted, and given our long procurement processes, we are already late in delivering the necessary assets. Recently, the Russians have become very proactive in the Arctic. Former President Bush issued a new Arctic security policy this year. The European Community wants to have a say in Arctic resource harvesting, and even NATO is now becoming interested in Arctic issues.
The key capabilities to protect the Arctic are surveillance and the ability to respond in a graduated manner. We must be able to monitor activity below, on, and above the surface and have redundant systems. We must make NORDREG compulsory to be able to cross-reference surveillance data. We must develop the capability to respond in a graduated manner to a security issue in the Arctic. Although the other departments must contribute, I believe the Canadian Forces to be best suited to protect the Arctic. The presence of armed forces also delivers a very clear message.
This is what I would like to recommend.
First and foremost, increase our surveillance capabilities so that we know what goes on in the Arctic; increase our response capability; increase training for all elements; increase the capacity of the Joint Task Force (North) headquarters; maintain the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group; and make NORDREG compulsory.
Let me conclude by saying that one of our Arctic sovereignty arguments is fast disappearing, and it is making our position weaker. Human activity and international interests are rising and will continue to do so. We need to take action now to protect our national interests. The best department to do so is DND, and Canadian Forces require additional assets to do this.
Thank you very much for your attention.