National Defence Committee on June 2nd, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Perfect.

M. Paillé dispose maintenant de cinq minutes.

[Pascal-Pierre Paillé, Bloc, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Thank you for coming here.

I would like to start by discussing the difficulty for Canada to respond to an accident in the Arctic. Can you tell us which northern nation is the best prepared or already has the necessary equipment and resources to respond to an accident in the Arctic?

[Prof. Michael Byers]

Very briefly, any of the other Arctic countries are significantly better prepared than Canada is to provide search and rescue in their territory and, to some degree, in Canadian territory. There is some cooperative planning going on between Canada and the United States in terms of search and rescue in the western Arctic, and there is some planning, together with Denmark, concerning search and rescue between Greenland and Canada. There needs to be more of that.

The fact of the matter is that if there's a major airplane crash anywhere in the Arctic, we will be calling on our NATO partners to help. Certainly, I don't think it really matters to the passengers on the ground whether it's an American or a Canadian or a Danish helicopter that gets to them first. So there's cooperative planning on that domain.

We should also be talking with the Russians about cooperation on search and rescue. There's not a whole lot of activity that happens in the middle of the Arctic Ocean right now, but there are, of course, tourists and adventurers who do venture into that vast and inhospitable place. And yes, we need to be thinking ahead as to how we would deal with a crisis situation there.

But it's cooperation, not competition, when it comes to search and rescue.

[Prof. Greg Poelzer]

I agree.

Whether you look at northern Norway or even Russia, which is obviously not in the same economic situation as Canada is—Canada is obviously far richer per capita—their search and rescue capabilities in very remote regions of the Russian Arctic, including the High Arctic, far exceed those of Canada.

[Pascal-Pierre Paillé, Bloc, Louis-Hébert, QC]

We all agree that it is important for Canada to have the ability to respond in future. Earlier, you spoke about the Canadian Forces and about strengthening the regions.

The ideal thing would be for this to happen as quickly as possible. In your opinion, what would be the critical point if Canada failed to act, if it was almost impossible for Canada to catch up with other countries, or if it was at a clear disadvantage over them?

As you know, there is an administrative maze to contend with. Creating or implementing a new program or system can often be a very complex undertaking.

In the short term, is there a point of no return, a deadline or a critical point that Canada should not move beyond?

[Prof. Greg Poelzer]

If I were to pick a deadline, it would have been maybe about 1990, but it's never too late to catch up. We are late in the game, but the go time is now.

It's not as if we have to build a number of things from scratch. There is Canada-Russia business cooperation. Much of it is in the north, strengthening those kinds of things. There's Northern Forum, in terms of municipality associations; there are the indigenous organizations; there are things like the University of the Arctic; there is the Arctic Council. So we have a lot of things; we wouldn't be starting from scratch.

What we have to do, quite frankly, is take Canada seriously. We only take Canada seriously from coast to coast. As Canadians, as a society, as a government—and it cuts across broadly—we don't take our north seriously. We talk the talk, but we don't walk the walk. It's the kind of thing—the deployment Michael Byers has identified in terms of capability—that's going to cost, absolutely. But it costs to be a country, and other countries have made that investment.

And sooner is obviously much better than later. I do want to point out that the kinds of investments we need to put in are going to have economic benefits, whether it's in icebreakers, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and so forth—and, I would argue, a much broader deployment across the Arctic, multiple sites, permanent sites. What does it cost to have high unemployment in indigenous communities? That also costs Canada.

These military investments, which are critically important investments around region building and nation building, are going to yield benefits back to Canada, even in the short run. Inaction costs us. Action is going to reduce costs in the long term.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Thank you, Professor.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Payne.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to welcome you, as my previous colleagues have done. It's really important that we hear your thoughts in terms of what's going on in the north, as I think it is a very important strategic area for our country and our government.

I'd like to ask Mr. Byers first. I wanted to review your one comment when I thought you said the number of commercial flights going across the North Pole was 90,000, but I wasn't sure if that was correct.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

It is correct. It's a staggering number, and to just illustrate this, there are more people who fly over the Canadian Arctic every day than live on the ground. There are 104,000 people living north of 60 degrees, and there are more than that number of people who fly over there on long-range commercial aircraft. Yes, these planes are extraordinarily safe, but as we saw yesterday with the Air France plane, sometimes things will go wrong.

In that context, there is one more point in terms of search and rescue. We also have less than perfect radar coverage in the Canadian Arctic. So if you're on a transpolar flight, you go out of Canadian radar contact a lot farther south than you encounter that contact on the Russian side. The Russians have better civilian radar and civilian communications than we do in the Arctic, and if we are serious about Arctic sovereignty and providing search and rescue, providing adequate radar coverage would be a small component of doing that.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you.

The other thing I wanted to ask you, Mr. Byers, is this. I understand you're currently doing research on implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and on mechanisms to grant control beyond the 200-mile limit. Could you maybe describe the expected process in cases where countries may have conflicting views or jurisdiction, or what they're looking for in terms of claims?

[Prof. Michael Byers]

I'll come back to my very first point, which is that the Arctic is a very large place and so most of the Arctic will fall unquestionably, indisputably, into one or another country's sovereign jurisdiction. Russia will get a large amount of seabed on the Russian side of the ocean; Canada will get a large amount of seabed on our side of the ocean. The actual potential overlaps only amount to about 5% or 10% of the whole. So we're not talking about the whole Arctic in potential dispute; we're talking about some overlaps.

A lot of this will be resolved by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by looking at the science to determine whether the seabed is a natural prolongation of one country's continental shelf as opposed to another country's continental shelf. There will be potentially some remaining disputes, and those will be ultimately left to diplomatic negotiation. We have a dispute and we will have a dispute with Denmark and the Lincoln Sea over a couple of hundred kilometres of seabed. Let's sort that out now so it doesn't cause problems in the future. And it's the same thing in the Beaufort Sea, with the Americans, in terms of the dispute there.

Then in terms of the Russians, in terms of that area in the middle of the Arctic Ocean, it's a good thing for us to be talking, as Alan Kessel, the senior lawyer at DFAIT, was talking with the Russians about filing a joint set of claims, so we actually sort that out between ourselves, split any difference, and resolve it diplomatically rather than throwing it off to some third body like the UN commission.

The fact of the matter is that oil and gas exploitation in the very middle of the Arctic Ocean isn't going to happen for 100 years. It is so far north, it is so inhospitable. It is in total darkness for several months each year, and the North Pole itself is in 4,000 metres of water. There's some symbolic value attached to this, but in terms of practical value, resolving the issue with the Russians now would be a very sensible thing.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Mr. Poelzer, I understand you had the opportunity to observe recent Canadian Forces exercises near Iqaluit. Could you share your experiences and any recommendations that may have come out of that?

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You have 30 seconds, please.

[Prof. Greg Poelzer]

Thank you very much for the question.

Yes, it was Operation Nanook last year. It was Arctic sovereignty exercises involving a couple...[Technical Difficulty]...approach. So it involved multiple federal government departments, with the Government of Nunavut and local...[Technical Difficulty]....

The exercises we participated in involved both the coast guard--so the civilian arm--as well as the armed forces with both air force and naval.... It was quite impressive, frankly. As a Canadian you couldn't be but awestruck by the level of professionalism, the hospitality provided by the Canadian Forces personnel as well as the coast guard. It's something Canadians ought rightly to be very proud of.

What we have seen of the level of the current government's approach is absolutely on the right track in terms of upping the intergovernmental or the whole of government approach in dealing with both human security issues and environmental security issues.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Professor.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Bagnell.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

I have three questions. I'll put them all first, so you can get your answers in quickly.

Greg—if you don't take too long—you talked about the university. In Canada, universities are normally funded by the provinces. In fact, I talked to the University of Northern British Columbia in Prince George and asked them if the federal government put any money in, and they said no.

For Mr. Byers, I have two quick questions. One is in regard to the implications of losing our legal battle on the Northwest Passage and it becoming an international strait. Outline a bit the implications of the overflights that will then be allowed over the middle of Canada's Arctic. Secondly, Justin wants to know, related to the Northwest Passage, under our assumption that it's ours, our sovereignty, what we should be doing to enforce that sovereignty.

[Prof. Greg Poelzer]

On the university question, first of all, a big thank you, Larry. You've been one of the hugest supporters of the University of the Arctic historically. We couldn't be here today without the support and leadership you've provided. I want to make that note.

In terms of provincial and the equivalent territorial support, it's true that a lot of base funding for universities does come from the province. We would need to see that, obviously, from the territorial government, but university activities are heavily funded by the federal government. You can look at CFI grants or at the tri-council funding grants around research. Lots of infrastructure is paid for by the federal government. So I think there is a very important federal government role to play in a university that is north of 60. I think there's still a fiduciary responsibility constitutionally to the north, and there is certainly a fiduciary responsibility to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

On a practical level, the territories simply don't have the capacity to go it alone. It's going to require partnership with the federal government.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

Thank you. Those are a couple of very interesting questions about the Northwest Passage.

If the Northwest Passage becomes an international strait—that is, if the American legal position prevails—what are the consequences in terms of overflights, because it's not only an international strait for ships but also an international strait for the purposes of aircraft?

It just so happens that the Northwest Passage, as a corridor, is not very practical for civilian aviation, and Canada already allows civilian aviation to use our airspace in return for some pretty modest fees.

Ironically, the only consequence I can see is that those Russian bombers might actually do exercises through our Northwest Passage if the Americans succeed with their legal position. There's a terrible irony here, because Russia is the one country that actually explicitly supports Canada's legal position, because they have a waterway on their side of the Arctic Ocean that the Americans also maintain is an international strait and the Russians say, “No way; it's our internal waters.”

In terms of how to enforce sovereignty in the Northwest Passage, the best way, quite frankly, is to provide lots of good reasons for other countries and international shipping companies to accept Canada's jurisdiction. Let's provide world-class search and rescue. Let's provide world-class shipping charts. Let's provide really good icebreaking for commercial vessels. Let's provide port facilities so that if a vessel has a problem with its equipment, it can actually pull into a port and be safe from Arctic storms. Let's develop the Northwest Passage as a commercial waterway subject to Canadian jurisdiction, just like we developed the St. Lawrence Seaway a couple of generations ago to facilitate the use of that waterway under the umbrella of both Canadian and American sovereignty.

That's the true answer. Let's get our Arctic sovereignty by providing carrots rather than waving sticks. You have to have some sticks as well, but this investment in a Northwest Passage, a kind of Arctic gateway, is something that would make a huge difference today.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

I will give the floor now to Mr. Blaney.

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Lévis—Bellechasse, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bernier.

Before I put some questions to the two witnesses, I would like to mention a few things.

Your work, your research and the role you play already help to ensure Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. Your work is extremely important, and this is as true of the scientific research that you are carrying out with ArcticNet as it is of your efforts to set up a research and study centre in the High Arctic. This is much to your credit. The quality of your responses and the depth of your comments prove that your work will indeed be valuable to us.

My first question is for Mr. Poelzer.

Sir, of the three considerations, namely defence, the increase in regional capabilities and the sense of belonging and recognizing the North as a Canadian value, I want to focus on defence. I'd like to hear more from you about our requirements.

You spoke about being able to navigate in these waters and to ensure Canada's sovereignty in the High Arctic on a year-round basis. Somewhat more specific questions have been raised about the type of icebreaker Canada possesses.

Do you think it is important for Canada to have ships capable of navigating these waters twelve months of the year? What combination of vessels, of security, air surveillance and rescue services would you like to see in place?

I'll come back to Mr. Byers if I have any time remaining.

[Prof. Greg Poelzer]

From my perspective, if we're going to be a self-respecting country, ideally...we won't have it overnight but I think we need to have a year-round surveillance of the full extent of our territory. We aren't there yet. It won't come overnight, but that's the goal we should seek.

Our challenges, of course, are quite different from those of, say, Norway. They do have the benefit of the gulf stream, and their capabilities in terms of defence surveillance are a little less formidable. Russia does have similar challenges to Canada's. In my view, we should. If we're going to be a country from sea to sea to sea, we need that year-round capability. What is needed is a mix of surveillance capability on the defence, as well as search and rescue, and we aren't anywhere close to providing it as a country.

The situation in the north would not be tolerated whatsoever in the south, whether it be southern Ontario, southern British Columbia, or in the lower half of Alberta or other parts of Canada. It wouldn't be tolerated at all. We do need to have a very strong search and rescue capability in our north, and we do need, I would argue, permanent year-round Canadian Forces bases that have multiple capabilities. We don't have that. If you go by contrast and look at Alaska, and you look again at Russia, let alone the Nordic countries, those capabilities are there.

It's very important for Canadian Arctic sovereignty, and I'll come back on one point about Russia. I think Michael Byers is quite right. We do need to go to the fullest extent on the diplomacy route with Russia. With Russia, we cannot also be naive, either--I'm talking in general, about Russia's behaviour internationally. It doesn't always follow international norms. This is a big worry in Norway. They see the Russian bear resurging, and that is a concern.

So I think we always have to extend the diplomatic initiatives and strengthen those--I think that's vitally important and our best route--but we always have to back that up. In the international system, the effectiveness of search and rescue in terms of our credibility and in terms of surveillance of our north is vitally important, but so is defence. We need to have a presence in terms of defence, to have that credibility in order to assert our own Arctic sovereignty.

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Lévis—Bellechasse, QC]

Do I understand that the role of search and rescue would go to Defence, in your opinion, instead of the coast guard?

[Prof. Greg Poelzer]

No. It has to be a mix. There has to be a mix in looking for those kinds of efficiencies that have already been raised. The coast guard does excellent work around search and rescue and, to a certain degree, civilian surveillance, but inevitably you're going to need a very, very strong defence role. The logistical challenges in operating in an Arctic theatre are so immense that you do require a very strong backbone of defence capability.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you, Professor.

I will now give the floor to our last member, Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to continue on the topic of search and rescue. I do have to challenge Mr. Bagnell's analogy of a lifeguard in a pool. I mean, people don't decide to drown or not drown because there's no lifeguard or because there is one. Aircraft don't decide to crash or not crash because there are SAR assets there or not. It's a simple fact.

I would love to have the capacity to put aircraft in all kinds of bases across the north. I think we all would. Statistically, based on history, they would be very underutilized most of the time. Well over 95% of the SAR incidents happen in the south, not in the north.

There is the ultimate risk of the doomsday scenario of a major airliner crashing in the north. That's there for sure, but do we position all our assets or a disproportionate number of assets for that doomsday scenario? Or do we have strong plans, as we do with the MAJAID planning that the Canadian Forces has done, along with our allies, including the Russians, who are a significant part of that?

There are finite resources. If we took a Cormorant away from Gander, I'm sure Jack Harris would be all over us. We'd love to have the assets to do that. If we had support for funding that level of defence spending and if we had the people, I'm sure we'd do that. But I do have to challenge the wish to do all of this with limited resources and without the historical evidence to back up the need.